RETROWARTHINK 020: WW1 Armored MUDFIGHTERS: German Ones Ground-Mobile! CAS NOT INVENTED BY THE LYING USMC

So all the IL-2 Sturmovik and A-10 Warthog fanboys need to get a clue and ease up on the pontificating of their favorite's being the 1st when they were NOT.

Yes, PLEASE advocate armored MUDFIGHTERS for CAS/MAS..but do so with the FULL CONTEXT of reality that people in the past were NOT dummies...that misbehavior is reserved for today's normie WOKETARDS.

What of USMC liars claiming to have "invented Close Air Support"?

Their lying bureaucracy didn't. 

Does the lying USMC operate ANY armored O/A or O/A/L planes today?

No they fucking do not.

So STFU.

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n2/ww1-arcana.html

If Oskar Ursinus' fighter seaplane epitomizes the amateur enthusiasm and inventive genius that drove so much of the aeronautical innovation in the Great War, our second subject, the Vickers F.B.26A Vampire II, is no less representative of the other great force behind the advances of 1914-1918: the great, war-profiteering industrial combine. Under its sinister chairman and managing director, Basil Zaharof (the original "merchant of death"), Vickers-Armstrong had, by the end of the 19th century, emerged as one of the largest, most aggressive, most highly diversified arms manufacturing enterprises in history. Vickers could supply everything from machine guns and small arms ammunition to battleships (complete with their guns, armor, engines, and fire control equipment) from its own resources. When the military potential of the airplane became apparent, aircraft manufacture became a natural extension of the company's business. In 1913, Vickers introduced one of the first purpose-built armed aircraft, a two-seat, machine gun-armed pusher biplane called the Destroyer. A development of the aircraft, the FB5 "Gunbus," served in some numbers during the war.

Unfortunately, after the FB5, Vickers did not have much luck selling airplanes to the armed forces. Though sometimes excellent performers, Vickers aircraft always seemed to arrive on the scene just after some other type had been standardized for large-scale production. Basil Zaharof's celebrated readiness to advance his firm's interests at all costs and by all means, fair or foul, did little to help matters. Having once invested company money in a design, only to see it rejected, Vickers tended to persist, making minor modifications and counting on its formidable lobbying power to reverse the adverse decision. As a result, the company's offerings tended to fall behind the standards of the times. Notably, the company persisted with pusher-type fighters long after the fashion for them had waned.

In 1916, Vickers produced a pusher fighter biplane, the FB 12, as a replacement for the then-standard DH2 and FE8 fighters. Vickers designed the fighter around a new and untried engine fof unprecedented power, the 150-hp Hart air-cooled radial. The difficulties of cooling a high-powered, static engine with air had not yet been mastered, however, and the Hart never materialized. The FB12 had to make do with 80-100 hp Le Rhône and Gnome rotaries or with the highly unreliable 100-hp, 10-cylinder Anzani radial. Performance was good, given the power—95 mph. But this was really no better than the DH2s and FE8s it was meant to replace, and, with a single Lewis [7.7mm] gun, it was no better armed. Tractor types were now, moreover, the fashion for fighters. The FB12 had simply arrived too late with too little.

Vickers was not prepared to take no for an answer, however. In May 1917, the firm rolled out a developed version of the FB12 design, the FB26 Vampire. A 200-hp Hispano-Suiza water-cooled V8 replaced the air-cooled engines, and the fuselage was now attached directly to the top wing, rather than suspended between the wings as in the case of the FB12. Armament consisted of a pair of Lewis guns mounted in the nose or three of the weapons mounted on an experimental, trainable Eeman mount. Flare brackets and night-flying equipment were included, so that the Vampire could serve as a night fighter. It was not a success, however. Service pilots (including J.T.B. McCudden, then an instructor at Joyce Green), found it fast, but a poor climber. Spinning characteristics were considered dangerous.

Stymied once more, Vickers set about the third and last reincarnation of its unsuccessful 1916 fighter. In 1918, the FB26A Vampire II emerged as an armored trench fighter powered by a 230-hp Bentley BR2 rotary engine, the engine used in the Sopwith Snipe and a rival trench fighter, the Sopwith Salamander. The pusher configuration at last had some advantages, given the change of role. Visibility was excellent, particularly forward and downward and up and to the the rear, the crucial directions for a ground-attack pilot. More importantly, the layout placed the mass of the armor (more than 500 lb) where it could protect both the pilot and the engine. With the new engine, the airplane proved remarkably maneuverable and fast, reaching 121 mph at sea level. While this was fully comparable to its rival, the Salamander, the latter was by now already in production. Moreover, Salamander and Snipe production placed heavy demands on the limited number of Bentley radials available. With this in mind, Vickers redesigned the Vampire II for the 320-hp ABC Dragonfly air-cooled radial, then entering very large-scale production. The complete failure of the Dragonfly, the success of the Salamander, and the imminent end of the war combined to, at last, lay the long line of Vickers pusher fighters to rest.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sopwith_Salamander

The Sopwith TF.2 Salamander was a British ground-attack aircraft of the First World War designed by the Sopwith Aviation Company which first flew in April 1918. It was a single-engined, single-seat biplane, based on the Sopwith Snipe fighter, with an armoured forward fuselage to protect the pilot and fuel system from ground fire during low level operations. It was ordered in large numbers for the Royal Air Force but the war ended before the type could enter squadron service, although two were in France in October 1918.

In August 1917, the British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) introduced the coordinated mass use of single-seat fighter aircraft for low-level ground-attack operations [EDITOR: NOT THE FUCKING LYING USMC!] in support of the Third Battle of Ypres, with Airco DH.5s, which were unsuitable for high-altitude combat, specialising in this role. The tactic proved effective and was repeated at the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917 by DH.5s and Sopwith Camels being used in strafing attacks. While the tactic proved successful, losses of the unarmoured fighters proved to be extremely high, reaching up to 30 per cent per day. Most losses were due to ground fire, although low-flying aircraft also proved vulnerable to attacks from above by enemy fighters.[1][2] Two-seat German fighters such as Halberstadt CL.II, originally designed as escort fighters, were also used ground-attack, playing an important role in the German counter-offensive at Cambrai.[2][3] While the CL-type fighters were not armoured, the Germans also introduced more specialised heavily armoured two-seat aircraft such as the Junkers J.I for contact patrol and ground-attack work.[1][4]

As a result of the high losses sustained during strafing and after seeing the success of the new German types, the RFC instructed the Sopwith Aviation Company to modify a Camel for close air support, by fitting downward-firing guns and armour. The modified Camel, known as the "TF.1" (trench fighter 1), flew on 15 February 1918. Two Lewis guns were fixed to fire downwards and forwards at an angle of 45 degrees and a third gun was mounted on the upper wing.

