RetroWARTHINK 026: Light Bicycle Infantry By-the-Book
The following concepts are beyond the limited I.Q.s and
retarded imaginations of civilian and military normie, coward-pussies to
comprehend--let alone be kinetic participants in.
Light Bicycle Infantry (LBI) can be termed "Bike Infantry + 20/100".
Bicycle Infantry that can organically go 20 mph for
100 miles in a day.
Light MECHanized Bicycle Infantry (LMBI) or MECHANDOs are infantry with quadphibious
(land, sea, air, space) light tracked tanks or "MECHbike Infantry +
40/300".
MECH Bicycle Infantry that can organically go 40 mph
for 300 miles a day.
Light AEROMECHANIZED Bicycle Infantry (LAMBI) or AEROMECHANDOs are infantry with quadphibious
(land, sea, air, space) light tracked FLYING tanks with AERO units or embedded
flight means aka AeroGavins or "AeroMECHBikeInfantry +
100/100"
AeroMECH Bicycle Infantry that can organically go 100
mph for 100 miles a day.
Light ASTROMECHANIZED Bicycle Infantry (LASTROMBI) or ASTROMECHANDOs are infantry with
quadphibious (land, sea, air, space) light tracked astronomical tanks that can
go into space on top of booster Action Reaction Rockets (ARR) and parachute
after re-entry from space or inside stealthy aerospaceplanes launched into
space by their own powers (SSTO), a mother aircraft 1st stage or ARR rocketry
aka AstroGavins. or "AstroMECHBikeInfantry + 15k/15k"
AstroMECH Bicycle Infantry that can organically go
inter-continentally 15,000 mph for 15, 000 miles in a hour, anywhere in
the world.
BICYCLE COMBAT
Current police/security bicycle patrol use is increasing. An Overton Window exists in this arena.
Unfortunately, the current DoD civilian & military
mind is "wheeltarded" with sexy-looking trucks that are
high-ground-pressure, road/trail-bound and easily ambushed/destroyed in a space
satellite and air drone, C4ISR 720 degree, Non-Linear Battlefield (720 NLB).
DoD collectively hasn't yet realized the land Forward Operating Base (FOB) is
also untenably DEAD in the face of 1 CEP direct hit, Precision Directed
Munitions (PDMs) and Terrain Firepower Saturation (TFS) fires that cover entire
map represented grid squares. FYI, a command-detonated land mine is a PDM--not
a DoD buzzword to hide system incompetence leading up to a current troop
murdering/maiming fiasco: "IEwhatever". A roll of toilet paper
is an "Improvised Hygienic Device" (IHD) according to DoD
stupidliethink. Professionals call DoD's myriad of BSes plural military
malpractice.
https://jamesbondisreal.blogspot.com/2021/03/spythink-052-retrowarthink-018-play.html
www.combatreform.org/highexplosives.htm
Technologies already exist to make low-ground-pressure,
bicycle tires flat & fire-proof aka French company, MICHELIN's TWEELs and Japanese company, Bridgestone's
whatever similar product--but both greed-driven, corporations have yet to offer
a 29" or 20" diameter, 4" wide airless tire for bikes that
traverse loose sand/snow. We guess our $$$ money isn't green enough for them?
Narrow 2" wide, at most, air-filled tire bicycles have
been war-winning successful yet the limited western military mind of today
hasn't grasped this precedent nor the possibilities for Light Bicycle Infantry
(LBI) like police/security organizations have for their professional fields of
public/private service.
www.combatreform.org/militaryvehicles.htm
The Swiss Army unwisely retired their bicycle corps which had modern 7-speed, 2" wide tire, militarized bikes & towed carts capable of carrying all light infantry weaponry (rifles, machine guns, rockets, missiles, mortars) etc. wounded Soldiers, and supplies/equipment at 20+ mph for a daily 100 mile range reach not requiring any combustion fuel resupply. Their Field Manual (FM) or manuals for their bicycle troops are probably the best Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, Equipment, Environment & Enemy (TTPE3) experiential base for a modern LBI force to start with. More on this later.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FkjpDZ1O4C0
The optimal LBI would be light air-sea-space
mechanized centered on say an upgraded M113A4 Super Gavin, light
(under 20 tons) tracked, quadphibious (air, land, sea, space) tank with
combat-overmatching 30mm autocannon, Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) firepower
on a Remote Weapon System (RWS) as "mother vehicle" with which
to move across long distances with C4ISR-evasive camouflaging, under
passive/active armor and mechanical combat engineering, fortification digging
dozer blades/back hoes protection, give scouts time/place to stretch legs/rest
aka sleep, take showers/change clothes to not need fatally vulnerable FOBs.
Folding, 4" TWEEL airless tire eBikes stored in external Super Gavin storage
racks would be used for short-range scouting ahead of the mother track and/or
KILLER BEE swarm effects. Each ebike would have a front handlebar, automatic
PDW and some 2-seaters for a rear gunner to prevent the can't-fire-back phobia
scorners whine about to reject LBI--as if they never heard about bounding or
continuous OVERWATCH TTPE3? TTPE3 for a MECHANDO unit like this
doesn't yet exist--but we can certainly write one.
Winning: the Most Significant Bicycle Combats to Date:
1958-75: North Vietnamese Army (NVA) bicycle
resupply infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the face of constant U.S.
air strike interdictions during the Vietnam War
1939-1944: Finnish Bicycle Infantry vs. Soviet
Russian Red Army success
1941: German Radfahrtruppen success during
Operation BARBAROSSA invasion of Soviet Russia
1942: Japanese General Yamashita's Force seizure
of Malaya/Singapore vs. U.K. British Army
1942: British Paras Jumping Folding BSA bikes & Capturing a German Coastal Defense Radar aka Bruneval Raid
1944: D-Day extensive U.K. British Commandos BSA
folding bicycle use enabled them to go deeper inland than the hapless,
foot-slogging, General Percy Hobart combat engineering "funnies"
tank-less Americans re: "Saving Private Ryan" from whiny Jewish
Israelite, never-been-in-any-military-or-police-unit, civilian normie pussy,
Steven Spielberg. Love his breasty wife, Kate Capshaw. Stop the ethnic
inferiority complex whining, Steven and we'd like you a lot more too.
www.combatreform.org/sappertanks.htm
https://www.bitchute.com/video/9JqHPFKJv3LP/
https://www.bitchute.com/video/HwlwSC2zJ6mt/
https://www.bitchute.com/video/tHwdmBcBjrgf/
1898: Cuban Riots Put-down by U.S. ARMY LT Moss's 25th
Bicycle Corps
1917: German 2nd Infanterie Cyclist Brigade
Bicycle Infantry with LTA Zeppelins! help in Russia during World War 1;
triphibious warfare
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Albion
6x LTA airships
102x HTA combat aircraft
24,500x Soldiers
Ground Forces
42nd Division
2nd Infanterie Cyclist Brigade
https://www.amazon.com/Operation-Albion-Conquest-Islands-Twentieth-Century/dp/0253349699
QUOTE:
"Their success was due, at least in part, to the
abilities of people like Volkmann, a General Staff officer who, trying to
figure out how German forces might beat the Russians to a strategically crucial
causeway, hit upon the idea of landing troops mounted on bicycles closer to
the cause‐way than the primary landing force, a plan that met with great success."
https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=23754
Michael B. Barrett. Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands.
Twentieth-Century Battles Series. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2008. x + 298
pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-253-34969-9.
Reviewed by Jesse Kauffman
Published on H-German (March, 2009)
Commissioned by Susan R. Boettcher
On October 12, 1917, an amphibious German invasion force of some 25,000x troops, 350x ships and boats, and more than 80x aircraft began a complex, ambitious attack on a group of islands clustered in the eastern Baltic. Their location made the islands a tempting strategic prize. To the south lay the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, control over which was crucial for turning Germany's northeastern European conquests into bases for drives further into Russia. On the north side of the islands, the entrance to the Gulf of Finland opened the sea route to St. Petersburg. The German high command also hoped that, in addition to control over this territory, the invasion would deliver a final, crushing blow to the Russians, whose government so plainly teetered on the edge of complete collapse. By October 16, the largest of the islands, Ösel, was in German hands; a few days after that, the Germans were the masters of the smaller Moon and Dagö as well. More than 20,000 Russians were taken prisoner.
This was Operation ALBION, an audaciously named, almost entirely forgotten Russo-German clash whose story is told so well by Michael B. Barrett in this excellent new book. Barrett begins by giving a brief summary of both the Russian and German strategic situations in 1917. He then provides rather more extensive coverage of German planning for ALBION and Russia's defensive plans for the Baltic region before moving on, in chapter 6, to the main event, the battle itself. A brief but rather poignant epilogue, which sketches the post-war fate of the battle's major figures, brings the narrative to a well-crafted close.
Throughout the book, Barrett successfully sustains his initial commitment to covering both sides of ALBION, which is a major achievement. He draws heavily on both German and Russian archival military records (with the latter collected and translated by a research assistant, Elizaveta Zheganina), as well as a novel, Die Roten Streifen (1938), and its excerpted and condensed version, Unternehmen Ösel (1940), written by a German participant, Captain Erich Otto Volkmann.
