RetroWARTHINK 014: Taking Pikes to a Gunfight: Chinese Infantry with 7.62mm SKS and AKM Automatic Rifles Kicked Indians with Bolt-Action Rifles' Asses in the 1962 War

Dummy-corded mittens, Stick Hand Grenades; Chest Rig with Lots of PRELMs: What's Not to Like?

In previous posts, we condemned the British Army for not adopting Semi-Automatic Rifles (SARs) in World Wars 1 and 2. However, the Indian Army was along for these horrific rides--yet were content with its entire Army still equipped with Lee-Enfield SMLE bolt-action rifles in 1962--where they had their asses kicked by Communist Chinese (CHICOMs) with SKS and AKM, SARs and Assault Rifles (ARs). With the CHICOMs itchy in India's backyard as we speak, its time we look at went wrong and if India is better prepared this time around?

https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2020/06/futurewarthink-016-china-getting-itchy.html

The bolt-action riflemen surrounding a Light Machine Gun (LMG) force structure was followed by several nation's armies in WW2 that dismally failed resulting in desperation measures to replace the former with SARs. Nationalist China originally advised by German officers wisely built their infantry squads around the superb Bren LMG shooting the same German rimless 7.92mm (8mm) Mauser cartridges their Kar98 bolt-action riflemen used. The Germans advised the Chinese to form into combined-arms forces--but ended up as infantry-centric, peasant armies without artillery & tanks.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-German_cooperation_(1926%E2%80%931941)

Von Falkenhausen believed that it was too optimistic to expect the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) to be supported by armor and heavy artillery because the industry lacked the necessary capacity. Thus, he emphasized the creation of a mobile force that relied on small arms and would be adept with infiltration tactics, like those of the German stormtroopers around the end of World War I. German officers were called into China as military advisers, like Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Voigt-Ruscheweyh, who acted as adviser to the Artillery Firing School in Nanking from 1933 to 1938.[26]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Revolutionary_Army

The NRA's 9mm Browning Hi-Power also came with a holster-stock

For regular provincial Chinese divisions the standard rifles were the Hanyang 88 (copy of Gewehr 88). Central army divisions were typically equipped with the Chiang Kai-shek rifle and other Mauser--type rifles from Germany, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. The standard light machine gun were imported or domestically produced of the Czech Brno ZB vz. 26 in the standard 7.92 mm. There were machine guns from other sources, such as Belgian, French and from the Soviet Aid Programme. In general, there were 6-9 LMG's in an infantry company, with the monthly ammunition supply being around 5,000 rounds (for 5 days consumption). Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made Type 24 water-cooled Maxim guns (which were based on the commercial version of the German MG08), and Type Triple-Ten M1917 Browning machine guns chambered for the standard 8mm Mauser round. On average, every Central Army battalion contained a machine gun company with 5-6 heavy machine guns. They were allotted a monthly supply of 20,000 rounds. The most common sidearm for NCOs and officers was the 7.63 mm Mauser C96 semi-automatic pistol [EDITOR: which had a shoulder stock/holster]. Submachine guns were not part of any TO&E, but many were inherited from former warlord armies or locally produced. They were generally carried by the guards of divisional or corps commanders or special service platoon/companies. Some elite units, such as the X Force in Burma used Lend-Lease U.S. equipment.

Generally speaking, the regular provincial army divisions did not possess any artillery. However, some Central Army divisions were equipped with 37mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortars from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurn. Each of these infantry divisions ideally had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20 mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with Bofors 72 mm L/14, or Krupp 72 mm L/29 mountain guns and there were 24 Rheinmetall 150 mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Krupp 150 mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936). At the start of the war, the NRA and the Tax Police Regiment had three tank battalions armed with German Panzer I light tanks and CV-35 tankettes. After defeat in the Battle of Shanghai, the remaining tanks, together with several hundred T-26 and BT-5 tanks acquired from the Soviet Union were reorganised into the 200th Division.

Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Puttees were standard for Soldiers and officers alike, since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. Troops were also issued sewn field caps. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 Stahlhelms rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, usually seen with the Blue Sky with a White Sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. These helmets were worn by both the German-trained divisions and regular Central Army divisions. Other helmets included the French Adrian helmet, the British Brodie helmet and later the American M1 helmet. Other equipment included straw shoes for Soldiers (cloth shoes for Central Army), leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every Soldier was issued ammunition for his weapon, along with ammunition pouches or harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a gas mask.

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When cleverly advised to emulate the Romans, the NRA defeated the Maoist communist guerrillas--as well as the Japanese.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_von_Seeckt

In early 1934, Seeckt advised Chiang that to defeat the Chinese Communists was to wage a scorched earth policy, which required building a series of lines and forts around areas controlled by the Communists in the Jiangxi Soviet in order to force the Communist guerrillas to fight in the open, where the superior firepower of the Nationalists would give them an advantage.[87] Following Seeckt's advice, in the spring and summer of 1934 the Kuomintang built three thousand "turtle shell" forts linked by a series of roads while at the same time pursuing a scorched earth policy around the forts as part of the Fifth Bandit Extermination Campaign in Jiangxi.[4][87] It was Seeckt's tactics that led to a series of defeats suffered by the Chinese Communists that finally in October 1934 led to the famous Long March.[88]

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One wonders if Seeckt had lived if the NRA could have completely defeated the Communists at WW2's end--or even if he could have steered Germany back home to victory? 

Its a good thing he died in 1936! I would not be surprised if this military genius was MURDERED like Colonel Bauer was by bio-hit small pox in 1929. James Bond is REAL. 

German WW2 Infantry Weapons

With the NRA using lots of Bren-type LMGs shooting German ammo aka GermiBrens...the thought does occur that MAYBE--the U.K. Army should have ditched 7.7mm/.303 cal RIMMED for 7.92mm aka 8mm Mauser RIMLESS to improve its Bren LMG feeding and be able to use captured German ammo against them. Previously, we proposed the U.K. Army going to American 7.62mm/.30/06 before WW2 since in event of existential war, the U.S.A. would be their lifeline supplier. The U.S. ARMY could have adopted the Bren as a LMG better than the BAR (30-round or larger PRELMs, quick barrel changes etc.) and focused upgraded lightened, BARs with pistol grips, fluted barrels, plastic furniture insuring their 20-round PRELMs worked in AmeriBren LMGs--and the latter's 30-rounders vice-a-versa albeit not from the prone into a Designated Automatic Rifleman (DAR) in each rifle squad. Maybe the BAR could have been changed to SIDE feed instead of bottom feed that limited it to 20-round magazines lest prone firing be blocked. Certainly, the 8-shot en bloc-fed, M1 Garands could have fired from both 5-round stripper clips and 20-round, BAR PRELMs similar to the fabulous Johnson LMG though it used a weird single-stack, side-mounted 20-round magazine and could be topped off with another 5 rounds from a stripper clip for a total of 25 ready rounds for Maximum Rounds Start (MRS). 

