Future WARTHINK 033: Precision Directed Munitions: WW2 Style & Today

 

The FUBAR U.S. Navy is about to be out-ranged by enemy 1700 km range-reach, MACH 10 speed, DF-21 Theater Ballistic Missiles SINKEXing our handful of Super and Amphibious Carriers, leaving the TIN CAN surface fleet without air cover.

Funny how when the DoD is caught with its pants down, it detracts from enemy air-filled, rubber-tired crap vehicles but not its own Humvee, Stryker, JLTV, AMWHEELs' inability to go cross-country at-will. Be consistent, liars.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DF-21

The Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21; NATO reporting name CSS-5 - Dong-Feng (simplified Chinese: 东风; traditional Chinese: 東風; lit. 'East Wind') is a two-stage, solid-fuel rocket, single-warhead medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) in the Dong Feng series developed by China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy. Development started in the late 1960s and was completed around 1985–86, but it was not deployed until 1991. It was developed from the submarine-launched JL-1 missile, and is China's first solid-fuel land-based missile. The U.S. Department of Defense in 2008 estimated that China had 60-80 missiles and 60 launchers;[7] approximately 10-11 missiles can be built annually.[8]

Originally developed as a strategic weapon, the DF-21's later variants were designed for both nuclear and conventional missions. It is thought able to carry a high explosive and submunition warheads, as well as a nuclear warhead of 300 kt. The latest DF-21D was said to be the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21 has also been developed into a space-capable anti-satellite weapon/anti-missile weapon carrier.

Though the launcher itself is mobile to reduce vulnerability, an actual launch unit requires support vehicles that can cover a 300×300-meter area, making it hard to move quickly and easier to detect. Also, the wheeled launcher is not made to travel off-road and requires solid ground when firing to prevent backblast and debris damage due to the hard launch, restricting its firing locations to roads and pre-made launch pads.[9]

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As a desperation counter-measure, F-35B jump jets lightly AAM-armed should be placed on the fan tails of our TIN CANs in place of a crapola MH-60R helicopter that can't air defend.

www.combatreform.org/seaplanefighters.htm

Trying to fight surface naval actions without air cover has been a real disaster for the USN in WW2; watch "In Harm's Way".

https://www.ebay.com/itm/391886703150

The IJN's Long Lance torpedo directed by their cruiser-launched seaplanes at night was a PDM that was tragically devastating until 1944 when our mass-produced, USN escort carrier aircraft, long-range seaplanes and USAAF fighters & bombers started darkening the skies so the enemy surface ships couldn't get within 40 km launch range.  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_93_torpedo

The Type 93's development (in parallel with a submarine-launched model, the Type 95) began in Japan in 1928, under the auspices of Rear Admiral Kaneji Kishimoto and Captain Toshihide Asakuma. The torpedo design was inspired by the British oxygen-enriched torpedoes used on the Nelson-class battleships. At the time, the most powerful potential enemy of the Japanese Navy was the United States Navy's Pacific Fleet. The U.S. Navy's doctrine, presuming an invasion by Japan of the Philippines (an American commonwealth at that time), called for the battle line to fight its way across the Pacific Ocean, relieve or recapture the Philippines, and destroy the Japanese fleet. Since the IJN had fewer battleships than the U.S. Navy, it planned to use light forces (light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) to whittle down the U.S. Navy's fleet in a succession of minor battles, mostly at night. After the number of American warships was sufficiently reduced, the IJN would commit its own presumably fresh and undamaged battleships to finish off the U.S. remnants in one huge climactic battle. (This was essentially what the U.S. Navy's "War Plan Orange" expected.)

The Japanese Navy invested heavily in developing a large, heavy, and long-range torpedo, the Type 93. Torpedoes were the only weapon that gave small warships, such as destroyers, the potential to cripple or sink battleships. The IJN's torpedo research and development focused on using highly compressed oxygen instead of compressed air as the fuel oxidizer in the torpedo's propulsion system. These torpedoes used an otherwise normal wet-heater engine burning a fuel such as methanol or ethanol. Since air is only 21% oxygen (and 78% nitrogen), pure oxygen provides nearly five times as much oxidizer in the same tank volume, thereby increasing torpedo range. In addition, the absence of the inert nitrogen resulted in the emission of significantly less exhaust gas, comprising only carbon dioxide, which is significantly soluble in water, and water vapor, thus greatly reducing tell-tale bubble trails.

Compressed oxygen is dangerous to handle and required lengthy research and development, not to mention additional training for the warship's torpedomen, for safe operational use. Eventually, the IJN's weapons development engineers found that by starting the torpedo's engine with compressed air, and then gradually switching to pure oxygen, they were able to overcome the problem of explosions that had hampered it before. To conceal the use of pure oxygen from the ship's crew and any potential enemy, the oxygen tank was named the secondary air tank. The pure oxygen torpedo was first deployed by the IJN in 1935.

