FutureWARTHINK 024: Giant Seaplane Transports: Avoid D.O.T.G. by Being @ SEA
BREAKING NEWS! USSOCOM Suddenly Wants Amphibious C-130s, GMTA, huh?
QUOTE:
The U.S. military, as a whole, has been exploring concepts of operations in recent years that focus heavily on being able to operate from austere and remote areas with very limited infrastructure in the event that large, established bases are destroyed or are otherwise unavailable.
****
Globalist Treason Set to Ruin Amerika
1. Dingbat CCP-kontrolled
illegal POTUS Hoe Xiden invites CHICOM take-over of Taiwan
New Morally-Sound,
America-1st Defense GeoStrategy Needed
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxTZ870RJAc
2. NSA 47 Fatal Mistakes include a
FIREPOWER-obsessed USAF monopolizing air power development and tasks:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwK9jWbkBxQ
a. The U.S. ARMY SHOULD
HAVE ITS OWN GIANT KIWI-POD SEAPLANE TRANSPORTS to win wars by MANEUVER not
rely on the disinterest Douhet USAF with its break-bulk transports monopolized
to their FIREPOWER fantasies like having them drop palletized missiles before
transporting the ARMY. Seaplanes by the many untraceable places they can be operated from can avoid D.O.T.G.
Expect the ARMY to be left
high & dry like Bataan/Corregidor in WW2 when the USAAF lost air supremacy
and the USN naval supremacy; HISTORY SET TO REPEAT because the morons in charge
DO NOT change for the better; they change to STAY THE SAME
https://www.bitchute.com/video/Dj5R6CiGNsJf/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NffuYy7b4SI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qNUWcn7NvE
Seaplanes & Special Operations Commandos: We Once Had Them--Time To Regain Them
The essences of underwater warfare is while you can hide, the water also slows you down to around 30 mph so crossing the vast ocean distances of the Earth is slow/tedious requiring you to be already close by the action--or you FLY to cover the distance THEN swim which cries out for SEAPLANE TRANSPORTS that we once had but only the wise Russians., Japanese and Chinese have them today excepting some small SeaWolf Amphibians (SWAs) in SEAL use which need folding wings, sensors, weaponry and water-proof containers for carry aft of a submarine's main sail.
"The Silent Enemy"
https://www.bitchute.com/video/giUDl9U3bik3/
www.combatreform.org/thunderballfromunderthesea.htm
www.combatreform.org/seaplanetransports.htm
https://www.bitchute.com/video/6RWXY4nhgsiI/
How are we going to fix this?
HerkuSKIs (Modify our C-130Js with Pantobase skis)
https://www.bitchute.com/video/eKTba4TLtjVJ/
Or swallow some PRIDE and COTS BUY either 500 mph fast Russian seaplane amphibians and/or severe sea state-capable Japanese 400 mph propfan US-2s. Smaller Canadian CL-415 turboprops are an option, too.
Mother ships are needed to refuel/rearm and mobile "base" large LRASes.
https://www.bitchute.com/video/bRP2D88Fj1dw/
Submarines can be covert small seaplane carriers as the Japanese proved in WW2.
www.combatreform.org/submasrineaircraftcarriers.htm
H.I. Sutton's web site is THE world-standard reference to stay up-to-date with frogman warfare.
If you want to focus on WW2 and current COPP and RM Commandos our FB page is on it:
https://www.facebook.com/coppheroes.org/
b. The U.S. ARMY SHOULD
HAVE ITS OWN TACTICAL CAS AND Air Defensive AIR FORCE like thrust-vectored
canard F-20V TigerSharks MUDFIGHTERS operated from remote
camouflaged locations via ground mobility--General Brown's 4.5 GEN,
non-stealthy fighter-bomber like the SAAB Gripen with DOWNWARD POINTING autocannon for dive-less ground attacks...
https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2021/03/currentwarthink-004-usaf-snake-bit-by.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oRNsu_SGfRM
A-10s should be transferred
to the ARMY; upgraded with folding wings and 2nd seat enlisted JTAC observer
(emergency pilot) downward-pointing autocannon, to be their MUDFIGHTERS.