If this is not radical enough to ponder, WHAT IF the U.S. ARMY standardized into 7.92mm Mauser for its M1 Garands, AmeriBrens, BARs, and all other 7.62mmish machine guns--instead of .30 cal/06--to be able to use captured ammo against German foes???    

The Supply Your Allies with Bolt-Action Rifles for Rebellions/Cheapo National Defense Mentality

CIA-instigated Guatemalan rebels with MC bolt-action rifles on the left...

The CIA bought up thousands of Italian Mannlicher-Carcano (MC) bolt-action 6.5mm shooting rifles to be their signature yet untraceable to them legalistically. 

Italian WW2 Infantry Weapons

4, 000, 000 6.5mm rounds were bought by the CIA under BS USMC cover; operative Hemming says for the Guatemala PB SUCCESS operation in 1954. 

CIA Operative Gerald Hemming on MCs being Supplied to Rebels

The Infamous MC Rifle

https://youtu.be/G4OEbADUESo

Having patsy Harvey Oswald buy a mail-order, MC was a way to further showboat that the CIA murdered President JFK in Dulles, Texas instigated by embittered ex-director and Nazi traitor Allen Dulles. Supplying thousands of 7mm/.303 Lee-Enfields to Tibetan rebels would give off a Indo-British flavor to American CIA dirty trickery. 

The MC weirdly keeps its en bloc clip during what we generically call Stripper Clip Loading (SCL). So why-in-the-hell could someone load just 4 rounds into an en bloc clip designed for 6--asking for a jam as the MILINDCOMP conspirators accused Harvey Oswald of doing? Can you even load a MC en bloc with just 3-4 cartridges into the gun?

FRAUD VITIATES EVERYTHING (FVE).

The Dallas PD screwing up the planted MC with only 3 spent cases and 1 live round for a total of 4 with the en bloc sticking out the bottom is absurd--no real shooter would have anything less than the full 6x cartridges in the en bloc. The fact that the Dallas PD fraudulently contrived this as evidence discards THE ENTIRE LONE NUT narrative, period.  

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/22249-is-it-possible-to-insert-the-carcano-9138-clip-with-less-than-6-bullets/

Tom Neal
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Tom Neal
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Posted September 16, 2015

According to the WC, the 91/38 found on the 6th floor of the TSBD contained 1 live round, and 3 shells were found on the floor of the "sniper's nest." This indicates the rifle contained 4 bullets prior to the firing of the 1st shot. A full clip holds 6 bullets.

Can a clip containing only 4 rounds be inserted, or is a full clip a requirement?

Of course it's possible that a full clip was inserted, 2 shots were fired, and then the rifle was transported to the TSBD, but it seems reasonable to assume a shooter would want the maximum number of shots possible to assure a kill.

Before I go online seeking an owner of a 91/38, does anyone have contact information for an owner?

TIA for any thoughts/info,

Tom

Chris Newton
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Chris Newton
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Interests:solving puzzles
Posted September 16, 2015 (edited)

Tom,

You can load any number of rounds in the clip from 1-6. I've only seen them sold in full clips although it's really easy to manually load a pre-used clip. I've also seen newer ammunition sold with older clips.

Here's a decent vid of a 91/38 owner firing - note he had to push out the clip manually a couple times after ejecting the last round.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZLbaC3Gp-8

The fact that they found less than a full clip's ammo has always made me think it's entirely bullsh_t.

Note: the box displayed is ammo that is 3 lots (#6003) away from Oswald's purported ammo - lot #6000.

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http://forum.assassinationofjfk.net/index.php/topic/560-hemming-on-the-mannlicher-carcano/

Bob Prudhomme
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Location western Canada

First, it is possible to load a partially loaded clip into a Carcano and operate it, though it is not an easy thing to do. The imbalance allows the empty end of the clip to warp, and makes it difficult to "click" into place.

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MC en bloc with 6x 6.5mm rounds

How to load a Carcano Mannlicher [en bloc] clip

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-OgUm69Zao
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/6.5%C3%9752mm_Carcano

The MC weirdly ejects its clip when the last, 6th round is ejected out the action's BOTTOM. Thus, the famous photo of the alleged MC with a clip sticking out the bottom suggests--as Dr. James Fetzer writes--the conspirators ignorant of how the weapon worked jamming it in there. 

https://books.google.com/books?id=1BONAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA17&lpg=PA17&dq=mannlicher-carcano+ejected+from+bottom&source=bl&ots=2-UiGuF0-T&sig=ACfU3U22z-uI792Khonzlo5XiqHlkpqurg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjhgJbb55fqAhVJmK0KHU5_CSQQ6AEwD3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=mannlicher-carcano%20ejected%20from%20bottom&f=false

For long-range sniping a bolt-action rifle is fine if you can stay at a safe stand-off and get away--but for an infantry rifle where you must close with the enemy you're likely to be picked off and killed doing so since you cannot fire & move effectively. Its one of the reasons Germany lost WW2 against Russian SVT-40 SARs and PPsh41 SMGS and American M1 Garands and Thompsons, British Sten SMGs.   

A Designated Marksman (DM) or Designated Rifle Marksman (DRM) with a bolt-action 12.7mm/.50 caliber rifle to save weight should be a part of every infantry squad for long-ranged, High Explosive (HE) fires using Raufoss ammo to pre-detonate car/truck bombs from a safe distance.  

combatreform.org/highexplosives.htm

When moving into/out of the squad's Mini-Base-of-Fire (MBOF), the DM/DRM could carry his bolt-action lightweight .50 cal slung across his back or in the FIREteam's unpowered or electrically-propelled, All-Terrain, All-purpose Cart/Sleds (ATACS) or light tracked mother or resupply shuttling vehicle. The 4-man FIREteam's MBOF suppresses the enemy for its brother, 4-man MANEUVERteam.  

