RetroWarTHINK 001: WoodGavins: Genius Hussite Armored Personnel Carriers! Mounted Maneuver Warfare in the 1400s!
WoodGavins: Genius Hussite Armored Personnel Carriers! Mounted Maneuver Warfare in the 1400s!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Hus
Hus spoke out against indulgences, but he could not carry with him the men of the university. In 1412, a dispute took place, on which occasion Hus delivered his address Quaestio magistri Johannis Hus de indulgentiis. It was taken literally from the last chapter of Wycliffe's book, De ecclesia, and his treatise, De absolutione a pena et culpa. Hus asserted that no Pope or bishop had the right to take up the sword in the name of the Church; he should pray for his enemies and bless those that curse him; man obtains forgiveness of sins by true repentance, not money.
On October 18, 1412, he appealed to Jesus Christ as the supreme judge. By appealing directly to the highest Christian authority, Christ himself, he bypassed the laws and structures of the medieval Church. For the Bohemian Reformation, this step was as significant as the 95 theses posted in Wittenberg by Martin Luther in 1517.
****
This is the stuff of genius!
Hussite Wagon Forts - A Challenge To Heavy Cavalry In The Late Middle Ages | Late Medieval Warfare
SandRhoman History
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGUEqszHRwI
Genius Hussite General & military innovator Zizka not only correctly understood the Biblical Christian faith--he got his time's modern warfare right! 1st, value and win The Battle Against the Earth (TBATE) and use adverse terrain against enemy horse-borne, armored knights and walking armored heavy infantry. 2nd, in The Battle Against Man (TBAM) battle should never be forced upon them by the enemy--REFUSE BATTLE--only fight when you deem it necessary and stacked in your favor. Wow!
Replace wooden with aluminum alloy armor and horses/wheels for self-propelled tracks and you have the modern troop-carrying light tank aka a M113 Gavin!
ZizkaGavins: Looks like Light Armored Cavalry--ACAVs in Vietnam!
Leonardo DaVinci must have known of them when he envisioned his triangular saucer-like tank.
185 x War Wagons = Regiment of 3700 Men (-) Light/Heavy Cavalry, Infantry, Engineers/Sappers
35 x cannons
Each War Wagon with a:
20-Man Wagon-Infantry Team
How would Zizka's Firearm Wagon Combined-Arms Team (Cavalry) good to 100 meters fare against Mongol 300 meter range, muscle-powered bow/arrow horsemnen? Would Zizka's crossbow men when within range, pick-off the unarmored horse-archers? Wouldn't the wooden wagon armor negate massed arrows?
* 2 x horsemen = drivers--good idea we should have Driver A and Driver B
* Rear loading ramp for fast mounting/dismounting = hydraulic ramps/doors today
* Underbelly armor = anti-mine applique' armor
* 2 x Hand-Cannon, Musket-firing sharpshooters from war wagon tops and embrasures = Snipers
* 6 x Cross-bowmen accurate fire to 100 meters = assault riflemen
* Light Cannon from war wagons shooting area-effect to 100 meters, shotgun-like APERS rounds = Fire Support Tank Turrets, Recoilless Rifles
* Embrasures = firing ports
* 8 x flailmen/pikeman = rifle-bayonets
* 2 x hand shieldmen = gunshields but good idea for today on every hand weapon
_____________
TOTAL: 20
* Engineers/Sappers lead the way for the wagon main body to prepare ground ahead clearing obstacles = engineers should be habitually attached to light mech infantry/cavalry scouts
* Light & heavy cavalry lead the entire force to ascertain situation, report back by flags = scouts with radios
* Combined-arms team of mounted wagon infantry working with dismounted walking infantry and horse cavalry
* Mobile cannons could be rapidly massed at the point of enemy attack to wipe them out.