Observation/Attack planes to
HUNT and find the enemy for the MUDFIGHTERS:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sR51NY8NDE4
ALL of the above proposed in
our 2016 U.S. ARMY Joint Global Response Force (JGRF) Book:
c. The separate service, selfish,
perpetually-inept, malignantly tribalist, narcissist USMC is yet another
potentially-fatal NSA 47 mistake.
If the USMC wants to play WOKETARDED WHEELED Rocket Korps Coastal Defense--and not end up as Asian prisoners-of-war ala Wake Island they better have a means to get to remote naval passage blocking positions--AND out when SHTF and DoD's FIREPOWER-centric out-of-touch-with-physical-realities fantasies kollapse:
https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2021/02/future-warthink-021-weaponized.html
https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2020/08/currentwarthink-003-fast-landing-ship.html
If USMC wants to win the shell game and not get incinerated by pervasive surveillance and precision strikes that can terrain firepower saturate they need to be in all-terrain mobile TRACKS--not easy-to-kill, air-filled rubber tire wheels:
https://www.bitchute.com/video/bwtsqckiAIdZ/
d. USAF Fantasy & Horrors: MENTAL BLOCK Against Folding Wings and Ground-Mobile; Tofflerian Mental Gadgetry
Refusal to make TacAir Fighter-Bombers Ground-Mobile by FOLDING WINGS:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sslc0gkxcGg
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtiss_SB2C_Helldiver#US_Army_and_US_Marine_Corps_service
Built at Curtiss' St. Louis
plant, 900 aircraft were ordered by the USAAF under the designation A-25A
Shrike.[19] The first ten aircraft had folding wings, while the
remainder of the production order omitted this feature.
https://twitter.com/clark_aviation/status/1283763320802213888
Surplus to the USAAF by 1943, some went to the
RAAF, who rejected all but ten!
****
Mental Tofflerian Bureaucratic Electronic Gadgetry Set to Fail Under Real War Conditions--AGAIN:
In the test of the Great
War, efforts to coordinate ground and air forces jumped forward, and by 1918,
German schlachtfliegern were capable of strafing trenches and disrupting
the fire of artillery batteries behind the lines in order to support
infiltration attacks by “stormtroopers” filtering through the Allied
defensive lines. All-metal monoplanes equipped with crew-protecting armor
[Note USAF's proposed armored A-10 replacements are UNarmored] and
rudimentary communications foreshadowed the opening stages of the next war
twenty years later, but the result in 1918 was a general revulsion towards war,
underwritten with pacifist commitments to never again repeat the mistakes of
the Great War.
As a result, when
American infantrymen found themselves pinned down under the still-intact guns
overlooking Omaha Beach, they were unable to call upon the thousands of Allied
aircraft sitting just across the Channel in their English bases. Although
each assaulting Regimental Combat Team (brigade) had an attached [UNarmored,
dismounted] Air Support Party (ASP) equipped with VHF radios for contacting
supporting fighters, they could not control the aircraft directly. The ASPs had
to first relay their request to a ship just offshore, which then relayed the
request to the Allied Combined Air Control Center at Uxbridge for approval.
Unfortunately, the communications network broke down. V Corps made only
six requests for air support on the morning of D-Day, preferring to use the
more responsive and effective naval gunfire support provided by destroyers just
off the beachhead, especially after the [UNarmored, tankless] ASPs suffered
heavy casualties on the beaches. The 9th Air Force headquarters at Uxbridge
received only thirteen requests all day. A few aircraft managed to attack the
German defenders, but did so without direct communications with the ground
forces. As Lewis laments, “the air forces were incapable of improvising
success from failed plans. They were too poorly trained in direct support of
ground forces.”[11]
****
http://defensenews.va.newsmemory.com/
04/12/21
‘IF WE CAN CHANGE, WE CAN WIN’
An U.S. Air Force war game shows what the service needs to hold off — or win against — China in 2030
BY VALERIE INSINNA
vinsinna@defensenews. com
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force repelled a Chinese invasion of Taiwan during a massive war game last fall by relying on drones acting as a sensing grid, an advanced sixth-generation fighter jet penetrating the most contested environments, cargo planes dropping pallets of guided munitions and other novel technologies yet unseen on the modern battlefield.
But the service’s success was ultimately pyrrhic. After much loss of life and equipment, the U.S. military was able to prevent a total takeover of Taiwan by confining Chinese forces to a single area.
