FutureWARTHINK 034: The Mahan-Delusional U.S. Navy Refuses to Employ SFB Swarms, Botches SFA Swarms

 

At the turn of the century, it was realized that the Precision Directed Munition (PDM)--at 1st the torpedo--could be launched by short-range, Small Fast Boats (SFBs) and sink long-range, Big, Ocean-Going Ships (BOGSes) of the Mahan 300x-cruisers-to-dominate-the-world mentality. The long-range, Japanese Long Lance torpedo surprised and severely damaged the USN in WW2 battles--but was deliberately and quickly forgotten as an embarrassment--when it should have been a learning/emulation event. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_93_torpedo

The Type 93's development (in parallel with a submarine-launched model, the Type 95) began in Japan in 1928, under the auspices of Rear Admiral Kaneji Kishimoto and Captain Toshihide Asakuma. The torpedo design was inspired by the British oxygen-enriched torpedoes used on the Nelson-class battleships. At the time, the most powerful potential enemy of the Japanese Navy was the United States Navy's Pacific Fleet. The U.S. Navy's doctrine, presuming an invasion by Japan of the Philippines (an American commonwealth at that time), called for the battle line to fight its way across the Pacific Ocean, relieve or recapture the Philippines, and destroy the Japanese fleet. Since the IJN had fewer battleships than the U.S. Navy, it planned to use light forces (light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) to whittle down the U.S. Navy's fleet in a succession of minor battles, mostly at night. After the number of American warships was sufficiently reduced, the IJN would commit its own presumably fresh and undamaged battleships to finish off the U.S. remnants in one huge climactic battle. (This was essentially what the U.S. Navy's "War Plan Orange" expected.)

The Japanese Navy invested heavily in developing a large, heavy, and long-range torpedo, the Type 93. Torpedoes were the only weapon that gave small warships, such as destroyers, the potential to cripple or sink battleships. The IJN's torpedo research and development focused on using highly compressed oxygen instead of compressed air as the fuel oxidizer in the torpedo's propulsion system. These torpedoes used an otherwise normal wet-heater engine burning a fuel such as methanol or ethanol. Since air is only 21% oxygen (and 78% nitrogen), pure oxygen provides nearly five times as much oxidizer in the same tank volume, thereby increasing torpedo range. In addition, the absence of the inert nitrogen resulted in the emission of significantly less exhaust gas, comprising only carbon dioxide, which is significantly soluble in water, and water vapor, thus greatly reducing tell-tale bubble trails.

The Type 93 had a maximum range of 40 km (44,000 yd) at 70 km/h (38 kn) with a 490 kg (1,080 lb) high explosive warhead. Its long range, high speed, and heavy warheads provided a formidable punch in surface battles. In contrast, the U.S. Navy's standard surface-launched torpedo of World War II, the 53 cm (21 in) Mark 15, had a maximum range of 14,000 m (15,000 yd) at 49.1 km/h (26.5 kn), or 5,500 m (6,000 yd) at 83 km/h (45 kn), with a significantly smaller 375 kg (827 lb) warhead; torpedoes of other Allied nations did not have longer range. The Type 93 was launched from 61 cm (24 in) torpedo tubes mounted on the decks of IJN destroyers and cruisers; some Japanese destroyers, unlike ships of other navies, mounted their banks of torpedo tubes in turrets offering protection against splinters, and had tube loaders. The IJN armed nearly all of its cruisers with Type 93 torpedoes.

In the early surface battles of 1942–43, Japanese destroyers and cruisers were able to launch their torpedoes from about 20 km (22,000 yd) at the unsuspecting Allied warships attempting to close to gun range. The Allied warships expected that, if torpedoes were used, they would be fired from not more than 10 km (11,000 yd), their own typical torpedo range. The many torpedo hits suffered by Allied warships in such engagements led their officers to believe torpedoes had been fired by undetected Japanese submarines operating in concert with the surface warships. On rare occasions, stray Type 93s struck ships at a much longer range than their intended targets, leading the Allies on occasion to suspect their ships had been mined. The capabilities of the Type 93 went mostly unrecognized by the Allies until examples were captured intact in 1943.