This powerful force structure was overcome when musket and rifled bullets overmatched wooden armor. The failure of not immediately upgrading this form of warfare is exactly what naval warfare did with ironclads--aka improve with metal armoring. It would not be until WW1 with Swinton/Churchill that Zizka's war wagons would return as self-propelled armored tracks aka tanks.
Lessons for Today?
Obviously, the U.S. Army's absurd road/trail-bound ATGM/RPG/landmine kill, motorized light infantry in crapola Humvee/Stryker/JLTV trucks should light mechanize up-grade into M113A4 Super Gavin light tracked, tanks for airborne, air assault, armored, amphibious, cross-country maneuver war-winning capabilities.
combatreform.org/itmaneuversabattalion.htm
Brace yourself!
An eFFTMB or hand-towed eATACS could carry an armored troop fighting position like the Fighting Position Overhead Cover (FPOC) but this FPOC2 wouldn't offer no protection without sandbags but would have basic small-arms bullet and shrapnel ballistic protection that would stand-alone as a hardened 2-man tent or time permitting, be placed over the top of a vertical 2-man fighting position dug into the ground.
TRANSCRIPT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGUEqszHRwI
Published on Mar 8, 2020
The Hussite wagon fort, also known as Wagenburg answered a problem in late medieval warfare that puzzled military leaders of the time: how could infantry deal with armies of heavily armored knights on horseback? Initially the Hussite armies consisted mainly of ill-trained farmers and city dwellers, often only armed with the daily tools of your average farmer such as threshing flails, pitchforks but also polearms. But they made a virtue out of necessity and combined their farmers wagons, which they soon turned into war wagons, with early hand-held firearms and small artillery and managed to defend successfully against well-trained and well-equipped knights.
Throughout the medieval and early-modern periods a number of strategies and infantry formations were explored to fight heavily armored knights effectively. One strategy was to choose the terrain of the battles with great care, to use field fortifications and bottlenecks such as the Scottish at the Battle of Loudoun Hill in 1307, the Flemish at the Battle of Kortrijk in 1302 or the English at Crécy in 1346. Another strategy was to deploy deep pike squares as did the Swiss at Nancy in 1477, the German Landsknechte at Bicocca in 1522 and the Spanish Tercio at Rocroi in 1643.
However, in the early fourteen-hundreds, the Hussite wagon fort was a particularly spectacular way of coping with knights. Contemporary historiography tells the story of the Hussite’s military innovation as follows.
#history #hussites #wagenburg
Sources:
Durdik, Jan, Hussitisches Heerwesen, Berlin (Ost) 1961.
Schmidtchen, V., Kriegswesen im späten Mittelalter. Technik, Taktik, Theorie. VCH Acta humaniora, (habilitation dissertationan at the University of Bochum1984), Weinheim 1990.
Schmidtchen, V., Karrenbüchse und Wagenburg. Hussitische Innovationen zur Technik und Taktik im Kriegswesen des späten Mittelalters. In: Volker Schmidtchen, Eckhard Jäger (Editors.): Wirtschaft, Technik und Geschichte. Beiträge zur Erforschung der Kulturbeziehungen in Deutschland und Osteuropa. Festschrift für Albrecht Timm zum 65. Geburtstag. Camen, Berlin 1980 (erschienen 1981), p. 83–108.
Delbrück, H., Das Mittelalter. Von Karl dem Großen bis zum späten Mittelalter (Geschichte der Kriegskunst, Band 1)., 1907. (NOTE: Delbrück is an important author for military history--but often outdated due to the age of his books, so read this with care!)
****
The Hussite wagon fort answered a problem in late medieval warfare that puzzled military leaders of the time: how could infantry deal with armies of heavily-armored knights on horseback?