Work on a more advanced armoured fighter, conceived as an armoured version of the Sopwith Snipe, began early in 1918. The forward portion of the fuselage was a 605 lb (275 kg) box of armour plate, forming an integral part of the aircraft structure, protecting the pilot and fuel system, with a 0.315 in (8 mm) front plate, a 0.433 in (11 mm) bottom plate, 0.236 in (6 mm) side plates and rear armour consisting of an 11-gauge and 6-gauge plate separated by an air gap.[7] The rear (unarmoured) section of the fuselage was a generally similar structure to the Snipe but flat sided, to match the forepart. The two-bay wings and tailplane were identical in form to those of the Snipe but were strengthened to cope with the extra weight, while the fin and rudder were identical to the Snipe. The new aircraft used the same Bentley BR2 rotary engine as the Snipe, covered by an unarmoured cowling – the foremost armour plate forming the firewall.[8][9]

Originally an armament of three machine guns was planned, with two Lewis guns firing forwards and downwards through the cockpit floor as in the TF.1, and a forward-firing Vickers machine gun. This was changed to a conventional battery of two synchronised Vickers [7.7mm] guns in front of the cockpit, as on the Snipe, before the first prototype was complete. The guns were staggered, with the starboard gun mounted a few inches forward of the port one to give more room for ammunition. Four light bombs could also be carried.[10]

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Ground-Mobile WolfgangWartHog

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_J.I

The Junkers J.I (manufacturer's name J 4) was a German "J-class" armored sesquiplane of World War I, developed for low-level ground attack, observation and army cooperation. It is especially noteworthy as being the first all-metal aircraft to enter mass production; the aircraft's metal construction and heavy armour was an effective shield against small arms fire over the battlefield.[2]

It was an extremely advanced design for the period, with a single-unit steel "bathtub" running from just behind the propeller to the rear crew position acting as armour, the main fuselage structure and engine mounting in one unit. Engine access was provided by armored steel panels, one on either side of the nose. The armour was 5 millimetres (0.20 in) thick and weighed 470 kilograms (1,040 lb) and protected the crew, the engine, the fuel tanks and radio equipment.[3] The flight control surfaces were connected to the aircraft's controls by push-rods and bellcranks – not with the usual steel cable control connections of the era as push-rods were less likely to be severed by ground fire.[4]

There was a significant size difference between the upper and lower wings – the upper wing had an area of 35.89 m2 (386.3 sq ft), over double the area of the lower wing – 13.68 m2 (147.3 sq ft).[5] This is a form of biplane known as a Sesquiplane.

The aircraft had two fuel tanks with a capacity of around 120 litres (32 US gal).[5] The main tank (divided in two for redundancy) was supplemented by a smaller, 30-litre (7.9 US gal) gravity tank. This was intended to supply fuel to the engine by gravity feed in the event of an engine fuel pump failure; it contained enough fuel for thirty minutes on full power. There was a manual fuel pump for use when the gravity tank was empty.[3]

The aircraft could be separated into its main components: wings, fuselage, undercarriage and tail, to make it easier to transport by [trains] rail or [trucks] road. A ground crew of six to eight could reassemble the aircraft and have it ready for flight within four to six hours.[6] The wings were covered with 0.19-millimetre-thick (0.0075 in) aluminium skin which could be easily dented; great care had to be taken when handling the aircraft on the ground.[6]

The aircraft first entered front service in August 1917.[7] They were used on the Western Front during the German spring offensive of 1918.

The aircraft could be fitted with two downward-firing machine guns for ground attack but they were found to be of limited use because of the difficulty of aiming them. The J-Is were mainly used for army co-operation and low-level reconnaissance. They were also used for dropping ammunition and rations on outposts that could not be easily supplied by other means.[4]

The production at Junkers works was quite slow because of poor organization and only 227 J.Is were manufactured before production ceased in January 1919.[8] At least one was lost to ground fire, shot down by a French anti-aircraft machine-gun firing armour-piercing rounds, although this was apparently an isolated event as some sources claim none were lost in combat.[5][8] Some were lost in landing accidents and other mishaps.[9]

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v1/v1n3/attack.html

Field-Expedient Camouflage for Trench Strafing

Ground attack—"trench strafing" as it was then called—was by 1917 one of the principal activities of the Royal Flying Corps (later RAF). [NOT THE LYING USMC] Fighter aircraft would attack German trench lines, machinegun posts, artillery batteries, and communications from near ground level with machinguns and up to four twenty-pound Cooper fragmentation bombs per aircraft. Such attacks could be devastating, particularly against troops caught retreating or deploying. Strafing by Bristol fighters and Camels single-handedly routed and destroyed a Turkish army surprised in a defile in Palestine. All-out attacks by British fighters helped to slow and then isolate Ludendorff's storm troopers, contributing materially to the containment of Germany's last, great offensive of spring and summer 1918 and the subsequent Allied victory.

Giant AEG Armored Gunship with 20mm Anti-Tank Gun Weaponry to Explode 1919 Allied Tanks 

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v2/v2n1/1919.html

The high-performance AEG G.IV medium bomber was converted into an armored, antitank gunship, the G.IVk (kanone). Armor enclosed both engines and the entire forward half of the fuselage. Two of the new SEMAG/Becker automatic cannon were mounted, one in a fully enclosed turret under the nose and on an open, large-diameter gun ring on the rear cockpit. The Becker was the first 20-mm light-weight cannon, the direct ancestor of the Second-War Oerlikon. It could easily pierce any World War I tank, particularly from above. Performance was adequate, though probably not stellar. Like its Second-War and modern-day counterparts, the AEG gunship would probably have suffered severely had it been called on to support German offensive thrusts in the face of Allied fighters. But, like the Henschel Hs 129, it would have acquitted itself well as a container of breakthroughs, hunting Fuller's rampaging medium tanks in the German rear. A number were produced prior to the end of the war, but there is no evidence that they were ever used.

But such operations were not without their costs, costs that were often severe. At low-level, aircraft faced intense ground fire from scores of densely packed prepared positions. Hundreds of infantry rifles and machinguns—in some cases even field guns—would join the 37-mm automatic cannon ("flaming onions") and larger caliber flak guns whenever fighters ventured over the lines. While the Germans were quick to develop armored warplanes for low-level missions—the two-seater Junkers, Albatross, and AEG J-types—Britain lagged behind in this regard. The first British armored airplane, the Sopwith Salamander, was just entering production when the war ended. Nor was ground fire the only danger. Ground-attack airplanes were vulnerable to fighter attack. The British airman's attention had to stay focused on his targets and on the dangerous proximity of the ground. His enemy invariably held the dual advantages of surprise and height. [Hence, rearward defensive firepower was vital] Losses were often heavy, particularly in the desperate spring of 1918, when every available man and plane was hurled against the advancing Germans.

To shorten the odds against them, British trench-strafers began to supplement the standard RFC/RNAS/RAF camouflage scheme—greenish brown PC10 dope on all upper surfaces—with various additions, all intended to make the aircraft harder to see, especially from above. The large, red-white-and-blue roundels on the upper wings were quickly toned down. The white was very conspicuous against the ground and provided an excellent aiming point for a diving attacker—all the latter had to do was to aim between the white marks and he was sure to kill the pilot. At first, British ground crews simply smeared the white with mud while their aircraft did temporary duty as strafers before returning to their normal air fighting. But, as units began to specialize in dangerous low-level work (often over a set area, so that they could learn where the targets were), more permanent solutions were tried. The white ring of the wing roundels (and the fuselage roundels, if they were close to the crew) was commonly overdoped with PC10, as in the case of nightfighters. Sometimes, the entire over-wing roundel was obscured by an overwash of PC10. A few pilots experimented with irregularly spaced, unevenly sized, or distorted insignia, which, it was hoped, would throw off an attacker's aim.