Barrett tells his story in the style of classic battlefield history, with generals, admirals, and colonels maneuvering their forces, reacting to unforeseen events, and thinking and arguing their way through tactical problems. As is often the case, this approach is both a strength and a weak‐ness. Thanks largely to Barrett's mastery of his sources and his clear, fluid writing, the narrative is absorbing and flows smoothly. It is complemented by good maps, which are indispensable in a book of this sort, as well as a number of well-chosen photographs. Barrett's knowledge of the technicalities of warfare at this time is superb and extends to naval operations; his description of the terrifying process of sweeping for mines by means of a towed cable will not soon be forgotten by anyone who reads it. If one shortcoming affects his general organization of the book, it is that chapter 9, on the naval battle, while engagingly written (and enlivened by some truly extraordinary pictures), is poorly integrated with the rest of the book and somewhat awkwardly restarts the narrative.
The work is also slightly flawed by its focus on senior commanders. Officers below the rank of colonel rarely appear, while the opinions and impressions of common Soldiers and Sailors are almost entirely absent. As a result, the narrative can be a little too arid and bloodless; when a German shell causes a Russian fort to explode, for example, Barrett notes this fact and moves on without comment. The reader is left to imagine for himself what sort of horrific carnage such an event might have caused. On the few occasions when Barrett does work to imagine his way beyond the upper reaches of the command structure, the results are not entirely satisfying: "On board UC-58," he writes at the beginning of chapter 1, "every Sailor held his breath" (p. 1). This is probably true, but it is the sort of sweeping, imaginative statement with which historians tend to be uncomfortable.
Nonetheless, Operation ALBION is an enlightening book and well worth a read. Beyond its central contribution--what it tells us about the specifics of the operation--two subthemes that runthroughout the narrative are worthy of close attention. The first concerns the Imperial German way of war (though Barrett himself does not put the matter this way). Historians have made numerous attempts to define just what, if anything, this might be. Some have emphasized the Germans' tactical flexibility and their officer corps' embrace of improvisation and innovation. Ample support for this view is found in Barrett's analysis. The German military, he points out, had neither a tradition of nor real experience in joint-service warfare or amphibious operations. With a nod to Gallipoli, Barrett points out the difficulty of such assaults. Yet, after about a month or so of preparation, the Germans carried off just such an attack. Their success was due, at least in part, to the abilities of people like Volkmann, a General Staff officer who, trying to figure out how German forces might beat the Russians to a strategically crucial causeway, hit upon the idea of landing troops mounted on bicycles closer to the cause‐way than the primary landing force, a plan that met with great success.
At the same time, those who see something inherently pathological in the German way of war will find much here to support that view; the Germans, true to their strategic traditions, could not content themselves with figuring out how to ensure they beat the Czar's forces: "We must give the Russians a crushing blow," Major General Ludwig von Estorff, Volkmann's superior, told him. "It will not suffice merely to drive them from the island" (p. 100). Thus this obscure Baltic assault takes its place as one of the operations intended to realize the ideal of the Vernichtungsschlacht, the annihilating battle that seeks to inflict a mortal wound on the enemy in a single crushing engagement.
German strategy, however, was really only part of the reason why ALBION was a success. Perhaps the primary reason why the Germans carried the day, despite their inexperience in this kind of warfare, was the shocking state of the Imperial Russian armed forces on the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power, the second compelling subtheme of this book. The Czar's army and navy were nearly paralyzed by abysmal morale and poor officer-enlistee relations. "If you really want to, go and fight yourself," fleeing Russian Soldiers on Moon told a Russian colonel (p. 171), while on Ösel, crew members of a strategically crucial shore battery mutinied and abandoned their posts. Exacerbating matters, the March Revolution had left the military with an awkward and unwieldy command structure that consisted of two parallel authority structures, one left from the old regime and one, a system of councils, created by the revolution. It did not bode well for the islands' defense that on October 12, the day the invasion began, Admiral Razvozov, the Russian Baltic Fleet's Commander-in-Chief, had to pay a visit to the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (Tsentrobalt) to ask if it would, perhaps, lend its support to the fight. It is not surprising that such a force fought badly. It is extraordinary, however, that it fought at all, which it did, occasionally with distinction. The crews of the Czar's ships, Barrett notes, proved particularly reliable and managed to do their duty with skill and bravery.
Specialists in the history of the Great War and the operational history of any period, historians of Germany and of Russia, and anyone with a general interest in well-written military history will enjoy reading this book. In addition, those who labor to bring the struggles of the eastern front into the mainstream of Great War scholarship will have particular reason to feel grateful to Barrett for writing Operation ALBION. In the end, it is difficult to assess just what ALBION's larger significance was (though Barrett seems to say it encouraged the Bolsheviks in their schemes). It did not, and probably could not, change the course of the war. Barrett does, however, suggest at least one promising avenue for future research on ALBION's importance. After the war, the study of Operation ALBION was made a part of the curriculum of a few American military institutions that educated officers. Among their students: numerous commanders of American operations in the Second World War, including future Admiral "Bull" Halsey [EDITOR: bad example; a reckless idiot]. What sort of ties bind this now-forgotten Baltic clash and the epic struggles of the next war is a richly promising topic. The historian who eventually investigates it will owe much to Michael Barrett's fine book.
If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at
https://networks.h-net.org/h-german
Citation: Jesse Kauffman. Review of Barrett, Michael B. Operation ALBION: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands. H-German, H-Net Reviews. March, 2009.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=23754
BICYCLE TTPE3
Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
The romantic adventure movie, "Butch Cassidy
& the Sundance Kid" captures the turn-of-the-century, 1900s-ish
bicycle enthusiasm with the best, most iconic scenes are Paul Newman doing his
own bike stunt riding--with and without--the lovely Katherine Ross.
https://www.bitchute.com/video/C6UtI0E6wko2/
Cycle-Infantry
Drill Regulations
https://ia800303.us.archive.org/27/items/cycleinfantrydr00ordwgoog/cycleinfantrydr00ordwgoog.pdf
German Bike-Tank Synergism in WW2: Lessons for Today
"Time spent in reconnaissance is never wasted"
--Napoleon
The German Army of WW2 Is constantly bitched at by ignorant civilian
historians for doing WW2 with 2.75M horses. No one wants to see horses
destroyed and killed horribly in war. However, there was a REASON the German
Army employed horses: THEY ARE CROSS-COUNTRY-MOBILE and can SWIM ACROSS
RIVERS/LAKES that wheeled trucks and early, non-amphibious light tracked
tanks couldn't do.
Clearly, the German Army was EXCELLENT and usually found their enemies 1st by their cross-country-mobile & stealthy horse/bicycle reconnaissance "cavalry" and proceeded to kick ass from there.
Today, the 4" wide fat tire, ebike can go cross-country at will eliminating the need for horses. All horse lovers breath a sigh of relief. Low-ground-pressure M113A4 Super Gavin light tracked tanks should replace all crapola road/trail-bound wheeled vehicles and act as the mother vehicles for bicycle scouts to include armored "rafts" for them to cross rivers/lakes. M113A6 AmphiGavins with waterjets can go from ship-to-shore, too. Unpredictable cross-country and stealthy mobility is necessary for survival on 720 degree Non-Linear Battlefields (720 NLB) covered by 24/7/365 air/space drone surveillance that can be followed up with PDM/TFS fires.
The non-EM communications capabilities described below by using bicycle messengers should be retained today in light of the mere Iraqi enemy Direction Finding (DF) and hitting headquarters during the march to Baghdad in 2003.
NOTE: that 4" wide tire ebikes ARE "motorcycle infantry" scouts that operate in conjunction with light tracked tank "armor" aka mother vehicles.
UPDATES/CORRECTIONS in [
].
Important points in BOLDFACE.
Training Manual For the Cavalry
Scouts Out!
Hleeres-Dienstoorschrift 299/10
Draft
Training Manual For the Cavalry
Volume 10
The Reconnaissance Battalion (motorized)
The Reconnaissance Battalion (Partially Motorized)
Berlin 1939
The Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Army Directorate, Group 6 (Cavalry)
Berlin, 15 April 1939
I approve Volume 10 of the “Training Manual for the Cavalry”.
Von Brauchitsch
TABLE OF CONTENTS
[Deleted]
I. GENERAL REMARKS CONCERNING RECONNAISSANCE
1. Reconnaissance is intended to create a picture of the enemy as quickly, as completely and as reliably as possible. Its results form the most important basis for the measures taken by command and for the exploitation of the effects of weaponry.
2. Reconnaissance takes place at both the operational and tactical level from the air and from the ground. It is supplemented by the signals reconnaissance conducted by special means, the interrogation of prisoners, the evaluation of captured documents, statements made by the local populace, etc.
3. Operational-level reconnaissance provides the support needed for operational-level decisions. It concerns itself especially with monitoring the approach of the enemy and the movement of the enemy’s army forces.