Initially, the Hussite armies consisted mainly of ill-trained farmers and city dwellers often only armed with the daily tools of your average farmer such as pitchforks thrashing flails but also pole arms but they made a virtue out of necessity and combined their farmers wagons with early hand-held firearms and small artillery and managed to defend successfully against well-trained and well-equipped knights throughout the medieval and early modern periods a number of strategies and infantry formations were explored to fight heavily-armored Knights effectively one strategy was to juice the terrain of battles with great care to use field fortifications and bottlenecks such as the Scottish at the Battle of Loudoun Hill in 1307 the Flemish at the Battle of Court wreak in 1302 or the English at Crécy in 1346 another strategy was to deploy deep Pike squares as the Swiss did at non-si in 1477 the German lands connected at
bacówka in 1522 and Spanish data Theo at hawk wa in 1643. However, in the early 1400s the Hussite wagon fort was a particularly spectacular way of coping with Knights. Contemporary historiography tells the story of the Hussites' military innovation as follows: the rat inferred was found by an important military leader of the Hussites the military genius Zizika (Jung shisha sheesha) covers the son of a Bohemian aristocrat, he pursued a military career and fought for example at the famous Battle of Tannenberg in 1410. He eventually became a well-known tactician and expert on exploiting Geographic conditions and terrain in the aftermath of the first defenestration of Prague in 1419, he quickly took a key position in the early Hussites due to his military experience. Later, he became the military leader of the Hussites, Hussite is a blanket term referring to various religious reformatory and revolutionary movements in 15th Century Bohemia; these movements shared a conviction in the teachings of the theologian [Jan] Hus--hence the name Hussites. The conflict between the reformatory movements and the church establishment escalated in 1420. In early March, Pope Martin V issued the first of five Crusades against the Hussites because they refused to abandon their "heretical" teachings. Zizka now hard-pressed to come up with a way to counter the heavily-armed and well-trained Knights while his own army consisted of many farmers and city dwellers--but only a few war-experienced men. At the Battle of pseudo mare he faced the enemy Knights for the first time the 400 Hussites awaited them between several lakes and the swamp their frontline and left flank were covered by a mere twelve wagons but they still managed to repel the first enemy charge subsequently the Imperials tried to outflank the whose sights but moved into a swamp which forced them to dismount from their horses this meant they gave away much of their advantage, Zizka commanded his men turned around and charged them flail swinging in vase marshy terrain the whose sides were in equal footings with the dismounted Knights and defeated them in melee' The Hussites suffered many casualties as well but in the end, managed to retreat successfully.
According to Folker Schmidt Ian V expert on Hussite wagon forts, Zizka looked at the qualities of his men and soon realized he really only had 2 things going for him: his men's trust in the ability of their leaders and exceptionally high fighting morale--much of which was due to their strong religious cohesion. Regarding those givens, he discarded to train his man in the Knightly way of warfare and looked for a strategy and for weaponry his men were already familiar with and which did not require much further training. He founded on one hand in the daily tools of farmers such as pick-axes axes and threshing flails reinforced with iron bands and nails--in the words of historian Rudolf Urbanek "the habitual instruments in daily used by the peasants and artisans were made to serve new purposes and additionally the defensive duties on the city walls had familiarized many urban dwellers with crossbows and the new technology of early hand-held firearms and artillery while the farmers had their experience in handling wagons and horses". Zizka's strategy was based on the specially though meager abilities of his fighting force and followed two fundamental principles firstly that action should never be imposed by the enemy and secondly, that defensive warfare was superior to offensive warfare: the result was a surprisingly successful combination of early firearms and simple wagons. Of course, wagons had been used in warfare since antiquity mainly as a means of transport to secure the retinue or to create semi-permanent camps, Zizka in contrast saw them as the centerpiece of his new strategy he counted on mobility and sturdiness the marching order of his army was set up so that the entire convoy could be turned very quickly into a wagon fort by doing so a strong defensive position could be installed regardless of the terrain this made it possible to bring defensive warfare to the open battlefield this meant then now a defensive strategy could be used offensively. Zizka and his men were already familiar with defending all kinds of defensive positions--a skill which could now be transferred to open field battles; this rendered the ill-trained and under-equipped Hussites well capable to cope with the heavily-armored and well-trained Knights about the offensive views of the Hussite wagons vanHoose piccolo meanie who later became Pope Pius II even wrote the wagons were sometimes used to encircle and cut off parts of enemy armies--but most historians regard this as highly controversial if not simply as a myth in the early days of the conflict the Hussites used simple farmer's wagons--but after first combat experiences, they optimized their vehicles for actual war. Zizka coordinates Peche alized war wagons to be built after 1322 those wooden tanks were bigger and more stable than the carts intended for transport the crew could enter the wagon through collapsible ramps. Additional planks reinforced the outer walls and the log on the top also allowed a second protective side panel to be attached to further fortified a wagon this additional plating consisted either of two massive horizontal wooden planks or of planks with triangular embrasures this outer wall which had a simple protective function was placed in a slight angle resembling a capital "A" in order to break up the trajectory of an incoming missile or cannonball. Schmidt noted that each wagon carried along one of those additional walls and it was always attached to the side which faced potential danger. To prevent being shot at from underneath, the wagon another plank was placed between the bottom and to ground.