These methods made the airplane's markings less conspicuous, but they did little to break up the outline, the critical recognition feature for the ground gunner. Accordingly, some pilots followed the French lead and applied multicolored disruptive patterns to their aircraft. In some cases (viz. the SE5a shown here), actual French paint may have been applied.

While British authorities did all they could to discourage ad-hoc camouflage systems, they must have proved their value. By 1918, officialdom had to recognize that ground-attack aircraft needed something more than PC10, if only for the sake of morale. Had the Salamander and its corresponding two-seater, the Sopwith Buffalo, seen service, they would thus have been supplied in the service's first official disruptive finish, a pattern of brown, green, grey, and black developed after exhaustive trials in the U.K. Surely this alone testifies to the soundness of the earlier field expedients.

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Deja WW2: MUDFIGHTERS Received

Dreaded Jericho Siren Powered by a Propeller Harmed Stuka speed by 4 mph...

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v2/v2n2/china30s.html

QUOTE:

Most popular accounts make it sound as if WW2 erupted suddenly in the fall of 1939. But, one can easily argue that the war began several years earlier, in 1931, in China. In 1931, the generals decided that it was time to complete this slow takeover of north China. When some track was conveniently blown up along a Japanese-owned rail line near the Japanese garrison at Mukden, Japan's Korea-based Kwantung Army seized the whole province of Manchuria, citing the need to “maintain order,” to protect Japanese nationals, and, once again, to contain “communism.” The generals unilaterally declared the independence of Manchuria from China and proclaimed it the new Japanese protectorate of Manchukuo. In a clear threat to the rest of China, they selected the latter's deposed Manchu emperor as the puppet head of state for their creation. The vain, gullible princeling soon found himself a virtual prisoner in his own supposed country.

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While the Allied WW1 MUDFIGHTERS arrived too late, by the time WW1 re-started in 1931 with the Japanese occupation of China, the smart Russians realizing the need for ARMORED attack planes were already tinkering and fielding such planes leading to the short-range tactical IL-2 Sturmovik.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilyushin_Il-2

The idea for a Soviet armored ground-attack aircraft dates to the early 1930s, when Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich designed TSh-1 and TSh-2 armored biplanes. However, Soviet engines at the time lacked the power needed to provide the heavy aircraft with good performance. The Il-2 was designed by Sergey Ilyushin and his team at the Central Design Bureau in 1938. TsKB-55 was a two-seat aircraft with an armoured shell weighing 700 kg (1,500 lb), protecting crew, engine, radiators, and the fuel tank. Standing loaded, the Ilyushin weighed more than 4,700 kg (10,400 lb),[8] making the armoured shell about 15% of the aircraft's gross weight. Uniquely for a World War II attack aircraft, and similarly to the forward fuselage design of the World War I-era Imperial German Junkers J.I armored, all-metal biplane, the Il-2's armor was designed as a load-bearing part of the Ilyushin's monocoque structure, thus saving considerable weight. The prototype TsKB-55, which first flew on 2 October 1939,[8] won the government competition against[citation needed] the Sukhoi Su-6 and received the VVS designation BSh-2 (the BSh stood for "Bronirovani Shturmovik" or armoured ground attack).[9] The prototypes – TsKB-55 and TskB-57 – were built at Moscow plant #39, at that time the Ilyushin design bureau's base.

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Though the Germans realized and acted upon the need for ARMORED attack aircraft in WW1 first, inexplicably in the 1930s fielded UNarmored, UNderpowered, UNderarmed Stuka dive bombers with vertical tails blocking their rearward defensive gunner's field-of-fire and unable to accept much armoring resulting in the loss of the entire war because they were far too easy to shoot-down by enemy fighters and ground fire. Without Stuka Precision Directed Munitions (PDMs) taking out RAF radar towers, the 1940 Battle of Britain was lost creating England into a fortress island springboard for the Allies to regroup and march on Berlin ending the war. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_87

Superb ModelVISION! Diorama by Bjorn Jacobsen of a 37mm Autocannon weaponized Stuka popping the turret of a Russian T34 Medium Tank

During the trials with the K 47 in 1932, the double vertical stabilisers were introduced to give the rear gunner a better field-of-fire.

The square twin fins and rudders proved too weak; they collapsed and the aircraft crashed after it entered an inverted spin during the testing of the terminal dynamic pressure in a dive.[11] The crash prompted a change to a single vertical stabiliser tail design. To withstand strong forces during a dive, heavy plating was fitted, along with brackets riveted to the frame and longeron, to the fuselage.

Despite being chosen, the design was still lacking and drew frequent criticism from Wolfram von Richthofen. Testing of the V4 prototype (A Ju 87 A-0) in early 1937 revealed several problems. The Ju 87 could take off in 250 m (820 ft) and climb to 1,875 m (6,152 ft) in eight minutes with a 250 kg (550 lb) bomb load, and its cruising speed was 250 km/h (160 mph). Richthofen pushed for a more powerful engine.[17] According to the test pilots, the Heinkel He 50 had a better acceleration rate, and could climb away from the target area much more quickly, avoiding enemy ground and air defences. Richthofen stated that any maximum speed below 350 km/h (220 mph) was unacceptable for those reasons.

The gunner had a single 7.92 mm (0.312 in) MG 15, with 14 drums of ammunition, each containing 75 rounds.

The airframe was also subdivided into sections to allow transport by road or rail. Among the many German aircraft designs that participated in the Condor Legion, and as part of other German involvement in the Spanish Civil War, a single Ju 87 A-0 (the V4 prototype) was allocated serial number 29-1 and was assigned to the VJ/88, the experimental Staffel of the Legion's fighter wing. The aircraft was secretly loaded onto the ship Usaramo and departed Hamburg harbour on the night of 1 August 1936, arriving in Cádiz five days later. The only known information pertaining to its combat career in Spain is that it was piloted by Unteroffizier Herman Beuer, and took part in the Nationalist offensive against Bilbao in 1937. Presumably the aircraft was then secretly returned to Germany.[88]

This was an important consideration as the life expectancy of a Ju 87 had been reduced (since 1941) from 9.5 months to 5.5 months to just 100 operational flying hours.[84]

The Battle of Britain proved for the first time that the Junkers Ju 87 was vulnerable in hostile skies against well-organised and determined fighter opposition. The Ju 87, like other dive bombers, was slow and possessed inadequate defences. Furthermore, it could not be effectively protected by fighters because of its low speed, and the very low altitudes at which it ended its dive bomb attacks. The Stuka depended on air superiority, the very thing being contested over Britain. It was withdrawn from attacks on Britain in August after prohibitive losses, leaving the Luftwaffe without precision ground-attack aircraft.[126]

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WTFO?

Meanwhile, the Russians sought MUDFIGHTER improvements as they dominated the low-level air space over land battlefields.

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http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n2/su-8.html

The Ultimate Shturmovik: Sukhoi's Long-Ranging Su-8

Shortly after the start of the new year 1942, with the German invasion just 6 months old, Kremlin planners were already preparing for the moment when the Red Army would go over to the offensive and pursue the enemy across the vast spaces of western Russia. For this, they reasoned, the excellent Il-2 and Su-6 assault aircraft would need the assistance of a larger, longer-ranging aircraft, preferably with twin engines. The large aircraft would strike at columns of retreating troops and vehicles far ahead of the front lines, [INTERDICTION] while the smaller Shturmovik airplanes concentrated on close [air] support [CAS/MAS] along the forward edge of battle. The enemy would thus have no respite, even in [retreat] flight, and every attempt at tactical disengagement or regrouping would be likely to turn into a route. Kremlin planners called this airplane the DDBsh (the Russian abbreviation for "twin-engined, long-range armored attacker") and ordered two prototypes from Pavel Sukhoi's design bureau.