4. Tactical reconnaissance provides the support needed for command and control and employment of the forces in the field. It is primarily concerned with the detailed determination of the enemy’s concentrations, his approach routes, his organization, his deployment and the extent of his forces in both depth and width.
The closer one gets to the enemy, the more the need for tactical reconnaissance to focus on details. Combat reconnaissance is to be initiated, at the latest, with enemy contact. It creates the prerequisites for the conduct of the fight. All branches are involved in it.
5. A deep view of what is going on in the enemy’s sector is not generally available through ground reconnaissance generally often only provides the direction in which it is to be conducted. In contrast, however, it is only ground reconnaissance that can generally determine without doubt whether certain terrain is clear of the enemy. It is only through prisoners, enemy dead and other means that conclusions can be drawn concerning — the enemy’s organization for combat; that contact can be maintained with the enemy; and details obtained concerning his actions, his strength and disposition and, occasionally, his combat worthiness. In addition, timely contamination of the terrain can be determined. Furthermore, it can also provide information when aerial reconnaissance is not possible or is only very difficult as a result of weather conditions or at night [EDITOR: TBATE: https://www.bitchute.com/video/6rCsPB6HkmZl/ ].
The forces mainly responsible for ground tactical reconnaissance are motorized reconnaissance battalions, horse-mounted reconnaissance battalions of the cavalry and the reconnaissance battalions of infantry divisions.
6. Motorized reconnaissance battalions are in a position to get reconnaissance information quickly and at great distances. It will not be able to always capture details, however. Its reconnaissance activities are normally conducted during the day; approach marches can be conducted at night. Its speed is usually determined by the use of roads.
The performance of a motorized reconnaissance battalion is dependent on the capabilities of its reconnaissance vehicles, on the availability of supplemental fuel, on the condition of the roads and trails, on the terrain, on the weather, on the time of day and, most of all, on the ability to use organic means of communications and exploit those available locally.
7. Horse-drawn reconnaissance battalions and the reconnaissance battalion of the infantry divisions have the advantage of greater mobility in the field and the ability to deploy to virtually all directions with horse-mounted riders and bicycles. They are more independent of weather, ground conditions [EDITOR: TBATE] and logistics than motorized reconnaissance battalions. Their march speed [EDITOR: 20 mph] and the ability to conduct marches are limited [EDITOR: compared to motorized units' 40 mph on roads]. They are in a position to observe the enemy from hidden vantage points, to establish a tight reconnaissance net and, even more importantly, to gather details when that is of importance.
8. High demands are placed on the leaders of the forces employed in the service of ground reconnaissance—all the way down to the patrol leader. The leadership qualities of the leader is the determinant of success. Cunning, skill, understanding of the mission, decisive movement and riding in all types of terrain, offensive spirit, resourcefulness in the field, to include at night, unflappability, rapid and independent actions must be expected. [EDITOR what today's lackluster WOKETARDs lack]
All of the leaders are responsible for insuring that contact gained with the enemy is maintained day and night inasmuch as it does not contradict their mission. Contact lost is to be regained immediately.
9. Good ground reconnaissance guarantees a certain degree of security for the troop formations that follow. The desire for security may not in general lead to giving security missions to reconnaissance battalions in addition to their reconnaissance missions. The freedom of movement necessary for conducting reconnaissance is restricted by doing that and the ability to conduct reconnaissance is hindered.
If the reconnaissance battalions have to be used for security on an exception basis, then they must be reinforced, if necessary, in a timely fashion. They will then be directed as to which mission has precedence. If necessary, the leader of the reconnaissance battalion will clarify the situation by asking for guidance. If forces are sufficient, the reconnaissance battalion will request special forces for every mission.
10. In addition to the mission, orders given to the reconnaissance battalion must normally contain: Movement time; Information concerning neighboring reconnaissance forces; reconnaissance sector or direction; reconnaissance objective; the limits of advance for patrols; Measures for submission of reports with information concerning intermediate objectives, whereupon a report is to be submitted after reaching them; report times, if warranted; conditions for possibly establishing contact with one another and with aerial reconnaissance; as well as move-out time, route of march and objective of the main forces.
Information concerning actions on enemy contact and the local populace can also be necessary.
11. The senior, common commander determines the manner in which contact is to be established between air and ground reconnaissance as well as between motorized reconnaissance battalions and the reconnaissance battalion of the infantry divisions.
Special directives need to be established for the transfer of reconnaissance activities of a motorized reconnaissance battalion that is pulled out of the line after the conclusion of its operational-level reconnaissance and the reconnaissance battalions of the infantry divisions.
12. No later than the onset of combat reconnaissance, it is to be determined whether the reconnaissance battalions in front are to receive orders to clear the front and reconnoiter on the flanks of the enemy or continue their previous reconnaissance activity, while holding important terrain features, and be passed through the lines by the main forces or fall back on to the main forces.
If the reconnaissance battalion receives no orders, then it remains to the front and continues to conduct its previous reconnaissance, screens the following main forces and does not fall back to them until forced by the enemy. The reconnaissance battalion of a division that has friendly forces to both sides will be taken behind the front after the completion of its mission.
II. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF THE RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS
13. The motorized reconnaissance battalion in an armor division consists of:
Headquarters with a signals section
Two armored reconnaissance troops
One motorized rifle troop
One heavy troop, consisting of a towed gun platoon, a towed antitank platoon and a motorized engineer platoon
Combat trains
Rations section
Light column
Baggage trains
In the case of the light divisions, the reconnaissance battalions are formed from the reconnaissance regiment.
14. The motorized reconnaissance battalion of a motorized infantry division consists of:
Headquarters with a signals section
One armored reconnaissance troop
One motorized rifle troop
Combat trains
Rations section
Light column
Baggage trains
15. The march performance of a motorized reconnaissance battalion is primarily dependant on the enemy situation
________________________________________________________________
1. Original Footnote: The organizations listed in paragraphs 13, 14 and 16
are illustrative only.
2. Translator’s Note: Troop =
company-sized formation in cavalry usage.
and the terrain. Whenever there is a lack of resistance, favorable terrain conditions and a ready source of fuel, a march performance of between 200 and 250 kilometers can be achieved by armored reconnaissance patrols and reconnaissance battalions. Average march speeds—as long as the enemy does not appear—can be considered to be:
—approximately 30 kilometers an hour for motorized reconnaissance battalions and
—approximately 40 kilometers [an hour] for armored reconnaissance patrols.
Speed decreases considerably whenever it is night or there is fog.
An armored reconnaissance troop can generally reconnoiter along a width of 25 kilometers.
16. The partly motorized reconnaissance battalion of an infantry division consists of:
Headquarters with a signals section
One horse-mounted troop
One bicycle troop
One heavy troop, consisting of a gun platoon, an antitank platoon and an
armored car light tank section
Combat trains
Ammunition and equipment section
Rations section
Baggage trains
17. The march performance of a partly motorized reconnaissance battalion is
primarily dependent on the enemy situation and the terrain. Whenever there is a
lack of resistance and the terrain is favorable, approximately 75 kilometers
can be covered by horse-mounted and bicycle patrols, approximately 200
kilometers for armored car tank patrols and from 50 to 60 kilometers can
be covered by the reconnaissance battalion proper. If the upper hand in the
reconnaissance area has to be forced through combat, then those figures are no
longer valid.
Average march speeds—as long as the enemy does not appear and the terrain is favorable—can be considered to be:
—approximately 6 kilometers an hour for the partly motorized reconnaissance battalions
—approximately 8 kilometers an hour for the horse-mounted patrol
—approximately 10 kilometers an hour for horse-mounted messengers
—approximately 12 kilometers an hour for bicycle patrols
—approximately 40 kilometers an hour for armored light tank car
patrols.
A troop is normally capable of reconnoitering along a width of 10 kilometers.
Ill. COMBAT OPERATIONS OF RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS
18. Dominance in the area of reconnaissance makes friendly reconnaissance easier, makes the enemy’s more difficult and hides the movements of friendly forces.
Dominance can only be achieved through offensive actions against the enemy’s reconnaissance.
Offensive actions by the reconnaissance battalion is therefore imperative during reconnaissance activities:
a) against enemy reconnaissance forces in order to prevent the enemy’s reconnaissance activity and allow friendly efforts to be conducted.
b) against enemy outposts that prevent the continuance of friendly reconnaissance.
19. Fixing the reconnaissance battalion in unnecessary fighting that calls into question the friendly reconnaissance mission is wrong.
20. Reconnaissance battalions must use opportune situations to ambush the enemy and damage him whenever doing so does not call the reconnaissance mission into question or whenever its reconnaissance activities are over.
Even in cases of enemy superiority, the reconnaissance battalion can obtain success by exploiting its maneuverability. This frequently allows limited-objective attacks against the wings, flanks and rear of the enemy with the element of surprise, the frequent repetition of attacks at different locations, the rapid concentration of forces to eliminate dispersed weaker enemy forces and the employment of elements as a mobile reserve or the launching of immediate counterattacks during the defense.
21. The leader of the reconnaissance battalion commits his combat forces in a concentrated fashion and using the element of surprise as much as possible so as to obtain success as quickly as possible. Frequently, reserves are to be dispensed with.