ATACS

https://jamesbondisreal.blogspot.com/2020/06/tactismart023-vikings-know-best-towing.html

LIGHTning Infantry 

https://1sttac.blogspot.com/2020/06/futurewarthink-013-lightning-infantry.html

In the DM/DRM's hands should be at least a lightweight 5.56mm Personal Defense Weapon (PDW) aka SAR to counter possible enemy ambushes while the FIREteam's positions itself to be a MBOF. 

The Indian Rifle Debacle--Continued Until Just Recently

https://www.quora.com/Is-the-Indian-Army-fearful-of-the-Chinese-especially-after-being-defeated-once

Is the Indian Army fearful of the Chinese especially after being defeated once?

The "IN" Crowd: Chinese Soldiers IN INdia IN 1962

Aditya Cherukuri, Read a few books, watched a few docs and talked to a few veterans

Updated Oct 11, 2017 · Author has 101 answers and 477.4k answer views

Originally Answered: Is the Indian Army fearful of the Chinese especially after the shameful defeat at their hands?

Let me tell you what happened back in 1962, we had an army that did not have winter clothing and wasn’t well prepared for high altitude combat (unlike today, after we have fought many wars and skirmishes, not to mention insurgency and infiltration attempts for many decades now!). The Chinese on the other hand were quite well-prepared and were battle-hardened troops. The Chinese Civil war that happened between the Nationalists KMT and the Communists PLA came to an end in 1949. The PLA absorbed most of their foes into their own ranks after some political re-education (which meant executing a lot of them who were suspected of being disloyal to the revolution)! Now these troops fought the Japanese (Sino-Japanese war: Second Sino-Japanese War) for more than a decade and also fought each other in hellish fighting after WWII! This gave them serious combat experience. And their alignment with the communist bloc and close friendship with Russia until the Sino-Soviet split, gave them all the necessary know-how to equip their Soldiers with modern small arms from Russia. The Chinese were prudent in designing a fearless doctrine of “Human wave attacks" and heavy winter clothing for the war in Korea and they improved the same when it came to 1962 Sino-Indian War. The average Chinese Soldier was better clothed and equipped [than the Indian Army Soldier of the same time period.]

Indian Army SMLEs: Not Firing Fast Enough to Defeat CHICOMs with SKS SARs & AKM ARs!

The real handicap was this: We were still using age-old bolt action rifles (the colonially inherited Lee-Enfield .303) which had a rate of fire close to 15 rounds/min and held 10 rounds in a box magazine! [EDITOR: why not at least use 20-round SMLE PRELMs used in WW1 trench-clearing?]

German Kar98 Bolt-Action Rifle with 40-Round Trench Magazine

The Chinese had Type-56 (Chinese remake of the AK-47 AKM with expert Russian help, yes! alignment does have its benefits!) which fired close to 600 rounds/min! It was issued to squad leaders and officers. [EDITOR: fires 30-round PRELoaded Magazines aka PRELMs]

Type 56 SKS - Cartridge: 7.62×39mm M43, Action: Short stroke gas piston, tilting bolt, self-loading, Rate of fire: Semi-automatic 35–40 (rd/min), Muzzle velocity: 735 m/s [EDITOR: 10-round Stripper Clip Loaded aka SCL]

Edit 2: I have to admit that I’m incorrect regarding the comparison of our .303 Lee-Enfield with Type-56 automatic rifles. At best these were only issued to mostly squad leaders and officers. Most of the Chinese troops carried an SKS aka Type-56 semi-automatic rifle [SAR], the details of which have been updated in the answer. Thanks for pointing that out Nikolai Ezhov and the others.

These two weapons were better both in terms of ease-of-use and rate-of-fire compared to a bolt-action rifle like the Lee-Enfield. In a modern firefight that is a serious advantage.

But if you think that scares us Indians then you are dead wrong!

Do you think this Sikh gives a shit about firepower?

And yeah! I forgot to tell you, we have the Sikhs on our side and I’d ride into battle with them against any force on earth! And no this is not a prejudiced statement, just giving credit where it is due. I’d do the same with the Kumoanis (who had an entire outpost wiped out , but before dying they put the fear of India in the Chinese! Needless to say they never laid their eyes on that outpost again!), the Jats, the Musalmans, the Gorkhas and all the clans who have made my country stand fearless! Jai Hind! [EDITOR: none of this braggadocio saved the Indians in '62 when drastically overmatched by enemy weaponry, did it?]

Edit: Ok! Thanks for the overwhelming response. Like I responded to, in the comments , I’d like to apologize for having left out any of the other clans like Rajputs, Ahirs, Nagas etc. It was never my intention to downplay or forget their sacrifice.

Coming to the point: I have decided to include some more supporting evidence to my answer and the ones that were suggested by Varun Pratap Singh Raj User User-9224962230936828701 Aditya Rasal about the Nathu La and Cho La incidents that occured in 1967.

I can safely say that the Indian Army was as [EDITOR: physically] courageous and fearless [EDITOR: what about being SMART? HUMBLE enough to admit to weakness and having the MORAL COURAGE to fix these problems?] in 1962 as it was in these incidents. However, what changed was our preparedness and ability to plan. I also would like to bring to your notice the fact that, though this may have only been a skirmish, it does not fail to prove the point I’m making about our bravery. [EDITOR: rolls eyes. What about WINNING?--and not virtue signalling? Are you USMC BS artists?] But to state facts, we had a distinct advantage compared to 1962. It was this rifle:

It is our own indigenously-built Ishapore 1A1 [FN FAL] deployed with all troops in 1965 war:

Indian Army Soldier with SMLE and Bren LMGunner in background 

This was a crucial and paradigm shift from bolt-action “lone rifleman” tactics, that emphasized marksmanship with a slow firing bolt gun from fixed positions, to a modern full-auto assault rifle that enabled squad level “fire and manoeuvre tactics” that were far more effective and made the Army units much more deadly.

source: The rifle that won the war in 1965 - Times of India

And at the same time, they were more agile, giving each squad member of the 12-man squad, the opportunity to cover their forward assault and backward retreat with fully automatic fire! This was much better than a single machine gunner with a Bren LMG and 10 others with British .303 bolt guns. I hope you can feel the increased confidence and the smirk that would have been on our Soldiers faces when they saw what they could do :)

Given this context, it is no wonder that the Chinese were now faced with a foe who was at an equal footing and knew how to answer their movements. Remember, neither us or China ever deployed the Air Force or Navy during combat and neither of them started a new front apart from the disputed areas, both during 1962 and 1967. And neither of them deployed any large armoured units. This makes the dependence on small arms and their effectiveness all the more important in determining who would win, since these conflicts were essentially firefights happening at the infantry level.