Furthermore, the air force that fought in the simulated conflict isn’t one that exists, nor is it one the service is seemingly on a path to realize. While legacy planes like the B-52 bomber and newer ones like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter played a role, many key technologies featured during the exercise are not in production or even planned for development by the service.
Still, the outcome was a marked improvement to similar war games held over the last two years, which ended in catastrophic losses.
The Air Force’s performance this fall offers a clearer vision of what mix of aircraft, drones, networks and other weapons systems it will need in the next decade if it hopes to beat China in a potential war. The performance of those items in the game could influence fiscal 2023 budget deliberations.
China is “iterating so rapidly, and I think that forces us to change,” said Lt. Gen. Clint Hinote, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategy, integration and requirements. “If we can change, we can win.”
A ‘hard target’
Air Force officials talked about the classified war game’s results with Defense News in March, just months before the service releases its fiscal 2022 budget — its first spending request under the new Biden administration.
In similar war games held in 2018 and 2019, the Air Force failed disastrously.
The 2018 exercise involved an easier scenario in the South China Sea where the ser vice fielded a force similar to what it now operates; but it lost in record time. The following year, during a Taiwan invasion scenario, the Air Force experimented with two different teams of aircraft that either operated inside of a contested zone or stayed at standoff distances to attack a target. The service lost, but officials believed they were closer to finding an optimal mix of capabilities.
The findings helped determine what the Air Force fielded for its 2020 war game — played out by the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability team — over a two-week period.
One breakthrough moment, Hinote said, occurred at the start of the game. When the officer in charge of commanding the “red team,” which simulated China, looked out at the playing field, he initially declined to invade Taiwan. China considers the self-governing province of Taiwan as its sovereign territory, and has vowed to unite it with the mainland.
“The red commander looked at the playing board and said: ‘This is not rational for China to initiate an invasion, given this posture that I’m facing,’ ” he said.
But the Air Force wasn’t going to end the war game before it even started and so the red commander pushed forward with an invasion anyway.
For the exercise, the Air Force made several assumptions that the U.S. military and its partners will be successful in overcoming specific fiscal and technological challenges between now and 2030.
For example, in the service’s version of the future, the U.S. military had implemented its Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept, which would allow the armed services to send data among their previously unconnected sensors and shooters. This meant the Air Force had fielded its Advanced Battle Management System, which could work with networks and communications technologies procured as part of the Navy’s Project Overmatch and the Army’s Project Convergence efforts.
In addition, Taiwan had successfully increased defense spending as outlined by President Tsai Ing-wen, who has called for buying drones, electronic warfare equipment, M1A2 Abrams [heavy] tanks and F-16V fighter jets, as well as upgrading to its Patriot missile defense system, according to Reuters.
The U.S. Air Force also fought with a notional force that allowed it to operate different technologies that are not currently in its budget plans.
In addition, before the conflict started, the Air Force took steps to disaggregate both its operational footprint and its command-and-control structure. It made investments to remote air fields across the Pacific region — fortifying and lengthening runways as well as pre-positioning repair equipment and fuel — so that forces could deploy to those locations during a war instead of main operational bases. This approach is something the service calls “agile combat employment.”
“We tried to design ourselves where we would be a hard target. As an example, we never filled up any air field more than 50 percent, so even if you lost that entire airfield, you wouldn’t lose your entire fleet,” Hinote said.
Finally, instead of separate command organizations for the land, maritime and air domains, the Air Force created small command-and-control teams comprised of five to 30 individuals from each of the services. Team members could oversee the battlespace and direct forces using portable technology, such as handheld tablets.
“You would pass off the command of your forces, and in a way that meant that you were not ever knocked out of the fight,” Hinote said. “They could knock [Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii] out of the fight. In fact, they do almost every time we play this. But what they can’t do is they can’t knock out every command-and-control element that you have out there.”
Now, what has emerged as a result of the game is a list of what the Air Force thinks it needs to win a war after 2030.
Tactical aircraft
The air power community has been divided in recent years over how to replace the Air Force’s aging tactical aircraft fleet while ensuring there are enough advanced fighters to battle the likes of Russia or China.