22. When executing the attack, the following must be differentiated: Whether the attack is to be against an enemy occupying a piece of terrain or against an occupied line.
In the first case, the goal must be to eliminate the enemy through envelopment.
Armored cars light tanks are well suited to surprise attacks against
the deep flanks and rear of the enemy.
In cases where an attack is conducted against a enemy-occupied line, the breakthrough is to be forced by sharply concentrating all forces at one point. The effort to determine opportune breakthrough points will be dispensed with if the enemy’s attention will be drawn to the effort too early.
A breakthrough through more strongly fortified enemy defenses can usually only be accomplished by reinforcing the reconnaissance battalion.
23. The order to attack must allow the intended conduct of the attack to be clearly identified. The issuance of the order must maintain the proper balance between the necessary unity of operations and the independence of the individual units and avoid inhibiting the rapidity and force of the attack by too detailed orders.
As a rule, orders are issued to the heavy weapons first so that the attack will not be delayed while waiting for their firepower and the element of surprise is lost.
24. If the attack does not make progress, it may become necessary to call off the attack and attack at another location by exploiting the element of speed.
25. If the pursuit cannot be initiated from the wing or the way there is too far, then it is to be initiated from the point of breakthrough.
The direction the pursuit is to be taken is to be selected in such a fashion that reconnaissance can be conducted at the same time against the withdrawing enemy force.
26. The mission or the actions of the enemy can force the reconnaissance battalion to temporarily transition to the defense. Its operations in defending or conducting a delaying action are then executed in accordance with its mission and the situation.
27. A reconnaissance battalion can only succeed in defending successfully on terrain that only allows the enemy a narrow frontage. The flanks of the reconnaissance battalion have to be secure through the terrain or other forces. It is generally recommended that a mobile reserve be formed. The reserve can be committed in defending against an enemy envelopment, in interdicting an enemy force that has penetrated into the main battle area or in tossing back an enemy force in an immediate counterattack.
28. The execution of a defense as a delaying action corresponds more to the nature of the reconnaissance battalion than the [deliberate] defense. It is especially important that the line of resistance is tied in to terrain that offers protection against armor. Armored cars are well suited for providing supporting fires and, in the case of weak enemy forces, to conduct immediate counterattacks. When disengaging from the enemy, they are often the last to remain in contact with the enemy.
29. In cases where the main forces are tied in to the defense on both sides, the reconnaissance battalion is generally pulled behind the front by the force commander as a reserve, if the closeness of the enemy prevents its employment in front of the lines. If necessary, it can be employed by the force commander as the final reserve.
In cases of delaying actions, disengagement from the enemy and retreat of the main forces, reconnaissance battalion are usually used as mobile reserves, whenever their employment is not needed for reconnaissance.
IV. CONDUCT OF RECONNAISSANCE BY MOTORIZED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS
ORDERS FOR RECONNAISSANCE
30. There is a difference between
General headquarters reconnaissance battalions
Reconnaissance battalions in armored divisions
Reconnaissance battalions in light divisions and Reconnaissance battalions in motorized infantry divisions.
31. Operational-level reconnaissance is conducted by general headquarters reconnaissance battalions. They receive their missions from higher command levels of the Army to which they are attached.
The width of the reconnaissance sector and the lead out front will be based on the situation and the mission.
32. The reconnaissance battalions of armor divisions, light divisions and motorized infantry divisions receive their missions from the division to which they are assigned. It is intended for them to deliver the information necessary to command and employ the respective divisions.
The width of the reconnaissance sector and the lead out front are determined by the situation and the mission.
33. The commander of the reconnaissance battalion orders the execution of the reconnaissance and the sending out of patrols.
34. The strength and organization of the patrols is based on the mission, the situation and the terrain. They should never be stronger than necessary to conduct the mission. As a minimum, however, they have to consist of at least two vehicles (including a radio vehicle).
35. There is a difference between
Heavy armored reconnaissance patrols (heavy armored tanks cars)
Light armored reconnaissance patrols (light armored tanks cars)
Mixed armored reconnaissance patrols (heavy and light armored cars)
Reinforced armored reconnaissance patrols (armored reconnaissance patrols with attached motorcycle infantry, engineers or elements of the senior command)
Motorcycle infantry patrols.
36. In general, the armored reconnaissance patrols are usually taken from an armored reconnaissance troop. Special circumstances, such as a wide reconnaissance sector or an extensive road network, can justify the initial employment of armored reconnaissance patrols from both of the armored reconnaissance troops.
37. In general, only few and weak patrols will be dispatched far from the enemy. The mission of this first wave of reconnaissance is to ferret out the enemy and determine his location in a specific area or to establish contact with enemy forces reported by aerial reconnaissance. ‘To that end, a scouting of only the most important roads and traffic nodes will generally suffice. To determine the location of the enemy force, his organization for combat and the actions of the enemy force that has been identified, the reconnaissance effort is to be intensified.
38. The situation and terrain determine whether the patrols will be dispatched from the assembly area of the motorized reconnaissance battalion or only after reaching a section of terrain further to the front.
The lead employed by the first wave of reconnaissance is to be measured by the distance to the enemy, the terrain and the range of the radio equipment.
39. Contact is maintained between the patrols and the leader of the motorized reconnaissance battalion by means of radio. When it is imperative to maintain radio silence so as not to betray the approach of the battalion, reports can be made by attached messenger vehicles and, if opportune, by means of the postal network.
40. The patrols will be assigned phase lines that have to be reported when crossed, even without enemy contact.
41. Information concerning the situation and terrain, results of aerial and other reconnaissance, mission and intent of the leader of the reconnaissance battalion precedes the [specific] oral orders to the patrol leaders. The providing of information concerning the situation is especially important and must indicate where initial enemy contact is expected and what type of enemy force is to be expected based on previous reconnaissance results.
42. The leader of the reconnaissance battalion then gives the patrol leader specific oral orders.
In general, the order to the patrol leader contains:
Leader, strength and organization of the patrol
Mission
Reconnaissance objective
Movement route of advance
Actions on reaching the objective (Maintaining contact with the enemy, reconnaissance into the depths of the enemy or return)
Location and time of patrol departure
Details concerning actions (differs depending on the situation and terrain), e.g, actions at certain terrain features or localities
The main things the patrol leader has to report are contained in the phrase “I want to know...”
43. When determining the time of departure, the time needed by the patrol leader for his preparations must betaken into consideration, even when the situation demands arapid dispatching of the patrols.
44. More than one mission to a reconnaissance patrol is to be avoided. To conduct demolitions, special-purpose forces are to be employed to which a reconnaissance patrol can be added during the advance.
45. Reconnaissance activities at nighttime are principally devoted to monitoring roads. Reconnaissance patrols that remain in visual contact with the enemy at night conduct their monitoring from covered and concealed positions (patches of woods, farm outbuildings etc.). Generally, they are relieved early in the morning before first
_______________________________________________________________
3. Translator’s Note: This may sound odd to American readers, but what is meant is telephonic reporting, since the post offices in all of the European companies held responsibility at that time for telephone communications and had the capacity in each post office to make telephone calls.
light. There is no purpose served in leaving reconnaissance patrols in visual contact with the enemy for several days without a break.
SECURITY ON THE MARCH
46. The motorized reconnaissance battalion organizes to provide security of the march in the advance guard and the main body. An armored lead element is to be provided in front of the advance guard and the main body. The establishment of a rearguard can also be necessary.
47. The size of the advance guard is based on the situation, terrain and size of the main body that needs to be screened. In case the advance guard needs to assume additional screening missions—establishing reconnaissance elements to the flanks; screening of road networks leading in from the flanks), those missions must be ordered.
Generally, the advance guard consists of the armored car troop, which established the first wave of reconnaissance forces, and from elements of the motorcycle infantry troop. Depending on the situation, it may be necessary to attach engineers and antitank elements.
Generally, the main body follows the advance guard at a time interval of 20 minutes. The terrain and weather conditions may dictate other intervals.
The lead elements move forward by bounds. The distance between them changes in accordance with the terrain.
48. Antitank defense is maintained by the armored cars light tracked
tanks with armor-defeating weapons [autocannon & ATGMs] and the [attached]
antitank forces. The light armored cars tanks with [30mm] automatic
cannon are especially well-suited for [manned and unmanned] antiaircraft
defense. If possible, all security measures are to be conducted so that the
units are not separated.
SECURITY WHEN RESTING
49. To secure resting elements and quarters, it is generally preferred to
use motorcycle infantry elements, which can be reinforced by antitank guns,
light infantry guns and engineers. As long as the situation allows it, the
armored car tank units that are part of the force are to be allowed
to rest.
50. Frequently, measures taken to allow observation and alerting of forces, the blocking of routes, the occupation of dominant areas with good fields of fire and the establishment of rapid means of communication are sufficient as security measures. Special attention must be paid to anti-armor defense. Obstacles make that type of defense easier.
In cases of weather-restricted visibility and at night, the security measures are to be intensified.
51. The security elements are to be established far enough away from the resting reconnaissance battalion that sufficient time is allowed for establishing march and combat readiness.