You can read the first hand accounts here: The Nathu La skirmish & The Chola Incident: when Chinese were given a bloody nose

The Nathu La and Cho La Incidents

The Cho La incident (1 – 10 October 1967) was a military conflict between India and China in the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, then an Indian protectorate. The Chinese People's Liberation Army infiltrated Sikkim on 1 October 1967, but was repulsed by the Indian Army by 10 October. During the Cho La and Nathu La incidents, Indian losses were 88 killed in action and 163 wounded while Chinese casualties were 340 killed in action and 450 wounded.

The end of the battle saw the Chinese troops retreating from Sikkim after being defeated by Indian troops.

Sikkim became an Indian state in 1975, which was not recognised by China. In 2003, China recognised Sikkim as an Indian state, on condition that India accept that the Tibet Autonomous Region was a part of China, even though India had already done so back in 1953.This mutual agreement led to a thaw in Sino-Indian relations.

source : Nathu La and Cho La incidents

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It's amazing India is still a free country or even exist in spite of their at times, unjustified, cocky, arrogant attitude that dismisses enemy capabilities with smug pronouncements of their intentions which constantly produces military blunders. 

If they replaced 7.7mm/.303 cal Rimmed SMLEs with 7.62mm x 51mm NATO FN FAL SARs, but the 5.56mm INSAS rifles were supposed to replace the latter were defective, why not use the FN FALs again?

Regardless, the Indian Army has wisely DUMPED anemic 5.56mm which does NOT suppress or range-reach in mountain-desert environments in favor of 7.62mm x 39mm short in AKMs and AK-203s and 7.62mm x 51mm NATO fired through SIG 716 SELFARs and Negev 7 LMGs. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/INSAS_rifle

Since the late 1950s, the Indian armed forces had been equipped with a locally produced copy[17] of the L1A1 self-loading rifles.[12] In mid-1980s, the decision was taken to develop a 5.56 mm calibre rifle to replace other obsolete rifles. Trials on various prototypes based on the AKM were carried out by the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) in Pune. On the completion of the trial, The Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) was adopted in 1990. However, to phase out the still in use bolt-action Lee–Enfield rifles as quickly as possible, India had to acquire 100,000 7.62×39mm AKM-type rifles from Russia, Hungary, Romania and Israel in 1990–92.[18]

 In August 2005, after 43 Soldiers were killed in a clash with Maoists, a Nepalese Army spokesman called the rifle substandard and their counter-insurgency operation would have been more efficient with better weapons. The Indian embassy released a statement that rejected the claim and attributed it to improper use, it also offered training for the rifle's correct use.[22]

In December 2014, a parliamentary committee presented its report, after investigating why a high-quality assault rifle was not being produced.[25] In 2015, a public interest litigation (PIL) was filed in the Delhi High Court by a retired lieutenant colonel. He claimed that the lack of a modern rifle was causing Soldiers to lose their lives. In April 2015, the Court asked the Ministry of Defence to file its response.[26] The Ministry defended the use of the rifle, saying that casualties cannot be blamed on the weapon as it was inducted after thorough trials and had undergone three major upgrades since. They also pointed out the rifle had been not blamed by the Court of Inquires which had investigated the Naxalite operations.[27] In November 2015, the Court dismissed the petition stating that there was not enough evidence to show any defects in the INSAS. It also noted the government was in the process of acquiring new rifles.[28] [EDITOR: typical bureaucratic talking out of both sides of their mouths] 

In April 2015, the Indian government replaced some INSAS rifles of the CRPF with AK-47s.[29] In early 2017, it was announced that INSAS rifles were to be retired and replaced by rifles capable of firing 7.62×51mm NATO cartridges.[30] In March 2019, media reported that Indian military were set to replace the INSAS with Russia-designed AK-203 assault rifles, manufactured in India under a joint venture.[31]

http://worldnewsreport.in/they-fight-but-with-their-hands-tied-behind-the-back/

Another aspect of the 1962 of the war was that while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, was armed with advanced semi-automatic [SKS] and automatic [AKM] rifles the Indian Army was strutting around with British Army discards. 

The Babu’s in the defense ministry could not visualize the fact that Wars are fought with weapons and equipment not statistics of money saved buy not spending where it is needed. The Indian Army was living in a make-believe fancy dress parade, playing soldier-soldier with the obsolete, world war vintage Lee-Enfield rifle and Webley Mk IV revolvers. [EDITOR: is this the USMC you are talking about?]

The bolt-action rifles had been the standard arm since World War I and World War II. The bolt-action rifle fired a single shot with each pull of the trigger. The shooter then had to reload manually, by withdrawing the bolt and then returning it to its place, which made a fresh cartridge slide into the chamber from the magazine below the rifle’s belly. The bolt-action Lee-Enfield .303 SMLE with a 10-round magazine – had been one of the fastest military bolt-action rifle of its times.

It was a good, accurate and reliable rifle capable of firing 30 aimed shots per minute, quite a bit for any non-automatic rifle. But at a time when the British was discarding the bolt action guns in favor of semi automatic weapons after the World wars, the Indian Ministry of Defense like a typical scrap dealer, decided to make it standard issue weapon for the Indian Army..

'80s Militancy in Punjab & Counter Insurgency

The last '70s and early '80s added a new dimension in warfare. The army now had to face – the terrorists. From the militants in Punjab and Kashmir to LTTE in Sri Lanka the adversaries were using the AK-47. The army now wanted a rifle with a longer barrel — that would give the bullet higher speed and greater power of impact. No such product was given to them.

Necessity they say is the mother of invention, as a stop gap solution the Indian Armed forces and police forces started equipping themselves with the over 20,000 AK-47s captured from insurgents.  In Punjab, some resourceful police officers used their own resources to develop a bullet-proof tractor which could offer armor protection and mobility in rugged terrain.

A Punjab police officer interrogating a terrorist was in for a rude shock when a terrorist asked him to treat him properly. “Why?,” asked the officer. “Well all your new weapons, equipment and wireless sets are because of us. Had it not been for us you would have still been moving around in old British discard jeeps and bolt action guns,” he said.