The crew of a war wagon usually consisted of about 20 men; two of whom took care of the horses, 6 were crossbowmen, 2 were equipped with hand cannons, 8 carried flails, Morningstar spikes or halbert's and 2 men carried big square shields called Pahlavi Z's to cover gaps and Sally ports. When on the move with the Hussite wagons formed up to 4 columns and kept the outer rows longer than the ones in the center to be able to form a wagon fort quickly--but marching in 4 columns was often impossible anyways because of the terrain--yet experience showed that even when marching in 2 columns, the transformation could be done very quickly. At the tip of the convoy, a group of Engineers and Sappers cleared obstacles out of the way flags were used to pass orders along the convoy quickly. A department of light Cavalry was responsible for scouting ahead and two additional slightly bigger cavalry formations from the van and a rearguard their main purpose was to delay enemy attacks so that the convoy had enough time to set up the wagon fort before. It was either round or square depending on the circumstances of the terrain after the wagons were put in position the horses were brought to a place in the center of the formation and the wagons were bound together with chains the pavese bearers closed potential gaps in the formation and the Sally ports while the artillery and the hand-cannons awaited the attack. Most of the foot-Soldiers left the wagons and joined the rest of the infantry who often fought independently of the wagons crews note however; that the Hussites relied on clear and strict hierarchies: each wagon from the tactical unit and had its own commander this enabled them to react quickly and execute orders of the general immediately and efficiently once the wagon formation was completed and everyone in position the second pillar of fishka strategy came to action the small and mid-sized guns within the wagons these were loaded with heavy stone balls or scatter shots consisting of nails small rocks or lead bullets. Falcor Schmidt Ian stresses the efficiency of such rounds: at an average fighting distance of about 100 meters such scatter shots had a devastating effect on both cavalry and foot-Soldiers alike and stood in contrast to the static artillery positions to whose side city dwellers knew from their fortified home cities. The guns on wagons had an additional benefit they could be moved between and within the wagons very quickly in some whose side armies the guns on carts made up 1/5 of all the wagons this means that a wagon train of 185 fighting wagons had 35 cannons at its disposal whenever possible they were concentrated on the front from which an attack was to be expected in most cases one artillery volley was enough to take most of the momentum away from attacking troops. After the enemy's onslaught had been interrupted by the artillery, the Ravi's is covering the Sallyport stepped aside and the infantry launched a counter-attack--in many cases the foot-Soldiers attacked the enemy through the closest sally port while the cavalry left through a gap in the back of the formation; they would ride around and get in the back of the enemy to charge them and then to run them down relentlessly. The Hussite wagon fort left a great impression on the army leaders and tacticians of the time and there were various attempts to integrate it into other armies until the 17th century wagon forts were mentioned again and again as an integral part of armies however no one implemented them as efficiently as the Hussites.