52. When close to the enemy, it is recommended to change the battalion’s location at the onset of darkness in order to avoid ambushes. Prior to first light, it can also be imperative to change locations.
53. Small localities and built-up areas off of the main routes are especially suitable for quarters.
In large localities, quarters are to be taken in a portion of the locality that is away from the enemy and easy to defend.
An increased alert status is often necessary. The security measures taken must be so thorough that an enemy ambush encounters a prepared defense and an enemy attack can be turned back or held up long enough for the battalion to attain combat readiness. To that end, rapid means of evacuation must be reconnoitered and established.
In enemy territory, the civilian populace in the quartering area must be denied every opportunity to communicate with the outside world. To that end, all means of communication and transportation must be rendered inoperable. It may also prove necessary to keep the assembled populace under guard in suitable areas.
MARCH AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES
54. The reconnaissance battalion establishes a reconnaissance reserve, reporting points and backup for its reconnaissance patrols. It moves forward by bounds. The length of the bounds is influenced by the closeness of the enemy and the nature of the terrain and its vegetation. As the distance to the enemy becomes closer, the length of the bounds is to be shortened.
Terrain that is anticipated to be clear of the enemy is to be crossed rapidly, generally by marching at night.
Uniform blackout measures taken by the vehicles during a night march must be established (dimmed or complete blackout).
55. The march column is to be formed by infiltration while moving. The battalion determines waypoints for the advance guard and the main body and establishes the times they are to be crossed by the lead elements.
56. The selection of the route of advance is based on the mission and the
situation. Generally, a road that allows the battalion to leave it rapidly
and reduces its visibility from the air is preferable to a road that goes
across open terrain or crosses natural obstacles that are easily blocked (sector of
terrains; bottlenecks). [EDITOR: BS. No such thing as a road/trail that doesn't
fatally expose everyone on it. A road/trail is a thin strip of OPEN TERRAIN.
This is fatally bad TTPE3]
57. The commander of a motorized reconnaissance battalion generally locates himself in the advance guard right behind the leader of the advance guard, since reports reach him rapidly and securely there and orders can be sent in a timely manner to the formations marching behind him.
58. Collocated with the battalion commander are generally the signals officers, the leader of the reconnaissance reserve and the commander of the heavy troop.
The reconnaissance platoon generally moves with enough of its elements in the advance guard (Ist section), so that necessary contact can be maintained with the reconnaissance patrols employed, with superior headquarters, with neighboring reconnaissance formations and within the march column proper. The remainder of the signals platoon remains with the main body.
59. The combat trains are integrated into the main body or follow the main body at a distance dictated by the situation. The combat trains can also be left behind at a secure locality and then called forward later on under cover.
Important considerations for incorporation of the combat trains or calling them forward later are the situation, the mission and, above all, the necessity for the secured delivery of ammunition and fuel.
60. The leader of the combat trains is responsible for the security of the trains. Depending on their distance from the battalion, motorcycle messengers must be attached to them.
If the combat trains are integrated into the main body, then the leader of the trains joins the trail element. (See Heeresdienstvorschrift 472 “Vehicle Regulations for All Branches”.) The trail element moves ahead of the rear-guard and has a vehicle equipped with towing equipment and armor mechanics.
61. Generally, the rations section and baggage trains—frequently the light column or elements of it as well—are left behind with security elements when the battalion conducts reconnaissance. ‘They are not brought forward until later.
If the light column follows the battalion, then it is to follow behind the combat trains.
62. Short halts serve to check vehicles and allow breaks. Halts can also be
necessitated by march requirements or the actions of the enemy. When there are
halts, the roads are to be cleared and cover taken from aerial
observation.
When halting, the advance guard also receives the mission of securing the
main body. In the latter case, direct security measures may also be necessary.
Short halts that occur in rapid succession tire the forces.
Rests are designed to resupply and rest the forces. They are to be planned ahead of time and not to last less than two hours. It may be useful to establish rests after reaching each intermediate objective.
63. Patches of woods or farmsteads off the road are suitable for intermediate objectives. Securing the intermediate objectives takes place in accordance with paragraphs 49-53. Measures are to be taken that so that friendly [STOL Grasshopper] reconnaissance aircraft can find the reconnaissance battalion.
The rest areas of the battalion must offer concealment from the air and allow evacuation in several directions.
64. The battalion commander should be located away from the vehicles but in such a manner that he can easily be found by messengers.
65. Incoming reports go to the commander of the reconnaissance battalion. He evaluates the reports and reports to his superior commander. Word-for-word forwarding of the received reports to the superior commander can be necessary in some cases.
At certain intervals, the commander of the reconnaissance battalion can provide a summary of the enemy situation to the superior commander.
66. Especially important reports can be submitted to the superior commander
by an officer if necessary, in an armored light tank car.
This is especially imperative whenever the situation has fundamentally changed from the original assumptions of the superior and radio silence has been ordered.
67. The preparation of reports is covered by the section in Heeresdienstuorschrift 500, Part 1, “Reporting,” Sections I-Til.
68. Information concerning the enemy is only of value if it reaches the commander in a timely manner. If information concerning the enemy is lacking, the reporting of the location of the reconnaissance patrol or the motorized reconnaissance battalion can be of importance to the superior headquarters.
69. Initial contact with the enemy is always to be reported, unless other orders have been issued. If possible, the strength and combat arm is to be indicated. It is especially important to report enemy movement and the direction of movement early to the superior commander.
70. Reconnaissance by patrols must be supplemented by additional information gained by other means. To that end, information can be gained in enemy territory by listening in on public telephone lines and by searching post offices, train stations and government buildings for militarily valuable correspondence. In addition, the radio transmissions of the enemy’s reconnaissance forces must be monitored whenever the friendly tactical and signals situation allows it.
In friendly territory, the official telephone network can be exploited for reconnaissance purposes. Telephonic contact will be established with the post offices that are pertinent for the upcoming mission and with the telephone locations that are important because of their location. Those locations are to be provided with the appropriate set-ups, so that they can work cooperate with the reconnaissance activity. It can be necessary for the reconnaissance battalion to occupy telephone centrals along its route of march, facilitating the transmission of reports and orders.
The estimate of the enemy situation can be supplemented by the statements of prisoners brought in and the content of captured written material. After a short interrogation of prisoners and after scanning written material, both are to be sent to the superior headquarters.
71. Frequently, the first employment of reconnaissance patrols will not suffice in sufficiently clarifying the enemy situation in the reconnaissance area or satisfying the missions assigned by superior headquarters. Intensifying reconnaissance efforts in the direction the enemy has been determined will often be necessary based on the initial reports. By means of increasingly focused individual missions that are given to subsequent reconnaissance patrols, which increasingly concentrate on details, the effort must be made to complete the picture of the enemy. When the enemy situation changes, it may be necessary to send out additional reconnaissance efforts.
The commander of the reconnaissance battalion must be prepared at all times for enemy countermeasures in the reconnaissance area of operations. If reports from individual reconnaissance patrols are not received and it is believed that they may have been lost after contact with the enemy, then the dispatching of new reconnaissance patrols will be necessary.
72. Reconnaissance patrols and reconnaissance battalions moving through friendly outposts when coming from the direction of the enemy are to slow their rate of movement and clearly provide the corresponding appropriate recognition signals.
When larger formations are moving through the lines and also at night, the friendly outposts are to be notified ahead of time to eliminate the possibility of mistakes and faulty recognition.
In addition, it may be prudent to also issue orders or make arrangements for passage points, certain actions or pre-arranged signals.
CROSSING OF BODIES OF WATER
73. Bodies of water must be crossed by reconnaissance battalions and their reconnaissance patrols quickly. To that end, available bridges are to be taken in a timely manner by the reconnaissance battalion or forces sent forward. [EDITOR: how about NO BRIDGES because their M113A4 Super Gavins or M113A6 AmphiGavins are amphibious light tanks?]
74. Attacking bridges along the main roads usually offers little chance for success. It may therefore be advisable to conduct preparations for a crossing at another place that is not defended or only weakly defended at the same time that a coup de main is attempted.
By pretending to cross at another place, the attention of the enemy can be diverted from the actual crossing point.At the same time, however, a splitting of forces is to be avoided.
75. If it is intended to use the engineer bridging materials that are brought along, then it is necessary to determine in a timely manner whether the construction of a bridge is necessary or whether ferrying should be employed. The leaders of the heavy troop and the engineer platoon are to be informed of the intentions of the battalion in a timely manner, so that they can start their reconnaissance early and make the necessary preparations based on the battalion orders.
76. It can be beneficial to [also] employ crossing materials for the rapid crossing of motorcycle infantry in addition to the construction of ferries.
77. The engineer platoon has the following capabilities:
1. Construction of a bridge 11 meters in length with a 5-ton capacity or
2. Construction and operations of 2 ferries (2 tons) or 1 ferry (4 tons)
3. Construction of a footbridge for motorcycle infantry
78. Based on the situation and the mission, the commander of the reconnaissance battalion decides whether the entire battalion or only reconnaissance patrols are to be crossed. Generally, if only reconnaissance patrols are crossed, then a crossing point for the return of the reconnaissance patrols must be held open.