During the course of the war, 23 Allied warships were sunk after Type 93 hits: 11 cruisers, 11 destroyers, and one fleet aircraft carrier. Thirteen of these had been fatally hit solely by the Type 93, with the rest succumbing to a combination of bombs, gunfire, and torpedoes.[9]

Battle of the Java Sea:

Dutch destroyer HNLMS Piet Hein 19 February 1942 by IJN destroyer Asashio

Dutch cruiser HNLMS Java 27 February 1942 by IJN cruisers Haguro and Nachi

Dutch cruiser HNLMS De Ruyter 27 February 1942 by IJN cruisers Haguro and Nachi

Dutch destroyer HNLMS Kortenaer 27 February 1942 by IJN cruiser Haguro

More specific: actions at Sunda Strait, entailing the hunting down of Allied stragglers by the IJN:

British cruiser HMS Exeter (68) 1 March 1942 by IJN destroyer Ikazuchi

Australian cruiser HMAS Perth (D29) 1 March 1942 by IJN cruisers Mogami and Mikuma

American cruiser USS Houston (CA-30) 1 March 1942 by IJN cruisers Mogami and Mikuma

Battle of Savo Island:

9 August 1942 by IJN cruisers Chōkai, Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, and Furutaka:

U.S. cruisers USS Quincy (CA-39), USS Vincennes (CA-44), and USS Astoria (CA-34) 9 August 1942

Battles of Solomons/Tassafaronga/Guadacanal/Kolombangara/Ormoc Bay/Santa Cruz Islands/Vella Lavella:

Destroyer USS Blue (DD-387) 22 August 1942 by IJN destroyer Kawakaze

Aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8) 26 Oct 1942 by IJN destroyers Akigumo and Makigumo

Cruiser USS Atlanta (CL-51) 13 November 1942 by IJN destroyer Akatsuki

Destroyer USS Barton (DD-599) 13 November 1942 by IJN destroyer Amatsukaze

Destroyer USS Laffey (DD-459) 13 November 1942 by IJN destroyers

Destroyer USS Walke (DD-416) 14 November 1942 by IJN destroyers

Destroyer USS Benham (DD-397) 14 November 1942 by IJN destroyers; later scuttled by USS Gwin (DD-433)

Cruiser USS Northampton (CA-26) 30 November 1942 by IJN destroyer Oyashio

Destroyer USS Strong (DD-467) 5 July 1943 by IJN destroyer Niizuki

Cruiser USS Helena (CL-50) 5 July 1943 by IJN destroyers Suzukaze and Tanikaze

Destroyer USS Gwin (DD-433) 12 July 1943 by IJN destroyer

Destroyer USS Chevalier (DD-451) 6 October 1943 by IJN destroyer Yugumo

Destroyer USS Cooper (DD-695) 3 December 1944 probably by IJN destroyer Take[10]

****

Now fast-forward to today's 50 mph BOGS-killer made in Japan:

Hayabusa-class, a good example of missile boats' function in the blue water navies

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PRepPNMLyLU

The Battle Against The Earth (TBATE)

The minimum ship size to make headway in Sea State 5 bad weather is 1, 500 tons. Boats/Ships less than 500 tons can cross oceans in good weather--if they have the fuel. The obvious answer is to dominate naval battles with Anti-Ship Missile (ASM)-equipped SFB swarms brought across oceans--if you have to--by mother BOGSes. If you just need close-to-home defense, operate SFBs from there using covert bases & ambush tactics. The Finns don't cross oceans conquering other nations so they don't have mother ship BOGSes--but have the world's best under 300-ton SFBs which are stealthy, can destroy surface ships, subs, aircraft and land targets...compare what they achieve to the USN's grudgingly-made PC Cyclone ships.