Should the service move for ward with its plan to eventually [SOMEHOW] replace the [ARMORED] A-10, F-16 and some F-15C/D aircraft with stealthy fifth-generation F-35s? Or could a mix of F-35s and new fourth-generation jets like the F-15EX give the service more flexibility?
This disagreement heightened in February, when Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown floated the idea of designing a less expensive, non-stealthy follow-on fighter to replace the service’s oldest F-16s, instead of replacing them with the F-35, as had been planned for decades.
The service is evaluating its options through a tactical aircraft study that will inform the fiscal 2023 budget and could result in cuts to the Air Force’s program of record for 1,763 F-35As.
“We don’t have to make that decision this year,” Hinote said. However, he added, the roles each aircraft played during the war game could influence the outcome of the study “to a great degree.”
In the war game, four types of aircraft made up the Air Force’s future fighter inventory. Three of those are ongoing programs of record for the service:
• The [FANTASY] highly advanced Next Generation Air Dominance air craft, or NGAD, and its associated systems, which were capable of penetrating highly contested airspace.
• The LockheedMartinSikorsky-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which operated as a “workhorse” aircraft attacking targets at short ranges.
• Boeing F-15EX aircraft, which mainly conducted defensive missions but were also loaded with long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons to strike targets farther downrange.
Finally, the service operated a non-stealthy, light, tactical fighter for homeland and base defense, which could also be flown in support of counter terrorism missions. That aircraft, which aligns with Brown’s idea for a “fourth-generation plus” replacement for the F-16, doesn’t currently exist in the budget plans.
For years, Air Force officials have portrayed the F-35 as the aircraft that it would use to infiltrate into enemy airspace to knock out surface-to-air missiles and other threats without being seen. However, in the war game, that role was played by the more survivable [FANTASY] NGAD, in part due to the F-35’s inability to traverse the long ranges of the Pacific without a tanker nearby, Hinote said.
Instead, the F-35 attacked Chinese surface ships and ground targets, protected American and Taiwanese assets from Chinese aircraft, and provided cruise missile defense during the exercise. But “it’s not the one that’s pushing all the way in [Chinese airspace], or even over China’s territory,” Hinote said.
Notably, the F-35s used during the game were the more advanced F-35 Block 4 [FANTASY] aircraft under development, which will feature new computing equipment known as “Tech Refresh 3,” enhancements to its radar and electronic warfare systems, and new weapons.
“We wouldn’t even play the current version
of the F-35,” Hinote said. “It wouldn’t be worth it. … Every
fighter that rolls off the line today is a fighter that we wouldn’t even bother
putting into these scenarios.”
Drones and more drones
Much of the Air Force’s legacy drone inventory — such as the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper and Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk — operated in combat during the 2000s and 2010s across the uncontested battlespaces of the Middle East, where U.S. adversaries could not present significant electronic warfare or counter-air capabilities. But a war with a competitor like China some 30 years later requires more advanced and survivable [FANTASY] drones.
For the war game, the Air Force relied on a mix of systems that are either under development or not currently sought by the service’s acquisition arm.
[FANTASY] Autonomous “Loyal Wingman” drones flew alongside penetrating fighters in contested zones, providing additional firepower and sensor data to human pilots. Hinote pointed to Australia’s Loyal Wingman aircraft, which is produced by Boeing and flew for the first time in February, as an “impressive” capability that the U.S. sought to mirror in its war game.
Across the Taiwan Strait, the service operated a mass of small, inexpensive drones that formed a mesh network. Although they were mostly used as a sensing grid, some were outfitted with weapons capable of — for instance — hitting small ships moving from the Chinese mainland across the strait.
“An unmanned vehicle that is taking off from Taiwan and doesn’t need to fly that far can actually be pretty small. And because it’s pretty small, and you’ve got one or two sensors on it, plus a communications node, then those are not expensive. You could buy hundreds of them,” he said.
In the second island chain, the Air Force operated low-cost attritable drones out of installations such as Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. These aircraft, like the Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie currently undergoing tests by the service, delivered ordnance against ships, aircraft and ground-based targets. Attritable drones are cheap enough that combat losses can be endured by commanders.
Even farther out, the service flew a notional [FANTASY] successor to the RQ-4 Global Hawk, which Hinote said would not survive a conflict with China in the mid-2030s.