The development of more and more powerful firearms made the defense with wooden wagons obsolete; they could no longer withstand enemy fire so that they eventually disappeared from the battlefields of Europe
Hus spoke out against indulgences, but he could not carry with him the men of the university. In 1412, a dispute took place, on which occasion Hus delivered his address Quaestio magistri Johannis Hus de indulgentiis. It was taken literally from the last chapter of Wycliffe's book, De ecclesia, and his treatise, De absolutione a pena et culpa. Hus asserted that no Pope or bishop had the right to take up the sword in the name of the Church; he should pray for his enemies and bless those that curse him; man obtains forgiveness of sins by true repentance, not money.
On October 18, 1412, he appealed to Jesus Christ as the supreme judge. By appealing directly to the highest Christian authority, Christ himself, he bypassed the laws and structures of the medieval Church. For the Bohemian Reformation, this step was as significant as the 95 theses posted in Wittenberg by Martin Luther in 1517.
****
This is the stuff of genius!
Hussite Wagon Forts - A Challenge To Heavy Cavalry In The Late Middle Ages | Late Medieval Warfare
SandRhoman History
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGUEqszHRwI
Genius Hussite General & military innovator Zizka not only correctly understood the Biblical Christian faith--he got his time's modern warfare right! 1st, value and win The Battle Against the Earth (TBATE) and use adverse terrain against enemy horse-borne, armored knights and walking armored heavy infantry. 2nd, in The Battle Against Man (TBAM) battle should never be forced upon them by the enemy--REFUSE BATTLE--only fight when you deem it necessary and stacked in your favor. Wow!
Replace wooden with aluminum alloy armor and horses/wheels for self-propelled tracks and you have the modern troop-carrying light tank aka a M113 Gavin!
ZizkaGavins: Looks like Light Armored Cavalry--ACAVs in Vietnam!
Leonardo DaVinci must have known of them when he envisioned his triangular saucer-like tank.
185 x War Wagons = Regiment of 3700 Men (-) Light/Heavy Cavalry, Infantry, Engineers/Sappers
35 x cannons
Each War Wagon with a:
20-Man Wagon-Infantry Team
How would Zizka's Firearm Wagon Combined-Arms Team (Cavalry) good to 100 meters fare against Mongol 300 meter range, muscle-powered bow/arrow horsemnen? Would Zizka's crossbow men when within range, pick-off the unarmored horse-archers? Wouldn't the wooden wagon armor negate massed arrows?
* 2 x horsemen = drivers--good idea we should have Driver A and Driver B
* Rear loading ramp for fast mounting/dismounting = hydraulic ramps/doors today
* Underbelly armor = anti-mine applique' armor
* 2 x Hand-Cannon, Musket-firing sharpshooters from war wagon tops and embrasures = Snipers
* 6 x Cross-bowmen accurate fire to 100 meters = assault riflemen
* Light Cannon from war wagons shooting area-effect to 100 meters, shotgun-like APERS rounds = Fire Support Tank Turrets, Recoilless Rifles
* Embrasures = firing ports
* 8 x flailmen/pikeman = rifle-bayonets
* 2 x hand shieldmen = gunshields but good idea for today on every hand weapon
_____________
TOTAL: 20
* Engineers/Sappers lead the way for the wagon main body to prepare ground ahead clearing obstacles = engineers should be habitually attached to light mech infantry/cavalry scouts
* Light & heavy cavalry lead the entire force to ascertain situation, report back by flags = scouts with radios
* Combined-arms team of mounted wagon infantry working with dismounted walking infantry and horse cavalry
* Mobile cannons could be rapidly massed at the point of enemy attack to wipe them out.
This powerful force structure was overcome when musket and rifled bullets overmatched wooden armor. The failure of not immediately upgrading this form of warfare is exactly what naval warfare did with ironclads--aka improve with metal armoring. It would not be until WW1 with Swinton/Churchill that Zizka's war wagons would return as self-propelled armored tracks aka tanks.