Under the desperate conditions prevailing in contemporary Soviet Russia, nothing much could be done about Project B, as the proposed aircraft was also known. But, as the war began to turn against the Germans and their allies, the Kremlin committee's far-sightedness became increasingly evident. By the winter of 1943-1944, when the first prototypes appeared, Germany's retreat to the west was already at times so precipitous that the Il-2s could not reach them from their most advanced landing grounds. Soon, advanced Soviet forces would be outrunning their air support as well.

Sukhoi's Su-8 emerged as the most powerful, most heavily armed, and best protected attack aircraft of the war. The designers set out to build the smallest airframe that could carry the requisite fuel and two of the most powerful engines available, Shvetsov ASh-71F 18-cylinder air-cooled radials each offering 2100 hp. The narrow forward fuselage housed the pilot, a large fuel tank, and the radio operator/air gunner in a fully structural armored shell up to 15-mm thick. Extensive bullet-proof glazing in the canopy and lower nose gave the pilot a good view for this type of aircraft. Over 1600 kg of armor was used in all. Twin fins and rudders provided redundancy in the event of damage and gave the air gunner a better field of fire above and to the rear. Defensive armament consisted of a 12.7-mm Beresin machine gun flexibly mounted in the rear cockpit (or in a small power-driven turret, according to some sources) and a 7.62-mm ShKAS machine gun firing from a ventral position. The aircraft spanned 67 ft 1 in, was 44-ft 7-in long, and had a wing area of 646 sq-ft. Empty they weighed about 20,000 lbs, loaded about 27-29,000 lbs.

The offensive armament was, of course, the aircraft's real reason for being, and here the design team excelled themselves. The main armament consisted of a battery of heavy cannon sized to defeat even the heavy Tiger and Panther tanks. The guns were housed in a broad, shallow pod under the center fuselage. The first prototype had four 37-mm 11P-37 (later NS-37) automatic cannon, each loaded with 50-round clips by the air gunner. Each gun could fire 735-gram shells at about 250 shots/min with a muzzle velocity of 900 meters/sec. They would penetrate 40-mm armor at any angle up to 45 degrees. In the second prototype, these weapons were supplanted by a quartet of 45-mm OKB-16-45 (later NS-45) automatic antitank guns, essentially the same weapon with a larger bore and shorter barrel. These formidable weapons fired 1065-gram shells at the same rate with a muzzle velocity of 850 meters/sec, and could guarantee penetration of 58-mm armor. These, too, were clip-fed in the prototype. But the OKB-16 design team already had a fully automatic feed system in test. On their own, these guns fired approximately 1 ton/min, the heaviest weight of fire achieved by any wartime aircraft. For sighting and for attacks on soft targets, eight 7.62-mm ShKAS machine guns were mounted in the wings immediately outboard of the propellers, each gun being capable of rates of fire between 1800 and 2700 rounds/min. In addition, four 150-kg FAB150 general-purpose bombs could be carried in bays between the engines and the wing guns.

Many, perhaps most, heavily armored attack aircraft have emerged overweight, underpowered, and ill-handling. Even the successful ones were often tolerated for their utilitarian virtues rather than loved for their flying qualities. But the Su-8 was reportedly an excellent airplane, with first-rate handling at all design weights. Maximum speed was 311 mph at sea level, 342 mph at 15,000 ft. It could takeoff in 1300 ft and land in 1528 ft at a modest 87 mph. It could climb to 10,000 ft in 7.3 min and to 16,000 ft in 9 min. Service ceiling was 28,000 ft. Range with maximum weapons load was 373 miles, 932 miles without the bombs.

By the time the Su-8 appeared, however, its time was already past, in the eyes of officialdom at least. Russia was clearly winning the war, and anything that might interfere with the production of the existing, war-winning aircraft types was frowned upon. No doubt this was the right decision, given the outcome. But there can also be little doubt that many a Soviet Soldier would have been glad of the assistance of this last and greatest of the Shturmoviks, especially during the last, frantic dash for Berlin, when Soviet spearheads often faced elephantine heavy tanks 150 miles or more from the nearest air support.

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Deja Vu Post-WW2: UNarmored KILLER BEES Get Killed

The problem with armored ANYTHING be it air or ground vehicles is when not needed in peacetime it's dead weight adding to fuel costs and accelerating breakage by increased stresses that are intolerable to lazy & greedy bureaucrats. To which I say, SO FUCKING WHAT? Do you want to WIN? Do you want to SURVIVE upcoming wars? Is this kinder garden or a military outfit USAF or USMC?

If you don't want to do what it takes to prevail in war which means superior mechanization--you have no right to be pretending and destroying lives at tax payer's expense in lives and funds.

During the post-WW2 "Cold War" the combat reality that armor protection and rear defensive armament were slowly forgotten as the experienced veterans left their military bureaucracies. This pattern of normie combat reality denial fed by nihilist/pacifist delusions and bureaucratic laziness and corporate greed is a fatal cocktail that is continually drunk to the present day.

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n1/frcoin.html

Algeria presented France with a set of tactical and political problems as different as the North African terrain differed from that of Indochina. Politically, Algeria was an integral part of the French Republic rather than a colony. Its native Berber and Arab people were technically French citizens. But discrimination was rife, and the European immigrants, the pieds noires, had a stranglehold on local government, owned most of the arable land, and controlled the police. When Arabs and Berbers were belatedly allowed to vote for half of a constituent, provincial assembly in 1948 and 1951, blatant fraud gave the pieds noire candidates a sweeping victory. [Like the DeMOBcrat's Hoe Xiden election 2020 steal] The resulting anti-European riots were savagely repressed, at a cost of thousands of lives.

When long-simmering resentments erupted in open rebellion by the Front pour la Libération Nationale (FLN) in 1954, the Armée de l'Air deployed its best and latest equipment in defense of French Algeria: the new SNCASO SE.535 Mistral jets (license-built DeHavilland Vampires). But they proved woefully ineffective. They lacked endurance and proved hard to maintain in the sand and dust of North Africa. Worse, they were too fast. It was all but impossible to spot and attack small groups of guerillas from a fast jet. The Republic F-47D Thunderbolts of the advanced training units proved more effective, but they were old and parts were all but impossible to obtain. Since there were no propellor-driven replacement fighter-bombers available in 1955, local French commanders began to arm light transports and trainers. Dassault MD.311 Flamants, Morane-Saulnier MS.500s, and the SIPA S.111s and 211s were fitted with machine guns and 37-mm rockets. These airplanes were formed into Escadrilles d'Aviation Legère d'Appui (EALA)—Light Tactical Aviation Squadrons—and used to good effect. With an observer spotting targets from the rear seat, such an aircraft was roughly twice as likely to spot a target as a conventional fighter-bomber and, given the relative unsophistication of the adversary, its light armament (no more than four rockets or two machine guns for the SIPAs and MS.500s) was not too great a handicap.