Hamina-class missile [235 tons] boat, the protector of the Finnish coasts

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhCZ8WenTTw

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclone-class_patrol_ship

Without justification, the USN top date has rejected mother BOGSes to launch & recover SFB swarms--but were/are AOK with Small Fast Aircraft (SFA) swarms--as long as they come from a tiny handful of overly-large, ego-gratifying capital ships aka the fleet super (stupid) carrier mentality that has fatally-infected them.

www.combatreform.org/midwaymyth.htm

The Battle Against Man

Naval warfare should be about battle-winning effects--the swarms--but since battle is a rare occurrence, the 99.9% daily peaceniking reality takes precedence: the BOGS ego trip. What hasn't happened YET is the USN having its ass royally kicked by swarms like the Japanese did to the Russians at sea in 1905 which is akin to what the Finnish ski/bicycle troop and MUDFIGHTER aircraft swarms did to the Soviet Red Army on air/land in WW2 (1939-44). 

https://www.bitchute.com/video/eXYBu0DFe9SZ/

https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2021/03/currentwarthink-004-usaf-snake-bit-by.html

However, any U.S. successes in WW2 by torpedo SFB swarms are easily concealed within the larger context of the USN's Mahanian BOGS delusions--thank God for John Wayne's "They were Expendable" in 1945 (Donna Reed such a sexy babe-factor!), "In Harm's Way" and "McHale's Navy" in the 1960s reminding Americans that SFBs even exist. 

The Ideal Naval SFB/SFA Swarm Maker

The good news is that the USN can fix this Mahan mess quickly by building 100x BOGS SFA/SFB motherships with retracting superstructure and a 300-foot long, flight deck with Vertical Launch System (VLS) missile cells with a ski jump based on the Fast 30 mph landing ship made in Australia called the SLV. The SLV should be design for the USMC's Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Coastal Defense Force (CDF) lander like the Japanese had to use fast destroyers to land troops after losing air supremacy to land-based USAAF aircraft, USN long-range seaplanes and ultimately over 100+ small escort aircraft carriers made from civilian ships in WW2. The USN hates the escort carrier so much they made certain the American people wouldn't know about them by scrapping every single one not leaving at least 1x as a museum to honor the men who died winning WW2 with them. Disgusting playing of bureaucratic favorites. 

100x motherships depending on SFB size, delivers 600x sensor-shooters for a total of 700x--exceeding the unlikely 300x BOGS goal @ $2B each. The non-bureaucratic racketeering nemesis of SFBs have been aircraft--ponder the Osa Class anti-ship missile boats sunk by subsonic USN A-6 Intruders from stupid carrier motherships before the former could get into ASM launch position in Gulf War 1 or the Japanese Rufe/Jake small seaplane fighters from tender motherships and lagoon bases vs. our PT boats in WW2.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsLBL30hGag

As good as the Finnish stealthy SFBs are, they can't dominate Over-The-Horizon (OTH) because they don't have aircraft to make 1st destructive contact with the enemy beyond their line-of-sight/sense--not even drones right now. SFBs need their own SFA swarms that can project out in all directions; not just a helipad for a few hours of fuel-hungry, inefficient helicopter--but more efficient, folding-wing seaplanes. The SFB's mothership can operate fighter-bombers of the same types that will be lost when the stupid carriers are destroyed; a 300x foot long, ski jump on top is the minimal length to STOVL (F-35B) or STOBAR (F-35C) operate naval fighters and small patrol seaplanes--another USN bureaucratic Cinderella budgetary threat to their stupid carrier BOGS mania;