Instead of concentrating on ISR, the Air Force primarily used the RQ-4 replacement as a long-range communications node, sometimes outfitting it with more exquisite radar that can track moving, airborne targets. Hinote likened the platform to an unmanned version of Australia’s E-7A Wedgetail aircraft.
“You’re using the huge aperture in there and all the power that’s there, but it’s crewed by people on the ground somewhere else,” he said. “It’s kind of a transition from where we are today to the future. You can’t do that with the E-3 [airborne early warning and control plane]; it’s just too old of an aircraft.”
Bombers, tankers and airlift
Neither China nor the United States resorted to nuclear weapons during the war game — a consequence, Hinote said, of being able to present a credible threat to China that the U.S. has the arsenal necessary to retaliate. However, the B-21 and B-52 bombers played active roles, providing conventional firepower during the scenario, with the B-21 penetrating contested zones and the B-52 remaining at standoff distances.
Once the simulated fight began, it became difficult for the Chinese and U.S. militaries to conduct airlift missions within range of each other’s missile threats. That made it critical for the U.S. Air Force to be able to pre-position food, water, medical supplies and the equipment needed run an airfield — including aircraft parts, fuel and weapons — at the locations from which it plans to operate, Hinote said.
Even though airlift assets like the C-17 and C-130 couldn’t transport cargo or people to the fight in the early days of the conflict, the aircraft still played an offensive role by launching [FANTASY] palletized munitions that are bundled together with a guidance package and airdropped from a plane. “One interesting thing about possible war with a peer competitor is you’re pretty agnostic as to where the fires come from; you just need the fires,” Hinote said. “I don’t want to give the impression that we’re going to create bombers out of every C-17 out there. But in certain phases of a campaign like this, you really need the extra missiles.”
A full complement of KC-46 tankers fulfilled the aerial refueling mission during the scenario, but were kept out of high-threat environments.
The Air Force also experimented with notional next-generation tanker designs to understand trade-offs between fielding many small tankers capable of refueling many aircraft at a time versus operating large tankers that can carry a massive amount of fuel.
“We’re hoping that that’s going to help us as we think about what is the next step in air refueling. Do we just go buy more KC-46s? Do we look at some other type of tanking concepts and try to create a capability around that?” Hinote wondered. “I don’t have an answer for that yet because the excursions were somewhat inclusive, and they depend on a lot of things that you’re making decisions on now,” such as the mix of fighters and bombers.
What happens now?
The outcome of the war game was a [FANTASY] United States victory, where the U.S. Air Force helped rebuff the Chinese military from taking over Taiwan. But any U.S. fight with a nation-state like China has the potential to be catastrophic for both countries.
The United States and Taiwan suffered high levels
of attrition during the exercise, with an even higher rate of casualties among
Chinese forces. Hinote declined to share exact figures due to the
classification of the exercise, but said the Air Force incurred losses an “order
of magnitude” lower than those projected by the ser vice in its 2018 war
game.
“The force that we had programmed, say, in 2018 took devastating losses. This force doesn’t take those devastating losses,” Hinote said. “They do take losses. We do lose a lot of airmen. It is a difficult fight.
“And that kind of gets to the point of what does it take to stand up to China in the Indo-Pacific, literally on their front doorstep. And the answer is: It takes a willingness to be able to suffer those losses. It’s just a difficult, very sobering reality that we have.”
The service plans to take its findings to Capitol Hill to gain the support of lawmakers. Brown, the Air Force’s top general, has indicated that programs could be canceled and legacy aircraft retired as the service seeks to revolutionize its technology.
But as Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense budget expert with the American Enterprise Institute, wrote in a March report, Congress has repeatedly rolled back the service’s plans to cut its existing force structure.
During the war game last fall, the Air Force invited lawmakers to help shape the exercise and interpret the results, hoping to pave the way for its narrative to gain traction on Capitol Hill.
“We’re trying to help people see the future, what it might look like, the types of choices it would take” to win a war, all keeping in mind “the evidence-based possibility that if we were able to change, we probably wouldn’t have to fight,” Hinote said. “And that’s a reason to change.”
DN
PIC: A formation of one Chinese HY-6 tanker and two J-10 fighters fly over Beijing during a military parade on Oct. 1, 2019.
****
Semper Airborne!
James Bond is REAL.
Comments
Post a Comment