Kargil 1999: Another war -a bigger jolt

Many years later the Indian defense ministry received a big jolt when mujahedeen fighters backed by the regular Pakistani Army silently intruded into Indian territory in the Kargil-Batalik sector. The Indian troops who went to fight the high-attitude war in Kargil -Dras sector were issued INSAS rifles for the first time. The INSAS repeatedly got jammed while its magazine and metal parts cracked due to the extreme cold. The rifle went into automatic firing mode when it was set for three-round burst. Apart from this, oil sprayed by the rifled caused many eye injuries to the troops.

That was 'till some Indian troops including some Gurkhas picked up the Kalashnikovs of the fallen Pakistanis because they were better and more accurate than their own guns.

Is this a way to fight a war? How do you expect the Soldier to fight- with his bare hands?

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/The-rifle-that-won-the-war-in-1965/articleshow/49327325.cms

KOLKATA: Even as the country celebrates 50 years of victory in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, few choose to remember a vital piece of equipment that helped India achieve this feat, one that came just three years after a humiliating defeat against the Chinese. This was the 7.62 mm self-loading Ishapore Rifle without which, the Indian infantryman may have had to do with bolt-action rifles of World War II which was in use during the Sino-Indian conflict.

It was after the 1962 disaster that Rifle Factory Ishapore (RFI) was tasked with designing and developing a suitable weapon for the Army. By 1965, the SLR had reached the hands of the Indian Soldiers. Not only was RFI’s efforts commended in the Parliament, then general manager K. C. Banerjee was awarded the Padmashree for his role.

The RFI website throws up some interesting facts. It states, “After Independence, due to shortage of work load from the military services, the factory had to diversify its production activities. The factory undertook design and development of civil weapons to keep the manpower engaged. Manufacture of 12 Bore DBBL & SBBL Shot Guns started in the year 1953. In the year 1956, .315 Sporting Rifle was established. This weapon still has a good demand in the civil market.”

It was no mean task to shift from a bolt-action sporting rifle to an advanced weapon as demanded by the ministry of defence. The SLR was by no means an indigenous development but it was certainly the most advanced weapon to be manufactured by any ordnance factory in India till then. It was a[n illegal] copy of the Belgian-made FN-FAL Rifle and led to a diplomatic row, but the Indian Soldier was not left out in the cold with a vintage gun.

In his book The FN-FAL Battle Rifle, Robert Cashner notes how the FN-FAL was replicated by several countries across the globe, including India. According to Cashner, the Americans, in 1958, offered the 7.62 X 51mm AR-10 and 5.56 X 45mm AR-15 rifles to India. These were successfully tested by the Army--but old ties with Britain led to the adoption of the 7.62 X 51mm NATO round and the FN-FAL in 1963.

“The Indian Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) ordered several Metric-pattern FALs from FN, as well as multiple examples of both British and Australian Inch-pattern L1A1s. These rifles were minutely dissected and tested, and the Indian Army was brought on board with the new FAL. Seeking to manufacture their own version of the FAL domestically, the Indian military was soon butting heads with FN. The Belgian firm insisted that the Indians purchase Belgian FN machinery and hire Belgian FN technicians to run the show. These requirements seemed a little insulting to the Indians, as the Ishapore Rifle Factory had been in the business of gun-making for a century….So, ARDE’s Small Arms Design Group began drawing up plans for their own weapon, incorporating what suited their military needs best by using their FALs and L1A1s as patterns. Thus the resultant L1 (the 7.62 mm SLR) was a mixture of Inch and Metric-pattern components. As a consequence, most Indian parts are not interchangeable with either Metric-pattern FALs or Commonwealth Inch-pattern SLRs,” Cashner wrote.

Though the SLRs were replaced as the primary infantry rifle in 1998 by the [EDITOR: piece of junk] INSAS, also a product of RFI, this trustworthy weapon continues to remain in service with central paramilitary units and state police forces.

****

Summary/Conclusion

Swiss Ke7 SELFAR/LMG used by the Nationalist Chinese in WW2

Bolt-action rifles in the face of superior SARs, SELFARs and ARs are dangerously overmatched and this has resulted in the loss of entire wars--Germany & Japan in WW2--and battles--the Indians in 1962. Those American triumphalists who dismiss the SKS SAR and AKM AR--whose Chinese Soldiers won the 1962 war against India with them--as somehow being obsolete out of zenophobic emotionalism are ignorant of actual modern warfare. 

The current place for the bolt-action rifle is for sniping by a DM/DMR to conserve weight to provide infantry with long-ranging, accurate HE fires--micro-Precision Directed Munitions (PDMs). .  

Difficult terrain warfare aka The Battle Against the Earth (TBATE) demands LIGHTning Forces have tracked resupply and mother tanks for the infantry so it does not run out of ammunition vital to at the very least act as a defensive shield to survive The Battle Against Man (TBAM)--which does happen and has led to many battle losses--yet another reality American triumphalists deny. 

American small arms need to be modular to shoot the best and available cartridges--even if captured from the enemy--as per the TBATE/TBAM situation and be as multi-functional in their loading--by belts, magazines and stripper clips as possible without loss of reliability.  

NOTES

http://worldnewsreport.in/they-fight-but-with-their-hands-tied-behind-the-back/

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/army-exercises-in-1960-had-predicted-chinese-attack/story-UXurm5n8OKopthc4mwl8eO.html

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/lessons-from-the-1962-sino-indian-war-in-ladakh/
https://web.archive.org/web/20010419174901/http://www.centurychina.com/plaboard/uploads/1962war.htm

As Nehru assured Parliament that the position in the western sector was "more advantageous to India," the forwarding Indians in the Ladakh were outnumbered by the Chinese by more than five to one. The strength disparity was beyond the numbers. The Chinese were concentrated where the Indians were scattered; the Chinese were able to move in trucks where the Indians trekked on foot; and the Chinese had all regular supports arms for the troops while the Indian Brigade had nothing beyond one platoon of medium machine-guns. The Chinese ranged heavy mortars and recoilless guns on the Indian posts, and infantry equipped with automatic rifles. The Indians had nothing heavier than three-inch mortars and most posts even lacked those, their troops equipped with [Lee-Enfield bolt-action] rifles last seen in action before the First World War. 