Lessons for Today?
Obviously, the U.S. Army's absurd road/trail-bound ATGM/RPG/landmine kill, motorized light infantry in crapola Humvee/Stryker/JLTV trucks should light mechanize up-grade into M113A4 Super Gavin light tracked, tanks for airborne, air assault, armored, amphibious, cross-country maneuver war-winning capabilities.
combatreform.org/itmaneuversabattalion.htm
Brace yourself!
An eFFTMB or hand-towed eATACS could carry an armored troop fighting position like the Fighting Position Overhead Cover (FPOC) but this FPOC2 wouldn't offer no protection without sandbags but would have basic small-arms bullet and shrapnel ballistic protection that would stand-alone as a hardened 2-man tent or time permitting, be placed over the top of a vertical 2-man fighting position dug into the ground.
TRANSCRIPT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGUEqszHRwI
Published on Mar 8, 2020
The Hussite wagon fort, also known as Wagenburg answered a problem in late medieval warfare that puzzled military leaders of the time: how could infantry deal with armies of heavily armored knights on horseback? Initially the Hussite armies consisted mainly of ill-trained farmers and city dwellers, often only armed with the daily tools of your average farmer such as threshing flails, pitchforks but also polearms. But they made a virtue out of necessity and combined their farmers wagons, which they soon turned into war wagons, with early hand-held firearms and small artillery and managed to defend successfully against well-trained and well-equipped knights.
Throughout the medieval and early-modern periods a number of strategies and infantry formations were explored to fight heavily armored knights effectively. One strategy was to choose the terrain of the battles with great care, to use field fortifications and bottlenecks such as the Scottish at the Battle of Loudoun Hill in 1307, the Flemish at the Battle of Kortrijk in 1302 or the English at Crécy in 1346. Another strategy was to deploy deep pike squares as did the Swiss at Nancy in 1477, the German Landsknechte at Bicocca in 1522 and the Spanish Tercio at Rocroi in 1643.
However, in the early fourteen-hundreds, the Hussite wagon fort was a particularly spectacular way of coping with knights. Contemporary historiography tells the story of the Hussite’s military innovation as follows.
#history #hussites #wagenburg
Sources:
Durdik, Jan, Hussitisches Heerwesen, Berlin (Ost) 1961.
Schmidtchen, V., Kriegswesen im späten Mittelalter. Technik, Taktik, Theorie. VCH Acta humaniora, (habilitation dissertationan at the University of Bochum1984), Weinheim 1990.
Schmidtchen, V., Karrenbüchse und Wagenburg. Hussitische Innovationen zur Technik und Taktik im Kriegswesen des späten Mittelalters. In: Volker Schmidtchen, Eckhard Jäger (Editors.): Wirtschaft, Technik und Geschichte. Beiträge zur Erforschung der Kulturbeziehungen in Deutschland und Osteuropa. Festschrift für Albrecht Timm zum 65. Geburtstag. Camen, Berlin 1980 (erschienen 1981), p. 83–108.
Delbrück, H., Das Mittelalter. Von Karl dem Großen bis zum späten Mittelalter (Geschichte der Kriegskunst, Band 1)., 1907. (NOTE: Delbrück is an important author for military history--but often outdated due to the age of his books, so read this with care!)
****
The Hussite wagon fort answered a problem in late medieval warfare that puzzled military leaders of the time: how could infantry deal with armies of heavily-armored knights on horseback?