79. All measures conducted for the crossing must be executed quickly to preclude the enemy time for bringing forward defensive forces.
80. Generally, in the case of broader expanses of water, if the entire battalion is crossed, which is only possible by the timely bringing forward of additional engineer equipment, then trains vehicles are generally to be left behind and under cover. In some situations, only the vehicles of the combat trains are to be crossed so as to provide the battalion with the necessary ammunition and fuel.
81. In order to rapidly continue reconnaissance on the far side of a river obstacle, it may be necessary to initially cross motorcycle infantry, who can be relieved by armored reconnaissance patrols later on.
RESUPPLY
82. The motorized reconnaissance battalion maintains 3.5 logistics packs in the vehicles in its combat trains and an additional three sets in the light column. Correspondingly, the reconnaissance battalion has a range of 600 kilometers with its basic load of fuel.
The careful monitoring and reporting of the consumption of fuel and ammunition is the duty of all leaders. The taking of fuel from fuel pumps in enemy territory is to be avoided, since it cannot be determined whether it has been rendered unusable.
83. The initial refueling of the combat vehicles takes place from the combat trains.
The combat trains replenish from the light column or directly from fuel points that the light column also uses that have been pushed forward by the commander, depending on the situation.
If the division is advancing at the same time, the unsecured portion of the resupply route is soon shortened considerably. In such a case, the resupply of the battalion will not encounter any significant difficulties.
It can frequently be necessary to protect the combat trains and the light column, including the use of armor-defeating weapons.
84. Ammunition, demolitions, rations and medical equipment are maintained in the combat trains of the reconnaissance battalion and the light column.
85. With regard to rations, the reconnaissance battalion carries an abbreviated portion for every man on its vehicles. An additional entire emergency portion is maintained by the field mess.
86. Rations section and baggage trains are consolidated by the reconnaissance battalion, just like the combat trains.
The rations section and the baggage trains may not disturb the movements of the reconnaissance battalion and the troop formations that follow it. It may be ordered by superior headquarters that they remain behind in the main battle area—either entirely or partially—and be moved forward to the reconnaissance battalion later on.[What if there is no MBA in 720 NLBs?]
87. For the care of the wounded and the sick, see Heeres-dienstvorschrift 21.
V. CONDUCT OF RECONNAISSANCE BY PARTLY MOTORIZED
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS ORDERS FOR RECONNAISSANCE
88. The reconnaissance battalion (partially motorized) is employed by the infantry division for tactical reconnaissance.
89. The reconnaissance battalion must receive orders in such a timely manner that it can achieve the necessary lead in front of the division without being precipitously hurried, unless the lead is already there as a result of its positioning. Likewise, mounted Soldiers and bicycle reconnaissance elements must have a lead that allows them time to conduct reconnaissance. In general, this should be no less than 1.5 hours. Increased march speed in order to obtain the necessary lead for the reconnaissance battalion in front of the division and for the reconnaissance patrols in front of the reconnaissance battalion fatigues the force and can only be required under special circumstances.
90. The commander of the reconnaissance battalion orders the execution of the reconnaissance and the sending out of patrols. If the division commander also dispatches reconnaissance patrols, he will inform the commander of the reconnaissance battalion of their missions.
If the commander of the divisional reconnaissance battalion is without orders or he unexpectedly is faced with a changed situation, he is then responsible for ordering or continuing reconnaissance that complies with the divisional commander’s intent on his own.
91. Prior to issuing orders, the commander of the reconnaissance battalion must be clear on the map on the advance route of the reconnaissance battalion and its intermediate objectives.
92. In situations, in which direct enemy contact is not expected and in which the reconnaissance battalion has a sufficient lead, the commander establishes the area to be reconnoitered as far as the day’s objective, using intermediate objectives in depth. The reconnaissance battalion proper moves along a march route that is known to the reconnaissance patrols. The objectives of the individual horse- and bicycle-mounted patrols are generally no more than 15 kilometers from that of the reconnaissance battalion, if they have not been provided with radio equipment.
By controlling the movement of the reconnaissance battalion and the reconnaissance patrols in this manner, the transmittal of reports is maintained the best. The horse and bicycle-mounted messengers can hurry back to the reconnaissance battalion, whose location is known, avoiding roundabout ways.
93. The commander of the reconnaissance battalion orders the number and type of reconnaissance patrols, as well as their strength and composition.
The number of patrols to be employed is based on the demands of the situation. The monitoring of the major roads of the area to be reconnoitered, especially the advance route of the division, must be assured. Sufficient reconnaissance reserves must be maintained.
94. Horse-mounted [EDITOR: and today, 4" wide tire bicycle troop] reconnaissance patrols can also move off to the sides of the roads, traverse terrain that has no roadways and cross watercourses swimming on the horses. They can search terrain in widely dispersed formations; they are not affected by the ground or the weather and, generally, not reliant upon resupply. Their march speed and performance are limited.
Bicycle-mounted reconnaissance elements have a superior march speed and
performance compared to horse-mounted elements in areas with a good road network
and corresponding weather. Their march speed sinks on field trails, especially in bad weather; in open terrain, their speed is often
less than that of those on foot. At night or in
cases of fog, they are more suitable than other types of patrols, assuming
there is a good road network, since they can move without making a
sound.
The armored [light tracked] reconnaissance patrol has a high march speed and performance. As a result of its armor, it is superior to the enemy in encounters with non-armored reconnaissance patrols and, as a result of its equipping with
a radio vehicle, capable of performing better than other reconnaissance
forces. It is well suited for employment on roads cross-country and
crossing great distances. It can execute a mission rapidly and is quickly
available again to the commander for new operations.
95. The strength of the reconnaissance patrols of all types is based on the mission, as well as the terrain and the actions of the enemy and the local populace. In the case of horse-mounted reconnaissance patrols, they vary between in strength, between small groups and squads. In the case of bicycle patrols, they are usually formed in squad strength, since they more frequently have to fight their way forward as a result of their lesser mobility. The armored reconnaissance patrol is always to be employed in the strength of two vehicles (including one radio vehicle).
Reconnaissance patrols with important missions are to be led by officers. It may be necessary to attach bicyclists to horse-mounted patrols, as well as gas detectors of all types.
When calculating the strength of the horse-mounted and bicycle reconnaissance elements, there should be two rider or bicyclist messengers employed for every anticipated report in enemy territory or cases where the enemy threat is high. Also to be taken into consideration, however, is the fact that larger patrols cannot escape enemy observation so easily and, as a result, their activities will be made more difficult. Having an additional leader go along with the patrol can be advisable. It must always happen whenever the reconnaissance patrol must be divided after reaching an objective.
96. The transmittal of reports to the reconnaissance battalion can be sped up by attaching backpack radio sections to the most important reconnaissance patrols. The commander should maintain a reserve of one or two backpack radio sections, however, so that a second wave of reconnaissance patrols can receive them as well.
It must be remembered that enemy radio intercept efforts in determining the presence and movements of the reconnaissance battalion are made more difficult if radio traffic is restricted to that which is unconditionally necessary. Every transmittal—including tuning—betrays the presence of the radio set and affords the enemy opportunity to vector or listen in.
97. If it is imperative to quickly cross areas with a good road network that have been determined to be free of the enemy or the terrain off the roads is not accessible to horse-mounted elements, then the use of a wave of bicyclist reconnaissance elements may be initially called for. Generally, however, horse-mounted elements should be employed as soon as possible, since they can get through everywhere. By doing so, the strength of the bicycle troop is maintained. [4" fat tire bike troops can do cross-country movement today as well as horses]
98. The commander of the reconnaissance battalion issues individual orders to the reconnaissance patrol leaders.
In general, orders to the reconnaissance patrol contain:
Leader, strength and organization of the patrol
Mission
Reconnaissance objective
Movement route of advance
Actions on reaching the objective (Maintaining contact with the enemy, reconnaissance into the depths of the enemy or return)
Location and time of patrol departure
Details concerning actions (differs depending on the situation and terrain), e.g, actions at certain terrain features or localities
In addition, a timeline for movement can be issued to the reconnaissance patrol, at least if it appears the movements will not be disturbed by the enemy. The timeline must detail when the reconnaissance patrol departs, when it is to reach its intermediate objectives (based on a predetermined march speed), where the reconnaissance battalion will be located at a specific time and how the messengers (mounted or on bicycles) are to move, based on that
information.
The main things the reconnaissance patrol has to report are contained primarily in what follows the phrase “I want to know...” The establishment of several phase lines, from which the reconnaissance patrol should also report, even without enemy contact, may be advisable.
99. When determining the time of departure, the time needed by the patrol leader for his preparations must be taken into consideration. Frequently, the situation can demand a rapid dispatch of the reconnaissance patrol.
100. In general, reconnaissance patrols can only reconnoiter by daylight. At nighttime, the activities of the reconnaissance patrol are generally limited to establishing or maintaining contact with the enemy and determining the location of his forward outposts.