Even the Best COIN Buys only TIME

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n1/frcoin.html

All this staff-level cerebration resulted in a technical and political tour de force, the counter-insurgency or limited-war doctrine that would in large part shape international relations for the next four decades. Like many earlier French efforts, it was self-consciously revolutionary, extreme, idealistic, and short on the gritty details that often make-or-break real campaigns. While the French theorists conceived a whole range of practical, tactical measures, some of which form the main subject of this article, they did not place much hope in the mechanics of a material struggle that they all but conceded to the Asian and African hoardes. Instead, they recast war as an ideological, moral struggle, a crusade that would be won by the spiritually stronger society. When they tried to define the best way of using France's limited resources in the kind of war she now had to fight, they stressed the esprit de corps of small, élite units, the resourcefulness and self-sacrifice of the wholly committed individual, the professionalism and mystical, sacred honor of the army, and the supposedly world-historical, civilizing mission of France. Combined operations, mobility, intelligence, and psycho-political warfare would be important. But these tactical expedients were only ways of winning time. While France's paladins kept the enemy at bay, the real battle—the battle for hearts and minds—would be fought elsewhere, at home and, above all, in the treasury of the post-war West, the United States.

France's new military doctrine recast France's colonial problems as key battles in the larger struggle with communism, the struggle that preoccupied the United States during the postwar years. French staff officers argued that the U.S. and Britain were feverishly preparing for threats that would never emerge and ignoring the real, present danger. The unprecedented power of nuclear weapons made armored assaults across the North-German plain or nuclear bomber attacks on North America suicidal propositions. The Soviets would never dare to mount all-out, open attacks on the West. Instead, the French insisted, Russia would concentrate on the vulnerable African, Near-Eastern, and Asian fringes of Western society, the sources of the raw materials, cheap labor, and closed markets that Western capitalism supposedly required. Seen in context, third-world nationalism and anticolonialism were thus not simply products of the inequities of colonial administration, as Americans generally assumed in the 1940s. They were fronts for covert Soviet aggression. As Washington blindly watched the European horizon for hordes of tanks and missiles, third-world agitators, trade unionists, and guerillas were quietly sapping the foundations of the Western economy and way of life. The communist assault that Washington feared was, in short, already underway, and the French were in the thick of it, fighting the good fight so that Americans could sleep soundly.

Measured by its success in converting the United States to France's vision of international relations in the nuclear age, limited-war theory was amazingly successful. The support for self- determination that drove American policy during the Roosevelt and early Truman years gave way, by the Eisenhower administration, to whole-hearted if secret support for France's colonial aims and a marked readiness to adopt her methods elsewhere in the third world. By 1952 or so, the policies that would lead America into Vietnam and a score of lesser involvements in Africa and South America were already well-established in Washington.

Initially, success proved more illusive in the field. French planners counted on achieving localized superiority in numbers and firepower to offset the superior human and material resources their opponents could muster in the overall theater of operations. Small, highly motivated bands of commandos would do the work of the much larger conventional armies that France lacked. This strategem presumed a high degree of mobility that was, unfortunately, all but unobtainable under the conditions prevailing in the colonies. In Indochina, [wheeled] trucks bogged down as soon as they strayed from a few easily blocked, ambush-prone roads. In North Africa, they got stuck in desert sand or broke down on rocky, mountain tracks. Armored vehicles proved incapable of providing adequate covering fire. Aging M-8 armored cars bogged down almost as badly as the trucks. In Indochina, [narrow tracked] Stuart and Chaffee light tanks could not ford the myriad waterways or use more than a handful of the bridges. In Algeria, [these] tanks proved too slow, too short on range, and too noisy for hunting small, dispersed bands. [The Italian light tanks were effective re: "Lion of the Desert"] They gave away their presence before they could close with the enemy. Amphibious vehicles, particularly the little, jeep-sized [Wide-tracked but UNarmored] Weasels, could operate anywhere in Indochina. But, with little or no armor and limited payload, they could neither survive nor fight. The élite commandos were frequently confined to a relative handful of garrison towns, where their special skills were useless and their vaunted morale vulnerable to boredom and frustration. [Triphibious, wide-tracked M113 Gavin light tanks solve all of the above]

Air power was thus crucial to counterinsurgency strategy. When airplanes and helicopters replaced vulnerable, ambush-prone road [wheeled truck] convoys, the pace of operations and, with it, the likelihood of success increased enormously. [Watch the superb, fact-based "Lost Command"] Guerillas could not concentrate rapidly enough to overrun outposts before reinforcements arrived. Nor could they easily disperse or evade pursuit. Since route security was no longer necessary, far fewer troops were necessary. Major operations could be mounted by relative handfuls of professional light infantry—Foreign Legionaires, paras and marine commandos. It was even hoped that, in the absence of aerial opposition, modern combat aircraft could give the airborne force the firepower that light infantry had lacked in the past. With napalm, rockets, fragmentation bombs, and machine guns, a few pilots could, perhaps, do most of the killing from the safety of the air, before the infantry arrived. Survivors could then be kept constantly on the run and never allowed to rest or regroup. Most importantly of all, air power could greatly reduce the political vulnerability of colonial operations. By reducing the need for large numbers of French troops, air strikes minimized casualties and obviated much of the need for unpopular, large-scale conscription.

French forces had too few aircraft to provide the level of support the army needed, and the available airplanes were worn, out of production, and ill-suited to their new roles. The United States refused to allow its European allies to use U.S.-supplied equipment against their erstwhile colonial subjects, so the bulk of France's air force—P-47Ds based in Europe—could not be sent to Indochina. When nationalist Viet Minh insurgents resisted the reimposition of French rule in their homeland, Armée de l'Air units were at first forced to use abandoned Japanese aircraft, including Nakajima Ki.43 Hayabusa fighters and Aichi E13A-1 seaplanes. These were supplemented by the German wartime types tht were built in France during the occupation. The Amiot AAC.1 Toucan (Junkers Ju-52) was used for transport and paratrooping duties, and the Morane-Saulnier Criquet (Fieseler Fi-156 Storch) performed communications, observation, forward air control, and convoy escort missions.

In 1948 and '49, the rapid collapse of the Kuomintang regime in China and the apparently cordial relations between the Viet Minh and Mao's Communist party caused the U.S. to relent and allow France to deploy some of its American equipment in Southeast Asia. 50x Bell P-63C Kingcobras were hurriedly despatched from Europe. They proved well suited to the climate [TBATE] and the prevailing type of operations. Their range was better than the Spitfires, and were highly resistant to the ever-increasing volume of groundfire [TBAM] that French pilots faced over Viet Minh-dominated areas. The lifting of the ban on U.S. warplanes also let the French Aéronavale take a more active role in the conflict. The light carrier Arromanches took up station in the gulf of Tonkin and used its SB2C Helldivers, F6F-5 Hellcats, and, eventually, F4U-7 Corsairs to good effect during the remainder of the campaign. Douglas SBD-5 Dauntless dive bombers and Consolidated PB4Y-2 Privateers operated from shore bases. The Long time on station and heavy bombloads made the Privateers particularly useful. They were often pressed into service as flareships during night assaults on French positions.