After over a month of trekking, the Indians emerged on the upper reaches of the Galwan River, and took positions, on July 5, 1962 to cut off a Chinese outpost and also hold up a small Chinese supply party. On July 8, the Chinese first made diplomatically "strongest protest" asking for immediate withdrawal of the Indian troops and warning that China would not "give up its right to self-defense when unwarrantedly attacked." India replied that India has "regularly been patrolling the Galwan valley" and has "never encountered any Chinese infiltrators" there, and lodged "an emphatic protest" against the Chinese "unwarranted aggressive activity" on the ground. India warned China to be entirely responsible for any untoward incident if China did not "stop the incessant intrusions deep inside Indian territory and ceaseless provocative activities against Indian border guards." The Chinese reacted on the ground advancing on the Indian post with a company in assault formation and quickly building up to battalion strength. In response, the External Affairs Ministry called the Chinese Ambassador and warned that the garrison would open fire if the Chinese troops pressed any closer to the Galwan post, and that India would retaliate against Chinese positions if the post were attacked. In a few days, the Chinese pulled back a little while continuing to surround the post in relatively great strength, cutting off the ground supply. Western Command requested for air supply since any land approach would provoke a clash. India decided that, since China blinked in the confrontation that now relaxed, the moral initiative must be maintained. A small force was dispatched to reinforce Galwan. It was turned back under the Chinese guns, which warned to fire if it advanced any farther. The Galwan post was supplied by air until it was wiped out on October 20.

In 1959, then Senator J.F. Kennedy said: "We want India to win that race with China …if China succeeds and India fails the economic-development balance of power will shift against us." [EDITOR is he talking about 1962 or TODAY?]

In the meantime, the new "great games" on the borders were reaching climax. At the beginning of September, in the Chip Chap valley, the Indians put into effect of the orders they had been given since the Galwan confrontation, firing into and killing several Chinese who advanced close to one of the Indian posts. By the end of August, the Indians had placed nearly forty posts in Chinese-claimed territory, most staffed between a dozen to thirty and fifty men. They were more than vulnerable, in fact helpless, as they were outnumbered and outgunned. The question was not how long they could resist, if they were attacked, but was how many Chinese they could kill before being wiped out. They were the hostages of the Indian conviction, civilian and military, that China would never attack, as Kaul reported: "I am convinced that the Chinese will not attack any of our positions even if they are relatively weaker than theirs." The Chinese protests became more threatening as August passed into September. "If the Indian side should insist on threatening by armed force the Chinese border defense forces…. and thereby rouse their resistance, it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom."

After the Longju incident in August 1959, the eastern sector had been quiet as Nehru and Chou En-lai agreed to suspend patrol along the McMahon Line on both sides. The forward policy reversed the orders and made the McMahon Line a live border again. In December 1961, Eastern Command was ordered to move forward to the closest practicable posts to the McMahon Line. To reach the Line, it took weeks of trekking, and supplying became an acute problem, often placing the remote garrisons in real danger of starvation. As the senior officers pointed out the impracticability of posting troops, unlike the western sector, their representations were brushed aside. In February 1962, General Kaul went to Assam to personally deal with the protests, and in the first half of 1962, the Army set up twenty-four posts along the McMahon Line. On the eastern sector, the Chinese did not counteract so long as the Indians kept to their own side of the McMahon Line. As the exact alignment of Longju was disputed, the Indians did not reoccupy it in 1962. However, the Indians set off the border war by establishing a new post at the disputed territory at the western extremity of the McMahon Line. The Line terminated on the boundary with Bhutan at the latitude of 27* 44'30'' N on the map signed by the British and the Tibetans in New Delhi on March 24, 1914. When the Line was transported to the coordinates to the ground, it did not lie along the highest ridge in the vicinity, which in fact lied three to four miles north of where McMahon drew the line, at Thag La ridge.

The military and civilian leadership, the latter with overriding command over the former, took unprofessional, overoptimistic and even irrational view of the military possibilities. On September 12, General Singh, of XXXIII Corps assured his superior officers of his determination to take actions, but suggested that Dhola Post should simply be withdrawn because of the limitations of his troops. The Chinese could quickly build up to divisional strength north of Tawang, and would outbid any Indian reinforcements in Thag La ridge. The Indian troops would have to rely on air supply, and also need heavy winter clothing and tents. General Sen of the Eastern Command personally went to Singh and other officers repeating the order to throw back the Chinese over Thag La ridge. On September 14, 9 Punjab battalion marched out for Dhola Post, with about four hundred rifles, half of the full complement of eight hundred. The second battalion of the brigade was ordered to move within forty-eight hours to Dhola Post, which was also at half strength.

By September 14, Army Head Quarter (H.Q.) learned the actual number of Chinese below Thag La ridge was only fifty or sixty, the true information that would unlikely have brought forth so drastic of reaction. But Army H.Q. did not call off the eviction move, but ordered the Punjabis to capture Thag La by September 19, but the order did not reached the Punjabis until September 19 itself. The Punjabis reached the Namka Chu early on September 15, still two full days of march away from Dhola Post, moving on hard scale rations and pouch ammunitions aside from heavy weapons and mortar ammunition. The Punjabis encountered the Chinese in company strength on both sides of the river that was forced by the monsoon rains. The Chinese reportedly "shouted in Hindi that the Indians should withdraw from the Namka Chu area as it was Chinese territory. They said that the Indian and Chinese peoples had an unbreakable friendship and this friendship should not be marred by petty border incidents. … They asked (the Indians) to send (their) local civil officers to discuss the exact location of the border." In response, the Indian political officer was ordered not to have discussions with the Chinese. The commanding officer of the Punjabis spread the battalion out along the Namka Chu in order to relieve Dhola Post, reopen the supply route and prevent Chinese incursion. Since September 13, Brigadier Dalvi, who was a forty-two-year-old graduate of the Indian Military Academy, had been ordered to move from Tawang to the Namka Chu. As the Indians laboriously built up force on the Namka Chu, the Chinese on the other side of the river kept pace with them effortlessly.

General Thapar’s warning was thus rejected in the Defense Ministry and the order for the Army was confirmed to evict the Chinese. General Thapar requested the order be put in writing, which came from a junior official who consulted through telephone call to the Defense Minister Menon in New York without consulting the Cabinet Defense Committee. The order overruled General Thapar’s professional judgment that his force was incapable of handling the Chinese reaction to the eviction operation. Three years before, Thapar’s predecessor Thimayya submitted resignation after having had a clash with Menon, and was humiliated and humbled under the name of "civil supremacy." This marked a point of no return in the Indian Army, and Thapar failed to offer his resignation. Brigadier Dalvi, much lower in rank, finally submitted resignation in protest and wrote later: "Resignation is the last constitutional resort of a service chief in a democratic set up … this is the only safeguard against incompetent, unscrupulous or ambitious politicians."