SECURITY ON THE MARCH
101. The lead troop of the two troops generally provides security on the march. In such a case, it organizes for the march as if on its own (Booklet 2, Numbers 250-258 and Booklet 3, Numbers 142-147). The establishment of a rearguard may be necessary.
102. If the terrain necessitates the motorized elements be separated from the reconnaissance battalion, then special security measures might be necessary.
103. With regard to antiarmor defense, the antitank guns are generally distributed among the individual parts of the march columns.
SECURITY WHEN RESTING
104. To secure quarters, it is generally preferred to use the bicycle troop. Antitank guns are usually attached to it for that purpose.
Security of the roads is generally assumed by the forces used to secure the march.
105. Orders must be issued each time as to whether the horses can have their saddles removed to better rest them.
106. Paragraph numbers 49-53 govern the security measures for rests and quartering areas.
MARCH AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES
107. The reconnaissance battalion establishes a reconnaissance reserve, reporting points and backup for its reconnaissance patrols. It moves forward by bounds, generally avoiding the main road and selects a march route that is located as much as possible in the middle of the reconnaissance zone.
108. The reconnaissance battalion consists of units with differing march speed capabilities.
The attempt must be made that despite these differing march speeds between the bicycle troop and the horse-mounted troop that both can be moved forward in such a manner that a unified command of the battalion is possible when the enemy is encountered. Since the bicycle troop must have its machine-gun section and its mortars when it deploys, those two generally follow directly behind the bicycle troop.
If the bicycle troop forms the advance guard, then a greater distance to the horse-mounted troop must follow so that the motorized sections can follow their troop in bounds.
109. The horse-mounted backpack radio sections generally march with the horse-mounted elements of the headquarters.
110. In individual cases, it can be advisable to bring up the motorized elements of the reconnaissance battalion either completely or partially as a motorized section. The elements needed for reconnaissance and combat—the motorized section of the bicycle troop, in the event that it is not marching with its troop (by exception), the motorized elements of the signals platoon and the heavy troop—are placed at the beginning. The motorized section is to be brought forward in such a fashion that it will be available in a timely manner prior to enemy contact.
111. In general, the combat trains of the horse-mounted troop marches with it, since the remaining elements of the reconnaissance battalion have motorized combat trains.
In the case of the reconnaissance battalions in East Prussia, the horse-drawn combat trains and the horse-drawn elements of the ammunition and equipment sections are brought forward together as a group, generally in front of the motorized section.
112. If the situation forces the reconnaissance battalion proper or just
the mounted troop to advance into terrain that is inaccessible for
motorized vehicles, [M113A4 Super Gavins can traverse nearly all
terrains] then the commander may not allow himself to be inhibited in his
decision by the lesser terrain mobility of individual elements of the
reconnaissance battalion.
The temporary separation of the radio sections and the loss of the ability to report by mounted and bicycle messengers must be accepted in certain situations.
113. In general, the radio sections of the reconnaissance battalion are employed at the individual intermediate objectives for establishing contact with the division and with the reconnaissance patrols outfitted with radio sets; if the situation presents itself, also with any motorized reconnaissance battalion that might be employed in approximately the same area. Every opportunity is to be used at any other halts to establish contact with the division, reconnaissance patrols and motorized reconnaissance battalions that may be employed. The reconnaissance battalion can also communicate with the division and an armored reconnaissance patrol during the march.
114. Paragraphs 62-72 apply in their entirety to the activities of the reconnaissance battalion.
THE CROSSING OF BODIES OF WATER
Horse-mounted Soldiers, bicyclists and motorized vehicle drivers can be crossed rapidly by means of rafts. (Book-let 2, paragraphs 347-353 and Booklet 3, paragraph 163) [M113A4 Super Gavins are amphibious and armored/armed aka better than rafts]
116. The reconnaissance battalion has two large and two small rafts at its disposal for crossings. These are kept in the engineer equipment vehicle in the ammunition and equipment section.
The horse-mounted engineers of the horse-mounted and bicycle troops must be consolidated into an engineer detail under unified command for crossing. If no divisional engineers are available, then the horse-mounted engineers—after the horse-mounted Soldiers and the bicyclists have been crossed—can cross over the combat trains of the horse-mounted troop, the staff cars and the radio sections of the signals platoon by means of a raft ferry constructed out of rafts and field-expedient materials.
117. For crossing the heavy troop, the motorized combat trains and the ammunition and equipment section, divisional engineers are necessary, if other field-expedient means are not possible. Requesting them must be done in a timely manner.
118. Reconnaissance on the far side of bodies of water must often be continued solely by the horse-mounted elements that have crossed. For purposes of transmitting reports to the rear, it may be necessary to leave behind the medium radio section under cover at an appropriate point behind the river obstacle and give it the reports for transmission to the division.
RESUPPLY
119. The combat trains and the ammunition and equipment section contain a basic supply of ammunition, demolitions, rations, medical and veterinarian supplies, fuel and crossing materials.
120. With regard to rations, the reconnaissance battalion carries an abbreviated portion for every man in the vehicles. An addition, complete “emergency” ration is provided to the field mess.
A third of a daily portion of feed is carried on the horse, with two-thirds of a daily ration maintained in the combat trains or in the ammunition and equipment section.
121. The rations trains are capable of accepting rations for two days.
The horse-mounted troop has at its disposal horse-mounted Rations Train I (The horse-mounted troop in East Prussia has a horse-drawn Rations Train I and Rations Train I).
The remaining rations trains of the reconnaissance battalion are motorized and consolidated for all elements of the reconnaissance battalion.
122. The baggage trains for all elements of the reconnaissance battalion are motorized.
123. The rations and baggage trains may not be allowed to disrupt the movements of the reconnaissance battalion and the formations that follow it. The division may dictate that the trains be left behind—in their entirety or only partially—in the area of the main forces and later sent forward to the reconnaissance battalion.
124. For care of the wounded and sick, see Heeres-Dien-stvorschrift 21,
125. For wounded and sick horses in combat situations, the battalion veterinarian establishes a horse medical clearing area in the vicinity of the combat trains. Horses capable of moving are taken from there by personnel of the horse-mounted troop to the division horse collection point established further to the rear by the veterinary company. Horses incapable of moving are to be reported to the horse collection point for evacuation.
VI. CONTAMINATED TERRAIN
[Deleted]
The Minute Book
Friday, 24 April 2015
Principles of Employment of Cyclists
Cyclist Training (Provisional), 1914
Characteristics and Functions of Cyclists
The value of their firepower is enhanced by their mobility, not the value of their mobility by their firepower…
1. The principal characteristic of [EDITOR: narrow-tire] cyclists is their power to move rapidly, and if necessary for long distances, in a country well-supplied with roads of fair surface. [EDITOR: 4" FAT Tire bikes now don't need roads/trails but can be riden cross-country]
Compared with mounted [EDITOR: motor-driven] troops, they can travel
more silently, are less conspicuous, and can conceal themselves with greater
facility; they can develop greater power in proportion to their numbers
since they require no horse holders, and are more easily billeted,
supplied, and transported by rail or boat. [EDITOR: air, space] On the
other hand, their inability to move rapidly across country (and at times to
move at all without leaving their cycles behind) [EDITOR 4" FTMTBs are
x-country-mobile] renders it more difficult for them than for [EDITOR: tracked]
mounted troops to carry out the services of protection and reconnaissance
during a march, and except when the roads are very favourable, to change position
rapidly when engaged with the enemy.
In any case, when acting independently, the difficulties cyclists experience in protecting themselves will frequently reduce their pace [to] almost to that of [walking] infantry. Rapid movement under such circumstances means dangerously little reconnaissance and renders cyclists a likely prey to hostile [horse] cavalry. The employment of cyclist bodies in country which has not been previously reconnoitred, unaccompanied by a due proportion of mounted men for the service of exploration should therefore be resorted to in exceptional cases only.
2. The power of infantry lies
in its firepower, [EDITOR narcissist hubris non-sense. Foot infantrymen are
like termites; maneuver slowly over closed terrain, stubbornly hold thereafter]
which in the case of cyclists can be carried to greater distance in relatively
less time, therefore the tactics of cyclists are the same as those of infantry
supplemented by greater mobility. [infantry + 20 mph]
The value of their firepower is enhanced by their mobility, not the value
of their mobility by their firepower, or, in other words, their mobility should
not be used for an indefinite purpose, but rather to move them for a definite
object, to gain which it is essential that they should adopt a vigorous
offensive action in order to defeat the enemy.
3. Cyclists are not a separate
arm, but a body of troops whose role is subordinate to, but a complement of,
that of cavalry and infantry. [EDITOR: says fucking who?] Their sphere
of action lies between the main body and the outer line of protection of the
force with which they are acting. Within these limits, their employment is
formed bodies on special missions, such as the rapid seizure of points of
importance, the destruction of railways or bridges, and the interception of
the enemy's movements will often be invaluable to a body of cavalry or a
detachment of all arms.