The Type 93 had a maximum range of 40 km (44,000 yd) at 70 km/h (38 kn) with a 490 kg (1,080 lb) high explosive warhead. Its long range, high speed, and heavy warheads provided a formidable punch in surface battles. In contrast, the U.S. Navy's standard surface-launched torpedo of World War II, the 53 cm (21 in) Mark 15, had a maximum range of 14,000 m (15,000 yd) at 49.1 km/h (26.5 kn), or 5,500 m (6,000 yd) at 83 km/h (45 kn), with a significantly smaller 375 kg (827 lb) warhead; torpedoes of other Allied nations did not have longer range. The Type 93 was launched from 61 cm (24 in) torpedo tubes mounted on the decks of IJN destroyers and cruisers; some Japanese destroyers, unlike ships of other navies, mounted their banks of torpedo tubes in turrets offering protection against splinters, and had tube loaders. The IJN armed nearly all of its cruisers with Type 93 torpedoes.

In the early surface battles of 1942–43, Japanese destroyers and cruisers were able to launch their torpedoes from about 20 km (22,000 yd) at the unsuspecting Allied warships attempting to close to gun range. The Allied warships expected that, if torpedoes were used, they would be fired from not more than 10 km (11,000 yd), their own typical torpedo range. The many torpedo hits suffered by Allied warships in such engagements led their officers to believe torpedoes had been fired by undetected Japanese submarines operating in concert with the surface warships. On rare occasions, stray Type 93s struck ships at a much longer range than their intended targets, leading the Allies on occasion to suspect their ships had been mined. The capabilities of the Type 93 went mostly unrecognized by the Allies until examples were captured intact in 1943.

While the Type 93 torpedo was dangerous to its user as well as its intended target, the Imperial Japanese Navy felt that its effectiveness outweighed its risks.[4] During the course of the war, 23 Allied warships were sunk after Type 93 hits: 11 cruisers, 11 destroyers, and one fleet aircraft carrier. Thirteen of these had been fatally hit solely by the Type 93, with the rest succumbing to a combination of bombs, gunfire, and torpedoes.[9]

Battle of the Java Sea:

Dutch destroyer HNLMS Piet Hein 19 February 1942 by IJN destroyer Asashio

Dutch cruiser HNLMS Java 27 February 1942 by IJN cruisers Haguro and Nachi

Dutch cruiser HNLMS De Ruyter 27 February 1942 by IJN cruisers Haguro and Nachi

Dutch destroyer HNLMS Kortenaer 27 February 1942 by IJN cruiser Haguro

More specific: actions at Sunda Strait, entailing the hunting down of Allied stragglers by the IJN:

British cruiser HMS Exeter (68) 1 March 1942 by IJN destroyer Ikazuchi

Australian cruiser HMAS Perth (D29) 1 March 1942 by IJN cruisers Mogami and Mikuma

American cruiser USS Houston (CA-30) 1 March 1942 by IJN cruisers Mogami and Mikuma

Battle of Savo Island:

9 August 1942 by IJN cruisers Chōkai, Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, and Furutaka:

U.S. cruisers USS Quincy (CA-39), USS Vincennes (CA-44), and USS Astoria (CA-34) 9 August 1942

Battles of Solomons/Tassafaronga/Guadacanal/Kolombangara/Ormoc Bay/Santa Cruz Islands/Vella Lavella:

Destroyer USS Blue (DD-387) 22 August 1942 by IJN destroyer Kawakaze

Aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8) 26 Oct 1942 by IJN destroyers Akigumo and Makigumo

Cruiser USS Atlanta (CL-51) 13 November 1942 by IJN destroyer Akatsuki

Destroyer USS Barton (DD-599) 13 November 1942 by IJN destroyer Amatsukaze

Destroyer USS Laffey (DD-459) 13 November 1942 by IJN destroyers

Destroyer USS Walke (DD-416) 14 November 1942 by IJN destroyers

Destroyer USS Benham (DD-397) 14 November 1942 by IJN destroyers; later scuttled by USS Gwin (DD-433)

Cruiser USS Northampton (CA-26) 30 November 1942 by IJN destroyer Oyashio

Destroyer USS Strong (DD-467) 5 July 1943 by IJN destroyer Niizuki

Cruiser USS Helena (CL-50) 5 July 1943 by IJN destroyers Suzukaze and Tanikaze

Destroyer USS Gwin (DD-433) 12 July 1943 by IJN destroyer

Destroyer USS Chevalier (DD-451) 6 October 1943 by IJN destroyer Yugumo

Destroyer USS Cooper (DD-695) 3 December 1944 probably by IJN destroyer Take[10]

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Semper Airborne!

James Bond is REAL.