After flying to visit military stations, Kaul reported on October 6 to Army H.Q. of heavy Chinese build-up below Thag La ridge, with artillery, heavy mortars, and medium machine-guns, "apart from other dangerous weapons they possess such as recoilless guns and automatic rifles." The Operation Leghorn was to be launched on October 10, and Kaul was "taking every possible step to outwit the enemy and capture our objective." After warning the possibility that the Chinese might overrun the Indian forces, Kaul proposed that Air Force should be alerted to be quickly deployed and to retrieve the situation.

Kaul reached Dhola Post on the afternoon of October 7, and spent the rest of the day studying the ground, which presented discouraging difficulties on the Indians side with deep and fast-flowing Namka Chu. The Chinese dominated the Indian positions and lines of communications, and had prepared strong bunkers and cleared timbers with infantry and equipment, taunting the Indian troops who tried to cut logs with entrenching tools and shovels. On the evening, Kaul sent another message to New Delhi, bypassing the regular channel through Army H.Q., in an immensely lengthy report, which were chatty and descriptive, more like a letter to a fond uncle at home than military signals. It took eight hours to transmit the lengthy message which described the difficulties confronting the Indian forces, including the strength of the Chinese, desperate supply position, lack of ammunition and rations, and lack of winter clothing as two of the three battalions were still in summer uniforms. "I must point out … the Chinese are bound to put in a strong counterattack … to dislodge us from the positions we capture. I have no resources with which to meet this threat and therefore recommend … all military and air resources are marshaled now for restoration of position in our favor." Kaul’s faith that the Chinese would fight back came under great strain and could no longer take the strength of the Chinese positions, the power of their weapons, and their easy reinforcements as exaggerated report by officers who did not have stomach for battle. "Despite all these difficulties," Kaul decided to proceed with Operation Leghorn and to order the more heavily armed 7 Brigade into an attack.

On October 7, Kaul received a report from Army H.Q. that was sent from the Indian Consul General in Lhasa. The report informed, without comment, that heavy mortars and artillery in divisional strength were concentrating on the Chinese side of the McMahon Line behind Thag La, and that the troops talked of an attack on Tawang. On October 8, Kaul began the opening moves in Operation Leghorn, and on October 9, he disclosed his intentions to officers that there was no option but to carryout the operation on October 10 as it was the last acceptable date to the Cabinet. He then ordered the Rajputs to move next day to Yumtso La pass at 16,000 feet on the west of Thag La, who were to take up positions behind and dominate the Chinese. This order came as unbelievable to the officers as they all knew the conditions of the Indian troops and the great strength of the Chinese positions. The Chinese were bound to respond violently to the move as they have warned repeatedly that they would not allow any Indians across the river. Kaul dismissed the demurrals of Brigadier Dalvi and General Prasad who pointed out that the Indian troops could not survive at 16,000 feet without winter clothing and could not be supplied, and that they could be slaughtered on the way without covering artillery. Instead, he ordered a patrol of some fifty Punjabis who crossed the river on October 9 and reached Tseng-jong before dusk, without being interfered or attacked by the Chinese. This put Kaul on high spirit, who had just received a signal from Thapar affirming the Government’s faith in him and those who warned of the Chinese reaction felt like "bloody fools" as Prasad put it. Kaul sent another long signal describing the manifold disadvantages of his forces and reporting that his "bold and speedy tactics" took the enemy by surprise and had in fact already occupied the crest.

The Chinese looked down from strong bunkers on Thag La ridge, in their comfortable thick padded uniforms and confidence in their numbers and weapons, at the unfortunate hungry and cold Indian troops on the river line. China had no reason whatsoever to fear an Indian attack, but had every reason to expect it. Chinese intelligence learned of October 10 Operation Leghorn, and on October 8 the Soviet informed the Foreign Ministry in Peking that India was on the point of launching a major attack. Krushchev told the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow later that it was natural for China to fight back if it were attacked. The Chinese remarked that the Russian helicopters and transport aircraft that helped India to prepare the offensive did not help the Sino-Russian goodwill among the Chinese frontier guards.

Brigadier Dalvi and General Prasad were reinforced on the Namka Chu with another battalion between October 12 and 14, who were as unacclimatized and exhausted and with poor equipment as the others battalions. The Indians had about 3,000 men, about 2,500 of them troops. As the first snow fell on October 17, winter clothing and tents were only available to two or three hundred, and the rest still wore cotton summer uniforms and made shelters with branches or parachute material. The gunners who were brought over to march on a 16,000-foot route suffered fatal casualties due to lack of acclimatization and cold. Since October 9, the troops had been on hard rations, of which reserve now was down to two days, with no sugar, salt or matches. Many airdrops were lost or smashed as the parachutes failed to open. To conserve foreign exchange, the Army had for years been returning used parachutes for repair and repacking in India. Only thirty percent of the loads dropped were being retrieved.

On October 18, the Chinese activity intensified on the southern face of Thag La ridge. On October 19, a force of two thousand moved at Tseng-jong, who prepared for a night advance with no effort to conceal their intentions. Dalvi suggested that the brigade was not able to hold off a Chinese assault and requested to pull in the Tsangle force for support. General Prasad passed on the categorical order from Kaul that Tsangle must be held at all costs. Dalvi told Prasad that "rather than stand by and see the troops massacred," he would put in his resignation, saying, "it was time someone took a firm stand." Dalvi’s words were noted and he was promised that Kaul would be contacted in New Delhi. On the night of October 19-20, the Chinese troops deployed for assault. They lit fires to keep warm while waiting and were confident that the Indians would not open fire. At 05.00 on October 20, on the signal of two Very lights, Chinese heavy mortars and artillery opened heavy barrage on the central Indian position of Thag La ridge. Dalvi recalled: "As the first salvoes crashed overhead there were a few minutes of petrifying shock," in impressive contrast to "the tranquillity that had obtained hitherto." The weight of the Chinese attack was thrown in the center of the river line against the Gorkhas and the Rajputs, whose positions were overrun one after another and met the final Chinese assault with the bayonet. By 09.00, the Gorkhas and Rajputs were finished, and the Chinese then brought Tsangdhar under attack, who fought on until the crews were wiped out. The Chinese plan of breaking through in the center and seizing Tsangdhar and Hathung La worked out perfectly. 7 Brigade ceased to exist. On October 22, Brigadier Dalvi was taken prisoner. General Prasad trekked back to Tawang reaching there on the evening of October 22. The Chinese ignored Tsangle, which was given high political and strategic importance by the Indians, as it probably showed in Bhutan on the Chinese maps as it did on the Indian maps. The Chinese attacked simultaneously in the western sector, in the Chip Chap River valley, on the Galwan, and in the Pangong Lake area. After reporting that the Chinese began to shell, the Galwan post was not heard again. The posts fought their best, but were soon overwhelmed and the little garrisons were either killed or captured. Western Command withdrew some of the smallest and most isolated posts. The fate of the forward policy and Operation Leghorn ended just as real Soldiers foresaw from the beginning.