4. Cyclists will frequently be of
use in assisting other troops to perform their protective duties, by their
employment as standing patrols for instance (see Field Service Regulations,
Part I, Sec 89.) or as a temporary relief for cavalry whilst the latter are
withdrawn for purposes of watering, feeding, etc., or before they are sent
out, or to act as a pivot round which cavalry can manoeuvre. At night their
movements, owing to the silence in which they can be carried out, are difficult
to detect. Formed bodies of cyclists should not carry out any
independent movement at night beyond the protective line, owing to their greater
vulnerability and liability to be thrown into confusion by an ambush or
temporary obstacle during darkness than in daylight. [EDITOR: Rubbish.
We have Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) today.]
5. In the battle, by reason of their mobility, cyclists are best suited for employment on the flanks of the force, either for the purpose of prolonging their own line or for enveloping that of the enemy, or as a local reserve, for reinforcing weak points.
6. In a pursuit, a vigorous use of their mobility may enable cyclists to occupy tactical points or defiles along the enemy's line of retreat, and thus materially assist in turning the pursuit into a rout.
7. In a retreat, they should be especially valuable on the flanks prolonging the front, and thus compelling the enemy to make a wide turning movement. By a stubborn resistance, and by a full use of their mobility and firepower they can delay the advancing columns, and assist their own troops to withdraw without being harassed.
8. The defence of the coast is one of the principal and most important roles of cyclists in Great Britain, and in carrying out this duty they will frequently have to act for a time without the assistance of the other arms. A vigilant look-out, and a rapid concentration, based on early and accurate information, will enable them to adopt a vigorous offensive the moment an opportunity for action occurs.
The Army Cyclist Corps and The Khaki Chums.
Since 1991 The Association for Military Remembrance - 'The Khaki Chums' had been touring the Battlefields of Europe on foot - marching from one place to another as did the infantry of the time. The only disadvantage to this (apart from the blisters) was the lack of mobility and the limits on what could be seen on each trip.
Several of the Chums suggested getting hold of original Mk IV army bicycles, restoring them, and using them as an ideal way to tour the battlefields. It looked like the idea would never get off the drawing board - not just because of the problems in getting enough original bikes. Not only would they all need to look the same (impossible), they would also have to put up with a fair bit of punishment (sacrilegious!).
In 1997 Chum Mo Stokes came up with the answer. He had been to a bicycle trade show in Southampton and met an Indian man who was the UK agent for Hero Bicycles. These are brand new but traditionally made Indian roadsters based on old British patterns. The agent was based in Croydon and we did a deal on 20 bottom-of-the-range Hero bicycles, with 28" wheels, rod brakes and no gears. Then came the mammoth task of turning them into Great War Mk IV Army Cycles!
The whole lot were transported to Chum Dick Knights' workshop in Cambridgeshire where stripping, priming, painting and re-assembling would take place, while rifle clips, lamp brackets and front and rear carriers where were being knocked out on makeshift factory lines by Dick himself, and Chums Gary Hancock and Kev Smith. Original plans and photographs were used to make exact copies. The Khaki Chums are extremely lucky in having several engineers and machinists in the ranks!
We had several get-togethers at Dick's, sanding paint and chrome ready for re-painting, and then putting them all back together again. We had ten completed by the summer of 1998 - just in time for our tour of the Ypres battlefield in August to commemorate "The Black Day of The German Army" in August 1918 - exactly 80 years before.
We assembled at Dover - all dressed exactly as members of The Army Cyclist Corps would have been in 1918. We packed everything on the bicycles, and set off for Ostend. Despite the unbelievably hot weather (The American weather reports claimed it was the hottest weekend of the century!) the trip was a total success. We travelled from Ostend along the coast to Neiuport and then via Ramskapelle and the old Belgian front line to Dixmuide and then on to the Ypres Salient. We spent several nights sleeping out in the open (with no tents or sleeping bags) including a night on the Ramparts in Ypres next to The Menin Gate. We also slept on the stone floor of a 1920s cowshed at Varlet Farm Poelkapelle (now an excellent B&B). The mileage was comparatively low but the bicycles were heavily laden and slow to ride with one speed. As stated in the original manuals of the period (Cyclist Training (Provisional) 1914), we dismounted whenever we met steep hills and marched up. We had a few mechanical problems with the bicycles - the quality of the metal wasn't good and things did get bent - but nothing we couldn't repair. Crankshafts, cranks and pedals took the most punishment.
We also took the time to practise the correct drill movements: mounting and dismounting, forming two files, stacking cycles, etc.
The Chums Cyclists have only had one other collective outing on the bicycles since then - on the Veteran Cycle Club Windsor Great Park Ride, in 1999. However, several of the dedicated cyclists amongst them get out on their bikes whenever they can. In 2003 we refitted the bikes with the correct colour tyres for the period, which completes the illusion.
Another Battlefield Tour is planned for 2005 to commemorate the Battles of 1915 (Second Battle of Ypres, Neuve Chappelle, Festubert, Aubers Ridge, Fromelles, and Loos) and we are hoping to field all twenty bicycles for this!
For more on The Khaki Chums there will be a web-site soon - watch this space.
Pte 'Jack' Johnson, 4616
------------------------------------------
If you require any further information on this group -
please contact the webmaster huntscycles@btinternet.com
On tour in full kit. - Belgium 1998.
Maurice Stokes, at Varlet Farm, Poelkapelle, 1998.
Windsor Great Park.
11/07/2017
Equipment
1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne)/Camp Benning
Tactical Technology Center's upcoming Operation
DARK CLAW 2 (OPDC2) demonstration of
SUPERFIGHT aka Soldier Fightability Technologies (SFT). Our TackBike SITREP:
https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2021/04/ebikes.html
All
bikes must have a 5.56mm Personal Defense Weapon (PDW) on their front
handlebars for instantaneous fires when moving.
Past Precedents:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Villar_Perosa_aircraft_submachine_gun
The Villar Perosa was designed as a portable
double-barrel machine gun firing a 9mm round. It consisted of two independent
coupled weapons, each with its own barrel, firing mechanism, and separate 25-round
magazine.
It was also used during World War I by the Italian
Infantry, with a bipod and a gun shield (which proved to be
uncomfortable in combat and was subsequently removed). Despite its high rate of
fire, its atypical design, and its weight, it proved to be very effective at
short range.[1] It was operated by Bersaglieri too, often mounted
on bicycles.[2]
It was in particular appreciated as a squad weapon by the
Arditi, the Royal Italian Army World War I shock troops, due to
its high rate of fire and its weight (it was light for a machine gun), and went
under various modifications: Lt. Col. Giuseppe Bassi personally designed a
carrying system (consisting of a leather belt fixed to the handles that was
later arranged behind the gunner's neck) and a 1.6 kg bipod and removed the gun
shield (which weighed roughly 26 kg) to enhance Arditi performances in battle.
In his idea, a section of 8 (later 16) VP machine guns had to support the
attack of 20-30 Arditi armed with rifle, dagger and hand-grenades, giving an
adequate suppressive fire and striking the enemy on a psychological level too.
Every weapon was manned by 4 people: a shooter with a backpack or a shoulder
ammo bag and 3 ammo carriers, who could take with them up to 5000 rounds.[3]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Villar_Perosa_aircraft_submachine_gun
Could this gun be used from a bicycle? The Twin Villar Perosa [9mm SMGs] with
firearm expert Jonathan Ferguson
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FRsjjyXZ6o
https://military.wikia.org/wiki/1st_Airborne_Division_(United_Kingdom)
https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Operation_Ladbroke
Men from the Border Regiment preparing to take off on Operation LADBROKE,
with a folding airborne bicycle in the foreground
****
Environment
LBI + must be able to collect H2O water as it goes by
ROWPU pump—even from salt sea water.
https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2020/06/tactismart-022-water-everywhere-but.html
LBI + must have SERE skills to survive collecting/hunting
its own food from off the land.
LBI + must be as maximum-ally maneuver mobile as possible
WITHOUT its quadphibious Gavins.
Without its tracks, “dismounts”
must be able to float/swim across rivers/lakes like Soviet Russian peasant
infantry was in WW2.
https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2020/06/futurewarthink-015-cant-swim-why-hell.html
LBI + Load Bearing Equipment (LBE) must have “donkey tails” to SPIE rope extract by
helicopters:
www.combatreform.org/fries.htm
Enemy
The Illuminati DEEP STATE BS that Russia is a mortal
enemy of us--when President Putin is more moral stoical than nearly all
functional nihilist Amerikans--is REJECTED. Russia should be a geostrategic ally of America—FUCK the Illuminati
and their constant war mongering for a nuclear WW3 to de-populate the Earth by mass-murdering
6.5B people and their CIA’s illegal coup take-over
of the Ukraine threatening Russia’s naval passage to the Med--as well as all
the people in Crimea who want to remain Russian.
https://www.bitchute.com/video/aojDbUqziQjW/
The Rockefeller/Rothschild Illuminati crime families--about
11M of these mankind traitors--are the arch enemies of every person on Earth.
The Illuminati need to John 3:16 repent of their sins and be removed from ALL
power positions in every society on Earth.
www.combatreform.org/rockefellerevil.htm
https://www.bitchute.com/video/V1tz1mCbpKr0/
Semper Airborne!
James Bond is REAL.
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