The Korean War was thus a lucky break for France. While the immediate needs of the U.S. services at first precluded delivery of aircraft the French especially wanted—notably B-26 Invaders, F-51 Mustangs, and additional Corsairs—Russian and Chinese involvement seemed to confirm France's interpretation of third-world nationalism. A global communist conspiracy seemed more plausible in Washington when Chinese soldiers were crowding round the Pusan perimeter. In 1950, after considering and rejecting a large-scale supply of B-25s and F-47s—replacement parts could no longer be had in the quantities required for operatinal use—U.S. authorities decided to supply France with a single squadron of B-26 Invaders—25 aircraft—as an interim measure. The French would also be given priority access to all materiel not immediately required by frontline U.N. units. Ex-USAF C-47 transports soon replaced the inadequate Toucan in the transport role. The Aéronavale received additional Hellcats in lieu of Corsairs (though the specially built F4U-7 and some surplus AU-1s were supplied later), while the Armée de l'Air got the Grumman F8F-1 Bearcat, a type relegated to Navy Reserve and National Guard units in the U.S. A further five RB-26C reconnaissance airplanes and 16 B-26C bombers arrived in 1952. Armed with napalm, 500-lb demolition bombs, M1A1 fragmentation clusters, 5-in HVAR rockets, and .50-cal [heavy] machineguns (up to fourteen on the B-26s, most of which had the late-war, 6-gun wings and both turrets) or 20-mm cannon (many F8Fs and F6Fs and all the Corsairs) the new strike aircraft were reasonably effective. But they were still too few, and the single-engined types lacked the range and endurance that were increasingly necessary now that Viet Minh were now concentrated in Laos and along the Chinese border (the mainstay of the fighter-bomber force, the F8F, had, after all, been designed as a short-range, high-performance interceptor of Kamikazes).

With the end of the Korean War in early 1954, the United States greatly stepped up its involvement in French Indochina. But, to maintain the "plausible deniability" that rendered so many poorly thought-out Southeast-Asian schemes palatable to American administrations, the intervention was placed in the hands of the CIA and its proprietary airline, Air America. To meet France's need for airlift capacity and long-range, high-endurance strike aircraft, USAF C-119 transports and B-26s were flown from Korea to Taiwan and the Philippines for overhaul. They were "sanitized" (rendered anonymous and hopefully untraceable), then transferred to the CIA for use in Indochina. USAF volunteers were "sheep-dipped"—stripped of the most obvious signs of their ongoing service connections—and transferred to Air America as C-119 pilots and loadmasters. 200 active-duty USAF B-26 mechanics were quietly seconded to the Armée de l'Air to maintain the CIA's bomber force, on the condition that they serve only in secure areas, where they could not be captured or spotted by reporters.

This infusion of airpower was, however, too little and too late for the French in Indochina. They never achieved the level of mobility and the firepower that their new tactical doctrines required. Nor had they put the necessary effort into civil action and political operations. Air transport and strike forces were manifestly inadequate, despite U.S. involvement. When the French mounted their last and greatest exercise in counterinsurgency warfare in Indochina, the battle of Dien Bien Phu, it was a disaster. The plan called for a modest garrison of élite paras and Legionaires to parachute into a remote valley deep in enemy territory. Aerial resupply and aerial firepower would turn this seemingly exposed and isolated position into an impregnable fortress. Viet Minh troops would rush out into the open plane, intent on swallowing up the deceptively vulnerable French position, and air strikes would annihilate them, winning the war more or less at a single stroke. Unfortunately for the paras, French and American planners had seriously overestimated their ability to resupply and support the force deployed from the air. C-47s and C-119s could not mount enough sorties or carry enough food and ammunition in the face of bad weather [TBATE] and heavy enemy fire [TBAM]. At first, only B-26s and PB4Y-2 Privateers could provide any useful coverage of Dien Bien Phu. Bearcats could manage only a single strafing run over the target areas and, even then, had to carry so much extra fuel for the round trip that they could carry no bombs or rockets. By building an airstrip inside the perimeter at Dien Bien Phu, the French were able to base a half-dozen Bearcats at Dien Bien Phu. The strip was long enough for C-47s (but not C-119s), so the French, were for a time, able to supply bombs, ammunition, and food and could evacuate some of the wounded. They even flew in a bulldozer and a couple of dismantled [M24] Chaffee [light] tanks. But the flying artillery that the plan counted on was no match for the 75- and 105-mm howitzers that Gen. Giap's soldiers had laboriously hauled cross country to Dien Bien Phu. Heavy shelling quickly made the airstrip unusable, drastically reducing the flow of supplies into the base. The Bearcats could no longer operate from the valley, sharply reducing the volume and timeliness of air support. Giap's heavy automatic weapons—12.7-mm machine guns and 37-mm antiaircraft guns emplaced on the heights above the valley—took a heavy toll of the strike aircraft and transports. Much of available strike capacity had to be dedicated to flak suppression, just so the C-119s could drop desperately needed ammunition and plasma into a rapidly shrinking French perimeter. When Dien Bien Phu finally collapsed, the French war effort in Southeast Asia collapsed with it, and colonial rule came to an end.

As the last, ragged defenders of Dien Bien Phu were being overrun, in May 1954, U.S. President Eisenhower came close to repudiating France's subtle, limited-war strategy in the bluntest way possible—a nuclear strike on Viet Minh positions using unmarked USAF B-29 bombers. Only the difficulty of identifying a worthwhile target and the rapidity of the final collapse prevented him. The idea of low-intensity conflict seemed to have failed miserably, so much so that only massive escalation seemed capable of containing the Red menace. Half a world away, however, French officers were already applying the lessons of Indochina to a new insurgency on France's doorstep, in Algeria.

By 1957, newly independent Tunisia had become a major source of supply for the FLN. The French responded with the Morice Line, an elaborate system of sensors, electrified border fences, mine fields, and forts stretching the length of Algeria's eastern border. When an incursion was discovered, either by sensors or reconnaissance aircraft, B-26s and Aéronavale Privateers, Lancasters, and, later, Lockheed P2V Neptunes would attack the intruders continuously until helicopter-borne [or C-47 fixed-wing transported] paras could arrive on the scene. The border fortifications worked reasonably well, but French authorities were aware that they could be easily breached by light aircraft. [like the USA's southern border] When air-defense radars at the Bône naval base seemed to show multiple tracks at low altitudes and low air speeds over the line, two radar-equipped MD-315 light transports were hastily despatched for night fighting duty. Predictably, they proved too slow and too short on endurance. The French then decided that they needed a special colonial night fighter. A small number of Invaders were thus converted and given the designation B-26N. The aircraft had British AI Mk.X radar (from French Meteor NF.11s), and an armament of two underwing gun pods, each housing two .50-cal machine guns, and two MATRA 122 pods for SNEB air-to-air rockets. By 1961, the B-26N fighters had intercepted 38 light aircraft and helicopters, downing nine.

However, a private, California firm, Pacific Airmotive, was then offering a more powerful, civilianized T-28A called the Nomad. In place of the 800-hp Wright R-1300 of the T-28A, the Nomad mounted a 1425-hp Wright R1820-76A Cyclone salvaged from B-17G stocks. Performance was excellent, but there were few civilian takers. France accordingly contracted with Pacific Airmotive for the design of a Nomad variant fitted with armorplate, reinforced wings, and increased cockpit ventilation: the T-28S Fennec ("Desert Fox"). Under the agreement, the California firm supplied design drawings, engines, and airframes for shipment to France, where Sud-Aviation would perform the conversion and install French equipment, armament, and sand filters. Fennecs were strenghtened to take four underwing weapons pylons. The two inner pylons usually carried French-designed pods for twin .50-cal (12.7-mm) machine guns. The outer pylons could carry shortened 440-lb bombs, 7- or 36-round pods of 37- or 68-mm rockets, napalm, or single 105- or 120-mm rockets. By 1961, over 100 Fennecs were operating with four EALAs in Algeria, with 50 more in reserve or final assembly.