A shaken Menon told the reporter when asked where the advancing Chinese could be stopped: "The way they are going there is not any limit to where they will go." All the past assurances of the Indian advantages were reversed to become the excuses for defeat. In the evening, Menon explained that India "had not conditioned her reserves for war purposes." 

The decision was crucial and disastrous. Se La was 14,600 feet high, flanked by peaks a thousand feet higher. The 5,000-foot climb from Tawang valley was very steep and was a strong defensive position, but it was a trap for the Indians. It was too far away from the plains, and the road could take only one-ton vehicles on a grueling trip of several days from the foothills to Se La. It was also too high for the defense force who lacked acclimatization. Air supply was possible but the terrain and weather made it wholly unreliable. Se La was also too close to Tawang and the Chinese could mount assault with minimum regrouping and without having to move their bases forward. The decision to hold Se La committed the Indians to holding a very deep area from Se La to Bomdi La separated by a difficult and unreliable road through broken country. The Government ruled out the tactical air support with bombers or ground-attack aircraft for fear of Chinese retaliation against Indian cities, especially Calcutta. During the Second World War, some random Japanese bombs fell there and swept the city with so huge panic that the Government resolved not to risk a repetition. Considering the terrain in NEFA and the limitations of the Indian Air Force, it was doubtful that it could have played an effective tactical role. Tawang was evacuated on October 23, with hundreds of civilians, including lamas from monastery, going with the troops. On October 25, the Chinese occupied Tawang without opposition. On the night of October 24, one battalion, 4 Garhwal, panicked and broke to trickle back. They were intercepted and braced back in the line. Later this battalion cleared its record by beating off repeated Chinese attacks from its positions flanking Se La.

The Chinese followed up the retreating Kumaonis and penetrated the main Indian defense positions. Having fired off all the shells in support of the Kumaonis, the Indian artillery could not engage the main Chinese assault when it came at first light on the 16th. The Indians fought grimly. After ceasefire, the returning Indians found in some posts every man dead. Kaul ordered withdrawal, but some troops did not receive it and fought on until their ammunition ran out or they were killed.

On November 18, the Chinese artillery bombardment began on the Indian outposts, airfield and brigade positions. Heavy mortars, recoilless guns and rockets softened the shallow Indian entrenchment. Of one company of another Kumaonis battalion, three wounded reached Battalion H.Q. in the valley, five were taken prisoner, and the rest of the company were found, three months later, frozen as they died with weapons in their hand. Only the Chinese bodies were removed, and evidence showed that there had been many. Five hours after, the Chinese launched assault on the hill positions, but stopped at their claim line and no attack was made on Chushul.

On the midday of November 17, the Chinese attacked the Guards who fought for three hours until they ran out of ammunition, and withdrew to Bomdi La. After disintegrating the Guards, the Chinese had cut the road between Bomdi La and Dirang Dzong. The Chinese also attacked a battalion deployed several miles north of Se La. By early afternoon, Pathania asked IV Corps at Tezpur for permission to pull his headquarters out of Dirang Dzong. Pathania realized that the Chinese had cut the road meant that Se La would be wholly dependent upon air supply, and that the garrisons would be wiped out as they ran out of supplies. On the evening of the 17th, Pathania telephone IV Corps again and asked for permission to pull the troops off Se La. Kaul still had not returned from helicoptering around the rear of the lost battle in Walong, but Generals Thapar and Sen, who were superiors to Kaul, declined to give Pathania any orders. 

In the NEFA front, the ceasefire that came into effect at midnight on November 21 was a formality. Although organized fighting had effectively ended nearly forty-eight hours before, skirmishes continued in NEFA for a week after the ceasefire. The ceasefire was more definitive in the western sector than in the eastern sector. Survivors continued to emerge from the foothills for several weeks. The trek was so arduous that many Indian troops died from exposure or starvation on the way back. In 1965, the Defense Ministry released the figures of Indian losses: 1,383 killed, 1,696 missing, and 3,968 captured. Twenty-six of the Indians died of wounds in captivity, and the remainders were repatriated. About ninety percent of the Indian casualties were suffered in NEFA. The Indian Army later estimated that the Chinese had used three divisions in the NEFA fighting; one normal and one light division for the main thrust through Tawang, Se la and Bomdi La to the foothills, and another division for the Walong action. The Indian forces in NEFA numbered about twenty-five infantry battalions, equivalent to just under three normal infantry divisions. So the Chinese probably had only a narrow numerical superiority. But the Indian forces were so scattered that Mao’s teaching could be easily put into effect: "In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force … encircle the enemy forces completely and strive to wipe them out thoroughly." Not one Chinese prisoner was taken by the Indians.

The withdrawal was slow as the Chinese had a lot of tidying up to do, and went about the task with meticulous and even fussy care. They made it a matter of principle or pride to hand back the equipment left by the retreating Indians in as good condition as possible. It was collected, sacked, piled or parked; cleaned, polished, and carefully inventoried – small arms, mortars, artillery, trucks, shells and ammunition, clothing, and all the other impedimenta of a defeated army. Among the return equipment were a few American automatic rifles as the first installment of American military assistance captured at Se La, and a Russian helicopter in serviceable condition. China did not publicize this extraordinary transaction, and said it was simply a gesture "to further demonstrate … sincerity for a peaceful settlement." But although Indians cooperated by formally receiving the returned equipment, they bitterly resented what they perceived as added humiliation and denounced the Chinese gesture as a propaganda maneuver.[EDITOR: don't let you assses get kicked and this won't happen again, Sanji!]

Great Mountain War Combo: 75mm Recoilless Rifle & Pack Mule