Initially, the Hussite armies consisted mainly of ill-trained farmers and city dwellers often only armed with the daily tools of your average farmer such as pitchforks thrashing flails but also pole arms but they made a virtue out of necessity and combined their farmers wagons with early hand-held firearms and small artillery and managed to defend successfully against well-trained and well-equipped knights throughout the medieval and early modern periods a number of strategies and infantry formations were explored to fight heavily-armored Knights effectively one strategy was to juice the terrain of battles with great care to use field fortifications and bottlenecks such as the Scottish at the Battle of Loudoun Hill in 1307 the Flemish at the Battle of Court wreak in 1302 or the English at Crécy in 1346 another strategy was to deploy deep Pike squares as the Swiss did at non-si in 1477 the German lands connected at
bacówka in 1522 and Spanish data Theo at hawk wa in 1643. However, in the early 1400s the Hussite wagon fort was a particularly spectacular way of coping with Knights. Contemporary historiography tells the story of the Hussites' military innovation as follows: the rat inferred was found by an important military leader of the Hussites the military genius Zizika (Jung shisha sheesha) covers the son of a Bohemian aristocrat, he pursued a military career and fought for example at the famous Battle of Tannenberg in 1410. He eventually became a well-known tactician and expert on exploiting Geographic conditions and terrain in the aftermath of the first defenestration of Prague in 1419, he quickly took a key position in the early Hussites due to his military experience. Later, he became the military leader of the Hussites, Hussite is a blanket term referring to various religious reformatory and revolutionary movements in 15th Century Bohemia; these movements shared a conviction in the teachings of the theologian [Jan] Hus--hence the name Hussites. The conflict between the reformatory movements and the church establishment escalated in 1420. In early March, Pope Martin V issued the first of five Crusades against the Hussites because they refused to abandon their "heretical" teachings. Zizka now hard-pressed to come up with a way to counter the heavily-armed and well-trained Knights while his own army consisted of many farmers and city dwellers--but only a few war-experienced men. At the Battle of pseudo mare he faced the enemy Knights for the first time the 400 Hussites awaited them between several lakes and the swamp their frontline and left flank were covered by a mere twelve wagons but they still managed to repel the first enemy charge subsequently the Imperials tried to outflank the whose sights but moved into a swamp which forced them to dismount from their horses this meant they gave away much of their advantage, Zizka commanded his men turned around and charged them flail swinging in vase marshy terrain the whose sides were in equal footings with the dismounted Knights and defeated them in melee' The Hussites suffered many casualties as well but in the end, managed to retreat successfully.
According to Folker Schmidt Ian V expert on Hussite wagon forts, Zizka looked at the qualities of his men and soon realized he really only had 2 things going for him: his men's trust in the ability of their leaders and exceptionally high fighting morale--much of which was due to their strong religious cohesion. Regarding those givens, he discarded to train his man in the Knightly way of warfare and looked for a strategy and for weaponry his men were already familiar with and which did not require much further training. He founded on one hand in the daily tools of farmers such as pick-axes axes and threshing flails reinforced with iron bands and nails--in the words of historian Rudolf Urbanek "the habitual instruments in daily used by the peasants and artisans were made to serve new purposes and additionally the defensive duties on the city walls had familiarized many urban dwellers with crossbows and the new technology of early hand-held firearms and artillery while the farmers had their experience in handling wagons and horses". Zizka's strategy was based on the specially though meager abilities of his fighting force and followed two fundamental principles firstly that action should never be imposed by the enemy and secondly, that defensive warfare was superior to offensive warfare: the result was a surprisingly successful combination of early firearms and simple wagons. Of course, wagons had been used in warfare since antiquity mainly as a means of transport to secure the retinue or to create semi-permanent camps, Zizka in contrast saw them as the centerpiece of his new strategy he counted on mobility and sturdiness the marching order of his army was set up so that the entire convoy could be turned very quickly into a wagon fort by doing so a strong defensive position could be installed regardless of the terrain this made it possible to bring defensive warfare to the open battlefield this meant then now a defensive strategy could be used offensively. Zizka and his men were already familiar with defending all kinds of defensive positions--a skill which could now be transferred to open field battles; this rendered the ill-trained and under-equipped Hussites well capable to cope with the heavily-armored and well-trained Knights about the offensive views of the Hussite wagons vanHoose piccolo meanie who later became Pope Pius II even wrote the wagons were sometimes used to encircle and cut off parts of enemy armies--but most historians regard this as highly controversial if not simply as a myth in the early days of the conflict the Hussites used simple farmer's wagons--but after first combat experiences, they optimized their vehicles for actual war. Zizka coordinates Peche alized war wagons to be built after 1322 those wooden tanks were bigger and more stable than the carts intended for transport the crew could enter the wagon through collapsible ramps. Additional planks reinforced the outer walls and the log on the top also allowed a second protective side panel to be attached to further fortified a wagon this additional plating consisted either of two massive horizontal wooden planks or of planks with triangular embrasures this outer wall which had a simple protective function was placed in a slight angle resembling a capital "A" in order to break up the trajectory of an incoming missile or cannonball. Schmidt noted that each wagon carried along one of those additional walls and it was always attached to the side which faced potential danger. To prevent being shot at from underneath, the wagon another plank was placed between the bottom and to ground.