During the same period, France sought a heavier, piston-engined fighter-bomber to complement the Fennecs. While the converted trainers had served well, none had proved entirely capable of replacing the long-since retired F-47 Thunderbolts. While WW2 fighters were, of course, all but unobtainable at this late date, fairly large quantities of piston-engined U.S. Navy attack aircraft were just becoming available. As jet types entered service, the Navy began to send the older marks of Douglas Skyraider to the Davis-Monthan boneyard. Among these were a large number of 2-seat, AD4N night-attack bombers retired at the end of the Korean War. The Armée de l'Air ordered 113 in 1956 and deliveries commenced in 1958. The Skyraiders were stripped of their specialized equipment and operated as conventional, daylight close-support aircraft. Like the Fennecs, the Skyraiders had only a short career in Algeria. But they nonetheless proved to be the most successful of all the ad hoc COIN airplanes deployed by the French. While the Fennecs, Tomcats, and Invaders were rapidly sold off at the end of the Algerian War, AD4Ns continued in active service until the late 1970s. They were heavily involved in the civil war in Chad, at first with the Armée de l'Air, and later with a nominally independent local air force staffed by French mercenaries. The aircraft also operated under the French flag in Djibouti and on the island of Madagascar. When France at last relinquished the Skyraiders ca. 1970, it passed the survivors on to client states, including Gabon and Cambodia (several aircraft from Gabon and Chad have been recovered recently by French warbird enthusiasts and entered on the French civil register).

Transport presented fewer problems than close support, and conventional aircraft, such as the venerable C-47 and the twin-boom Nord N2501 Noratlas, generally sufficed for most purposes. Nevertheless, the French services quickly saw a need for an aircraft that was smaller than its smallest transport type and capable of STOL performance, yet larger than the STOL grasshopper/AOP types then available. In the early 1950s, the Max Holste firm (later Reims Aviation) developed its commercially unsuccessful design for a light observation aircraft into a six-seat airplane able to combine the roles of observation platform, casualty evacuation aircraft, and commando transport. The MH-1521M Broussard proved an enormous success for the small Holste company. Between 1953 and 1959, 362 were built for the Armée de l'Air and, more importantly, for the Army's ALAT. With its 45-ft wingspan, twin tails, and 450-hp Pratt & Whitney R-985 piston engine, the Broussard could take off in 200 yds. Yet it had a 700-mile range. The aircraft served with ALAT long after the Algerian war, and many were subsequently passed on to former colonies or to Portugal, then locked in its own colonial wars further south in Africa.

****

The French Realize a HUNTER/KILLER Fixed-Wing Aircraft Combination is Needed for CAS/MAS

Does today's USAF realize this yet?

HUNTER

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n1/frcoin.html

A leading contender for the first requirement was also one of the last products of the pioneering Morane-Saulnier firm. The MS.1500 Epervier ("Sparrowhawk") was a two-seat, low-wing airplane with a rugged, fixed landing gear, and a bulbous canopy. The cockpit was placed well forward, ahead of the wing, for optimum visibility. Four 7.5-mm machine guns were mounted in the wings and light ordnance loads, including AS.11 missiles, could be caried under the wings. Light armor protected the crew from ground fire. The first prototype (shown in the accompanying illustration) first flew with a 400-shp Turboméca Marcadau turboprop engine, but was later re-engined with the planned production powerplant, the substantially more powerful, 805-shp Bastan. The Epervier could reach a modest top speed of 199 mph at 5000 ft (206 mph at 10,000 ft). Initial climb was about 1800 ft/min. Normal range was 528 miles (808 miles max). The airplane weighed 3505 lbs empty and 5512 lbs loaded (max. 6062 lbs). It spanned 42 ft 10 in was 34 ft 8.5 in long, and had a wing area of 258 sq ft.

KILLER

A clone of the OV-1 Mohawk but with troop/cargo space!

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n1/frcoin.html

The Sud-Aviation SE.117 Voltigeur ("Skirmisher") was, with the Dassault Spirale, a competitor for the twin-engined requirement. The SE.117 was a 2- to 6-seat multi-role aircraft armed with two 30-mm DEFA cannon in semi-external, fuselage pods. Underwing loads could include one 1000-lb and two 500-lb bombs, 24 rockets, or four AS.11 missiles. The pilot and co-pilot/observer sat side-by-side in an extensively glazed nose compartment, well ahead of the low-mounted wing. To facilitate air-to-ground operations at low level, large, perforated dive brakes were fitted on the rear fuselage. The first prototype, the SE.116, flew in December 1958 powered by a pair of 800-hp, Wright R-1300 Cyclone piston engines. Production versions would have had Bastan turboprops. The estimated maximum speed for the Voltigeur was 277 mph (236 mph cruising). Initial climb rate was to be 2677 ft/min and ceiling was 30,800 ft. Range topped 1100 miles and endurance was more than 5 hours. The airplane spanned 59 ft, was 40 ft 6 in long, and had a wing area of 443.5 sq ft.

Other contenders:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIPA_S.1100

https://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/passion/aircraft/military-dassault-aircraft/md-410-spirale/

SIDE BAR: Helicopters are CRAP

https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&u=http://www.portierramaryaire.com/foro/viewtopic.php?t%3D4418%26start%3D30

In line with the above, ALAT not only deploys helicopters. It has a dozen Pilatus PC-6, TBM-700 and Cessna F406 Caravan II aircraft for liaison and logistics missions. And they have the idea of ​​expanding this fixed-wing fleet in that same February appearance, their commander, General Grintchenko, had explained that the aircraft could be an interesting complement to helicopters, especially for transport, since their acquisition and operating costs They seemed much shorter, he already defended this idea during a parliamentary hearing in October 2018 before the French Senate.

Where he stated that "On the fixed-wing strategy, the comparison of the cost of the NH90 flight hour with that of Pilatus is unequivocal; in fact, for some missions, one could very well use a Pilatus for missions that are currently being performed. with an NH90 ", in the same interview in Air Fan he said that       "The plane has several advantages. First, it is much cheaper to buy, around 5 million euros against 20 to 30 million, depending on the type of helicopter, while it is also much less expensive to use, about 1,000 euros per flight hour versus 15 to 20,000 for a helicopter. Or a ratio of 15 to 20 in daily use. Also, because they require less maintenance, our aircraft deployed in operations it currently runs at 100 hours per month, compared to 30 for our helicopters. Finally, spinning wings have short legs and carry little." According to this command, the need would be for 15 additional aircraft. The choice of the device (Pilatus PC-12 or Cessna Grand Caravan) has not yet been finalized, nor the mode of acquisition.