www.combatreform.org/seaplanefighters.htm     

The BOGS mothership would have a retracting superstructure, 300-foot slick deck with ski jump, and could be named an "Aircraft Battle Frigate" (ABF) or Cruiser (ABC) capable en masse of projecting SFA swarms in lieu of super carriers likely sunk by enemy hypersonic weapons using air drone and/or space satellite targeting. ABFs/ABCs would be over 1, 500 tons to proceed against even Sea State 5 bad weather (TBATE) and well-armored at over 20, 000 tons to withstand PDM direct hits (TBAM). It's stern ramp when flooded can deploy not only several SFBs like ASM-armed Mark VI patrol boats the USN brass want to discard--but also stealthy from space/air observation, tracked tanks like M113A4 Super or A6 Amphibious Gavin (waterjets) light amtracks with 30mm autocannon/ATGMs to create both land and sea swarms. CH-53K King Stallion heavy lift helicopters can each internally carry then airland, Roll-On, Roll-Off (RO-RO) deliver a Gavin and its crew & dismounts at 150 mph; hundreds of miles deep inshore to form the CDF and/or conduct punitive raids with USN SEAL commandos, U.S. ARMY Rangers or USMC Raiders. ASMs on a towed trailers or tracked chassis can also air/sea deploy from ABF/ABC motherships.   

Each ideal SFB can also launch & recover a SFA like a small, folding-wing, high sea state-TOL-capable seaplane like the SeaWolf Amphibian (SWA) using towed sea mats & cranes to dominate the air/sea/land battlespace around them. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7sXfCo22Vo

The Finns should be contacted to make a longer SFB with seaplane operational sterns.  

The reasoning that the USMC LAW can somehow hide amongst civilian container ship traffic during the pre-war movements is not ruined by a ski jump; "Q" ship techniques proven in WW1/WW2 like decoy folding ISO shipping containers can be erected to look the part of container ship--but rapidly removed for war.  

Other Fleet Salvation Desperation Measures...

The USN is in deep trouble and doesn't know it. 

A Maritime Escort Force (MEF) of F-35B jump jet pilots/crews must deploy and VTOL operate on every USN surface ship TIN CAN ASAP in place of a crapola MH-60 SeaHawk helicopter that can't assert air superiority--SINCE THE STUPID CARRIERS WILL BE DESTROYED AS SOON AS THE WAR BEGINS. 

Do you want air cover or not?

STFU. 

This will take more time, but Attack Patrol Blimps (APB) must integrate with TIN CAN destroyers that can provide continuous 24/7/30 day OTH Airborne Early Warning (AEW) & ASW/ASuW patrolling.  

https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2021/06/tactismart-066-put-out-apb-attack.html

Long-Range Amphibious seaplanes (LRAs) must be purchased to effect LR ASW and CSAR capabilities.

www.combatreform.org/p6mseamaster.htm

Small seaplanes with folding wings must replace crap helicopters on every surface ship. 

The future of military VTOL is the TILT-WING--not the helicopter dead end--but we don't have 10x years and $10B to get them. 

Summary/Conclusions: A Blue & Brown Water Synergistic Force

The small combatant naval warfare approach need not be a bureaucratic threat to Blue Water BOGSes--but a synergistic force multiplier--100x ABFs/ABCs each with twin 8-round VLS missile cells (1600x PDMs); each launching 6x AFBs multiplies into 600x combatants for a total of 700x; if each SFB has 2x ASMs this adds 1200x PDMs for a total of 2800x direct hits upon sea, air or land targets--a battle-winning effect. The ABFs/ABCs organic SFAs and SFBs with water jet propulsion and shallow draft enables them to hunt & destroy enemy SFBs who wrongly think they can run & hide in the littorals. 

When not acting as a SFB mothership, ABFs/ABCs can act as armed transports to air/sea deliver land maneuver swarms; though U.S. ARMY Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) should have their own fast LSTs configured exactly like the ABFs/ABCs with ski jump flight decks, VLS cells etc. so they can fight their way in/out and not rely on some other bureaucracy providing a function necessary for mission accomplishment and survival.  

Semper Airborne!

James Bond is REAL.