The crew of a war wagon usually consisted of about 20 men; two of whom took care of the horses, 6 were crossbowmen, 2 were equipped with hand cannons, 8 carried flails, Morningstar spikes or halbert's and 2 men carried big square shields called Pahlavi Z's to cover gaps and Sally ports. When on the move with the Hussite wagons formed up to 4 columns and kept the outer rows longer than the ones in the center to be able to form a wagon fort quickly--but marching in 4 columns was often impossible anyways because of the terrain--yet experience showed that even when marching in 2 columns, the transformation could be done very quickly. At the tip of the convoy, a group of Engineers and Sappers cleared obstacles out of the way flags were used to pass orders along the convoy quickly. A department of light Cavalry was responsible for scouting ahead and two additional slightly bigger cavalry formations from the van and a rearguard their main purpose was to delay enemy attacks so that the convoy had enough time to set up the wagon fort before. It was either round or square depending on the circumstances of the terrain after the wagons were put in position the horses were brought to a place in the center of the formation and the wagons were bound together with chains the pavese bearers closed potential gaps in the formation and the Sally ports while the artillery and the hand-cannons awaited the attack. Most of the foot-Soldiers left the wagons and joined the rest of the infantry who often fought independently of the wagons crews note however; that the Hussites relied on clear and strict hierarchies: each wagon from the tactical unit and had its own commander this enabled them to react quickly and execute orders of the general immediately and efficiently once the wagon formation was completed and everyone in position the second pillar of fishka strategy came to action the small and mid-sized guns within the wagons these were loaded with heavy stone balls or scatter shots consisting of nails small rocks or lead bullets. Falcor Schmidt Ian stresses the efficiency of such rounds: at an average fighting distance of about 100 meters such scatter shots had a devastating effect on both cavalry and foot-Soldiers alike and stood in contrast to the static artillery positions to whose side city dwellers knew from their fortified home cities. The guns on wagons had an additional benefit they could be moved between and within the wagons very quickly in some whose side armies the guns on carts made up 1/5 of all the wagons this means that a wagon train of 185 fighting wagons had 35 cannons at its disposal whenever possible they were concentrated on the front from which an attack was to be expected in most cases one artillery volley was enough to take most of the momentum away from attacking troops. After the enemy's onslaught had been interrupted by the artillery, the Ravi's is covering the Sallyport stepped aside and the infantry launched a counter-attack--in many cases the foot-Soldiers attacked the enemy through the closest sally port while the cavalry left through a gap in the back of the formation; they would ride around and get in the back of the enemy to charge them and then to run them down relentlessly. The Hussite wagon fort left a great impression on the army leaders and tacticians of the time and there were various attempts to integrate it into other armies until the 17th century wagon forts were mentioned again and again as an integral part of armies however no one implemented them as efficiently as the Hussites.
The development of more and more powerful firearms made the defense with wooden wagons obsolete; they could no longer withstand enemy fire so that they eventually disappeared from the battlefields of Europe
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