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n2/portcoin.html

All were soon withdrawn. In desperation, the Portuguese turned to the only available STOL type that offered any improvement in payload over the Austers, the Dornier Do-27. The Dornier was essentially a light aircraft. It was powered by a 270-hp Lycoming. Yet, with 200 hp less than the Broussard, it lifted an equivalent payload, 6-8 passengers and crew. It was also rugged, versatile, and, with the simple, horizontally opposed Lycoming engine, economical to operate. After extensive tests, Portugal ordered 16 Do-27Ks, essentially the Luftwaffe's Do27A-4 with a strengthened, wide-track undercarriage, extra fuel tanks, and underwing hard points. These hard points allowed the aircraft to serve in a[n Airborne] FAC (Forward Air Control) role with smoke-marker rockets or in the light close-support role with an 18-round pod of 37-mm MATRA SNEB rockets under each wing (interestingly, this rocket was also adapted for use in the standard, infantry bazooka of the Portuguese army). All aircraft were painted in standard Portuguese colors: bare-metal wings and grey fuselage with a white top and a blue cheat line. [MISTAKE: what camouflage is this?] A second batch of 24 Do-27K-2s was received in 1962, all in overall aluminum finish. Finally, from 1963 on, as the German army and air force began to retire the Do-27, the German government passed many of the aircraft on to Portugal. In all, 106 Do-27A-1, A-3s, A-4s, and B-1s were taken on charge. All retained their German finish, generally NATO-standard Green and grey camouflage, [Better camouflage] sometimes with bright, day-glo orange cowls or wing tips.

The Dorniers proved popular and highly successful in use, though losses were comparatively heavy. Though vulnerable to ground fire, the rocket-armed Do-27Ks were useful close-support aircraft. But they were in increasingly short supply (11 were lost in action). Several attempts were thus made to arm the German-surplus aircraft, all of which lacked the wing hardpoints that made rocket armament possible. A number of Do-27A-1 and A-4 aircraft were fitted with fuselage racks for two 50-kg bombs and used in action, but the modification does not appear to have been successful enough for gneral adoption. A K-1 was given an experimental door mounting for a 1200 round-per-minute MG42 machine gun and successfully tested using a circling, gunship-style flight path. Though this would have been the easiest way of arming the Do-27As, it was not accepted for service use. Light aircraft could not survive in the face of the increasingly common 12.7-mm machine gun fire.

Portuguese scientists invented a special, "anti-radiation" paint that was supposed to absorb the infrared emissions, smooth out the hot spots, and thus make the aircraft harder to distinguish and harder to lock on to. This dead-flat, olive drab was used in conjunction with tiny, 20-cm, low-visibility, low-reflectivity roundels. Most (but not all) serving Portuguese piston-engined aircraft— including B-26s, T-6s, C-47s, Noratlases, and Do-27s—were repainted to the new standard shortly before Portugal withdrew.

****

Why not a 20mm autocannon that could out-range enemy 12.7mm HMGs for stand-off attacks? Mount it pointing down from the Do-27K's fuselage door.

Summary/Conclusion

The French military's success in Algeria made them conclude 2x types of FIXED-WING (not crap helicopters) STOL aircraft are needed to prevail in Sub-National Conflicts (SNCs) a long duration, agile HUNTER and a heavier, heavy-ordnance-delivering KILLER with a small commando/cargo capability--conclusions similar to the OV-1 Mohawk/OV-10 Broncos the USMIL once had but unwisely lost.

We have KILLERS--will the USMIL beyond the A-10 Warthog realize and acquire armored STOL O/A or O/A/L MUDFIGHTERS to HUNT for them? AFSOC has an opportunity to fix this with its Armed Overwatch program:

https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2021/05/futurewarthink-030-is-this-casmas-close.html

MILITARY WORLD

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Star Trek Saves the STOL Grasshoppers

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SPY WORLD

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MI-007 Indiana Jones, James Bond is REAL Universe (JBIRU)

ENTER THE REAL WORLD OF 007 JAMES BOND & INDIANA JONES!  

1933-45: "SPYMAKER: The Secret Life of Ian Fleming"

https://www.bitchute.com/video/IOvCQkiKYUkY/

1942: "The Silent Enemy"

https://www.bitchute.com/video/giUDl9U3bik3/

1944: 007 Indiana Jones: "FAST GETAWAY"

https://jamesbondisreal.blogspot.com/2021/05/007-indiana-jones-fast-getway.html

1945: "James Bond is Born" (JBIB)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/jHwnQ76xxh4P/

1953: "Moonraker" (MR)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/o3IzV3N6TuN7/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFINj5ol6l4

1954: "Live & Let Die" (LALD)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/PQUnQIOtvoMN/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7I7GPcGMpk

1958-Present: "007 Indiana Jones & the Danger of the Lost Moon" [9, 000 words]

https://jamesbondisreal.blogspot.com/2021/05/007-indiana-jones-and-danger-of-lost.html

1959: "Thunderball" (TB)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/nfwJtCtBqcc2/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNgD2ka4rbI

1962: "On Her Majesty's Secret Service" (OHMSS)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/xIvI37va4ebn/

1962: "Dr. No" 

https://www.bitchute.com/video/TW3R1vJHoeu9/

1963: "From Russia with Love" (FRWL)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/c3i9FpGBG3dY/

1964: "Goldfinger" (GF)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/l5COSIZmqOg6/

https://www.bitchute.com/video/Hgp19VkJO8sn/

1965: "The Man with the Golden Gun" (TMWTGG)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/UlXBvUIAXfDA/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wM33uYpJnyQ

1966: "You Only Live Twice" (YOLT)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/nRJkIwW4SYPK/

1967: "The New Spy Against Divided Evil" (NSADE)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/QXCseztn6931/

2009: "Casino Royale" & "Quantum of Solace" (CR & QoS)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/6fItlF6W1rDa/

2011: "The Point of Gravity"

https://www.bitchute.com/video/RJPKRNwSqUFz/

www.jamesbondisforreal.com/CHAPTER16CONTINUATIONPAGE.htm

2013: "MASQUERADE: Everything is NOT What it Appears"

www.combatreform.org/masquerade007shortstory1.htm

2015: "The Bell Tolls for Thee: The Poppy is Also a Flower" (TBTFT)

https://www.bitchute.com/video/5LFkc3WzlfaF/

https://www.bitchute.com/video/yEFnjIT58AeL/

https://www.bitchute.com/video/c6YCW5kL9jeh/

2021: "Jeannie in a Bottle"

https://www.bitchute.com/video/qzf8DMdbIssO/

More 007 Indiana Jones Adventures to Come!!

Semper

https://www.combatreform.org/2LTMichaelSparksUSMCR.htm

Airborne!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkRaE3UEags

Commander Ian Fleming RNVR 1939-51 wrote the James Bond 007 books/movies for the Information Research Division (IRD) of MI6-SIS who he worked for as a Master Spy under journalistic cover from 1933-39 and 1945-1964 when he was murdered (as concluded by legendary investigative reporter, Jim Marrs to me) to prevent him publicly condemning the Warren Commission white wash of the CIA's group ambush murder of his friend, President John F. Kennedy.

https://www.bitchute.com/video/hlwjiDU6qoF1/

https://www.bitchute.com/video/jHwnQ76xxh4P/

https://www.bitchute.com/channel/Sj9CnXlfNz62/

https://www.exopermaculture.com/2012/05/27/new-book-claims-that-ian-fleming-was-james-bond-his-fiction-was-real-and-drawn-from-his-own-life/

http://www.jamesbondisforreal.com

James Bond is REAL.